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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
VOL. 103 DECEMBER 2003 NO. 8
ARTICLES
SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF STATE-COURT
DETERMINATIONS OF STATE LAW IN
CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
Henry Paul Monaghan*
The decision in Bush *v. Gore and particularly Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's concurring opinion were widely criticized for their unwarranted intru-
sion upon the "authoritative" status of the Florida Supreme Court in deter-
mining the meaning of Florida election law. This Article rejects the merits of
that criticism. It proposes the thesis that the Supreme Court has ancillary
jurisdiction to review state-court determinations of state law in cases where
the Constitution or ftderal law imposes a duty of fidelity to prior state law
(ti) and the claim is that the state court materially and impermissibly de-
parted from that law at a later point in time (t2). Using Bush v. Gore as a
vehicle and building upon an examination of the adequate nonfederal
ground doctrine and the implications of the Supremacy Clause, this Article
establishes that some Supreme Court reexamination of state-court determina-
tions of state law "antecedent" to the federal claim is not only indisputable,
but quite familiar. It goes on to argue for independent judgment, rather
than the more familiar 'fair support" standard, as the ultimate measure of
the Supreme Court's jurisdictional authority to reexamine state law, support-
ing this normative assertion with extensive evidence from Supreme Court
practice since the founding. The Article concludes by suggesting that the
distinction between the two standards is important to litigants and should
(but may not) be important to the Court because, contrary to critics' claims,
in appropriate cases-Bush v. Gore among them-independent judgment
can serve, rather than undermine, the values of "Our Federalism."
INTRODUCTION
Bush v. Gore' received a harsh reception from much of the legal acad-
emy.2 A January 13, 2001, full page advertisement in the New York Times
* Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia University. This
Article is dedicated to the memory of my colleague Herbert Wechsler, master scholar and
master teacher, who with his customary acuteness quite plainly saw it all. Thanks to many;
special thanks to Brad Meissner and Stuart Naifeh. By way of full disclosure, the writer
voted (as always) for his fellow Democrats, Messrs. Gore and Lieberman.
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2. "Bush v. Gore provoked from the legal academy a response that was without
precedent. Never before had a decision of the Supreme Court been subjected by large
numbers of law professors to such swift, intense, and uncompromising denunciation in the
1919
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signed by 554 "Law Professors for the Rule of Law" charged (in large
boldface) that "By Stopping the Vote Count in Florida, The U.S. Su-
preme Court Used Its Power To Act as Political Partisans, NotJudges of a
Court of Law."3 Their stirring peroration stated:
By taking power from the voters, the Supreme Court has tar-
nished its own legitimacy. As teachers whose lives have been
dedicated to the rule of law, we protest.4
Shortly thereafter, Professor Ackerman, also expressing "rule of law" dis-
tress, announced his "reluctant[ ]" conclusion that halting the Florida re-
count was "a blatantly partisan act, without any legal basis whatsoever."5
And once again exhibiting his characteristic flair for understatement,
Professor Dershowitz stated that the Court's decision "may be ranked as
the single most corrupt decision in Supreme Court history."
6
popular press . Peter Berkowitz & Benjamin Wittes, The Professors and Bush v. Gore,
Wilson Q., Autumn 2001, at 76, 78. For a more inclusive survey of academic criticism, see
Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v. Gore, 82
B.U. L. Rev. 609, 612-18 (2002).
3. Advertisement, 554 Law Professors Say, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 2001, at A7
[hereinafter 554 Law Professors Say]. "The number of subscribers eventually reached 673,
from 137 law schools." Jesse H. Choper, Why the Supreme Court Should Not Have
Decided the Presidential Election of 2000, 18 Const. Comment. 335, 351 n.62 (2001).
4. 554 Law Professors Say, supra note 3. The law professors never explained why they
were especially aggrieved by the Court's alleged misconduct. "[I]f you were going to find
an act of betrayal on the Court's part it would have to be a betrayal of the country, in no
special way a betrayal of the law professoriate." Frank I. Michelman, Tushnet's Realism,
Tushnet's Liberalism, 90 Geo. L.J. 199, 213 (2001).
5. Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, Am. Prospect, Feb. 12, 2001, at 42, 48.
Professor Ackerm'an suffered "rule of law" distress because his "entire academic career...
has been one long struggle against the slogan that law is just politics." Id. Professor
Ackerman went on to argue that the majority's conduct was designed to perpetuate its own
conservative constitutional philosophy. Accordingly, he insisted that the Senate should not
confirm any of President Bush's nominees to the Court. Id. For other examples of ad
hominem criticism, see Berkowitz & Wittes, supra note 2, at 79-80. The "self
perpetuation" criticism is echoed even by non-conspiracy critics. See, e.g., Choper, supra
note 3, at 346-47 & n.45; Paul D. Carrington & H. Jefferson Powell, The Right to Self-
Government After Bush v. Gore 2 (Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. L. & Legal Theory
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 26, Dec. 2001), available at http://
www.law.duke.edu/pub/selfgov/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
6. Alan M. Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice: How the High Court Hijacked Election
2000 174 (2001). He added: "It is the uniquely corrupt nature of the decision ... that
explains the extraordinary vituperativeness of the language employed by so many usually
cautious critics of the high court." Id. This book, which quickly made the New York Times
best-seller list, is now available in a paperback edition. The "book" strikes this reader as a
much padded article. Professor Dershowitz's fundamental claim, like that of many other
critics, is that the result would have been different if the case were Gore v. Bush. (Does that
indictment imply that the four dissenters would then have voted to halt the recount?) His
evidence, endorsed by other critics, e.g., Choper, supra note 3, at 348-52, is that the
majority acted out of character. The majority Justices generally strongly defend state
prerogatives. In this case, Dershowitz said, consistency required deference to the Florida
Supreme Court. Dershowitz, supra, at 95-120,
Professor Dershowitz's animating premise is his claim that the current Court has
shown an inexorable commitment to the vindication of state prerogatives. See in
1920
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A subsequent, and sometimes only slightly less angry, wave of criti-
cism presented Bush v. Gore as the showcase for a much larger (and to
those commentators regrettable) transformative change: the rise of 'judi-
cial supremacy" (a term of splendidly indefinite content). The decision,
wrote Professor Kramer, is "surely the capstone of the Rehnquist Court's
campaign to control all things constitutional. '7 Professor Tribe instructs
us that the decision provides "an unusually clear window into much that
is lamentable about how [the majority justices] discharge their role: with
utter disdain for democracy and its pluralistic institutions and with eyes
fixed firmly on surface appearances rather than underlying realities."8
"The Court's self-confidence in matters constitutional," he adds, "is
matched only by its disdain for ... other actors in constitutional debate."9
particular his second and fourth chapters, id. at 55-94, 121-72. This is surely contestable.
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 429, 434 (2002) (noting, as one example, that
"[w]hen federalism and substantive conservatism come into conflict, substantive
conservatism frequently dominates"). Moreover, Professor Pildes contends that the lineup
of the Justices in Bush v. Gore generally coincides with their positions in prior election law
cases. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 695, 696 (2001). See
also the splendid article by DanielJ. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002
Sup. Ct. Rev. 343. This wide-ranging article, essentially an attack on "textualism," contains
an extensive review of the Court's recent preemption cases and the literature they
spawned. His conclusion: When the Court sees no serious issue of congressional power,
the Court, especially the Bush v. Gore majority, readily finds federal preemption and in the
process ignores textualism. Id. at 362-78.
7. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115
Harv. L. Rev. 5, 153 (2001); see also Linda Greenhouse, Learning to Live with Bush v. Gore,
4 Green Bag 2d 381, 388-89 (2001). "[Bush v. Gore] reflects a chronic and growing
disrespect for the institutions of self-government." Carrington & Powell, supra note 5, at
2-3. Most of the underpinning for this understanding of Bush v. Gore stems from the
Court's decisions rejecting congressional "interpretations" of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J. 1943, 2030
(2003) (advocating policentric rather than juricentric constitutional interpretation,
thereby allowing Congress "to respond to changes in constitutional culture"); see also
Michael Dorf & Barry Freidman, Shared Constitutional Construction, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev.
61, 64-65 (arguing, as the title suggests, for a role for Congress in the interpretation of the
Constitution, but acknowledging that once the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Constitution, there exists a "constitutional common law" that the Court will not allow
Congress to overrule); Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-
Comment: Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 153, 171-73, 185-88 (1997) (discussing various views of congressional power under
section 5 and concluding that the Court should have upheld the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act in Boerne).
8. Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Comment: Erog v. Hsub and
Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 Har,. L. Rev. 172, 172 n.t
(2001). Interestingly, as noted, Professor Tribe's colleague Professor Dershowitz charged
the majority with acting out of, not in, character. See supra note 6.
9. Tribe, supra note 8, at 288. Professor Tribe played a prominent role in this
litigation, and he acknowledges that the decision made a strong personal impact. Id. at
301-02.
20031 1921
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
What at least in part unites these disparate criticisms is their intense
and time-bound focus on the decision itself, or more generally, on its
"misbehaving" sponsor, the "Rehnquist Court." Similar foci, more or less,
pervade the analyses of those who assert that the Court felt impelled to
act as it did to save the nation from grave political turmoil; " ' that the
Court wrongly concluded that a Fourteenth Amendment violation had
been established;'I that the decision not to remand was unjustifiable;' 2
and, of course, the claim that resolution of the election's legal issues was
the prerogative of Congress, not the Court.13 To the extent that some of
Bush v. Gore's critics hoped to undermine the "legitimacy" of Mr. Bush's
presidency,14 they achieved little lasting success.' 5 "[U]nlike law profes-
sors, political figures, and a few similarly minded persons, most Ameri-
cans have a short memory for such events. '1 6
Bush v. Gore also raised a less transient but a less explored issue: the
scope of the Court's appellate jurisdiction to review state-court determi-
10. E.g., Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock 162-63 (2001); Michelman, supra
note 4, at 202-03. Others share the view that the Court sought to act in a "statesman-like
manner." See Choper, supra note 3, at 353-55 (collecting additional sources).
11. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000); see also infra notes 38-39 and
accompanying text.
12. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 123-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 129 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); id. at 135-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 144-46 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
13. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued this point. Id. at 152-58
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Many commentators agreed. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 3, at
342-45. My colleague Samuel Issacharoff observes, "[1It was, after all, a partisan election
that was at stake. It hardly seems an affront to democratic self-governance to channel the
ultimate resolution of a true electoral deadlock into other democratically-elected branches
of government." Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, in The Vote: Bush, Gore and
the Supreme Court 55, 73 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001). Echoing
justice Breyer, Professor Issacharoff noted that "Congress, being a political body, expresses
the people's will far more accurately then does an unelected court. And the people's will is
what elections are all about." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting)); see also Weinberg, supra note 2, at 664
("The Court should not intervene in an election in such a way as to take it away from the
electorate, or while the statutory process has yet to run its course."). But see Vasan
Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1653, 1659-61
(2002). Professor Kesavan's article is a lengthy textual and historical analysis arguing that
3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000), which sets forth the rules for counting and not counting electoral
votes, has no constitutional basis. Article II, Section 1, Clause 3, he argues, confers a purely
ministerial counting power on Congress. Id.
14. See the collection of essays in Bush v. Gore: The Question of Legitimacy (Bruce
Ackerman ed., 2002). Almost all of the essayists (for example, Ackerman, Balkin, Guido
Calabresi, Post, Rubenfeld, and Tribe) challenge the legitimacy of the Court's decision.
Cf. Robert Pushaw, Politics, Ideology, and the Academic Assault on Bush v. Gore, 2 Election
L.J. 97, 98-101 (2003) (book review). Professor Pushaw is sharply critical of the essays. Id.
15. See Choper, supra note 3, at 352-57.
16. Id. at 356. On the other hand, polls indicate that many of those polled in 2003
still believed that Mr. Bush was not legitimately elected. Adam Nagourney, Guns, Butter
and Hope; Listen Up, Democrats: Why 2004 Isn't 1992, N.Y. Times, May 4, 2003, at 3
(Week in Review).
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nations of state law in cases involving constitutional claims. 1 7 From be-
ginning to end, a widespread perception existed that the Court, and par-
ticularly Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence, had intruded far too
deeply upon the "authoritative" status of the Florida Supreme Court in
determining the meaning of the Florida election law. "Here the U.S. Su-
preme Court appeared to be second-guessing the Florida court on a ques-
tion of state law, a federal intrusion upon state autonomy more drastic
than any of the congressional intrusions nullified by the Court in [its re-
cent] decisions .... ."18 This Article examines-and rejects-the merits of
that complaint. 19
17. The jurisdictional question has received far less attention than the majority's
determination on the merits.
Most scholars have minimized the Bush v. Gore concurrence's jurisdictional
puzzle-that is, what might have given the Court power to reverse the Florida
court's state-law judgment despite its own limited jurisdiction to review only
federal questions?-and have treated the case as raising primarily merits concerns.
These scholars solve jurisdiction by characterizing the concurrence as raising the
federal question of whether the state court's reading of state law violated Article
II or a federal statute.
Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-Court State-Law
Judgments, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 80, 85-86 n.22 (2002).
18. Frank Goodman, Preface to Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci., March 2001, at 9, 14
(referring to the Court's "safe harbor" ruling). Professor Goodman's remarks were made
in reference to the Court's December 12 "safe harbor" ruling, discussed infra Part I. See
also Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Jtsticiable, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1093,
1111 (2001) (arguing that the Court should have declined to take the case, but that, in any
event, "[t] he Supreme Court impermissibly usurped the Florida Supreme Court's authority
to decide Florida law in this extraordinary case"); Steven G. Gey, The Odd Consequences
of Taking Bush v. Gore Seriously, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1005, 1023 (2001) (stating that "the
Bush v. Gore concurring justices' attempt to become the definitive arbiters of Florida
election law is weak and poorly supported"); Harold J. Krent, Judging Judging: The
Problem of Second-Guessing State Judges' Interpretation of State Law in Bush v. Gore, 29
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 493, 496 (2001) ("The [concurring] Justices' willingness in Bush v. Gore
to hold that the state court interpretation of state law changed Florida's law flies in the face
of the Court's reticence to examine state court decisions closely, even in the contexts in
which federal rights undeniably are at stake."); David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were
They Thinking?, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 737, 753 (2001) (noting that, while the Florida
Supreme Court's interpretation of the contest statute was not necessarily correct, "the fact
that [it] was consistent with the plain language of the ... statute should be enough to show
that that court was not acting in a fundamentally illegitimate way that warranted the
United States Supreme Court's determined effort to derail it"); Cass R. Sunstein, Order
Without Law, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 757, 763 n.30 (2001) ("To be sure, a decision by a state
court to disregard state law would raise serious questions under Article II. . . But the
[Florida Supreme Court] majority's view was not so implausible as to amount to a change,
rather than an interpretation."). This point was, of course, the principal theme of the
dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 135-43 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
19. Inquiry into this topic has begun, but on a still rather limited scale. See, e.g.,
Krent, supra note 18, at 511-33 (probing and exploring the significance of the materials
relied upon by the ChiefJustice); Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State
Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 Ind. L. Rev. 335, 336 (2002) (indicating that Bush v.
Gore's "aggressive review" may foreshadow a new role for the Supreme Court in
2003] 1923
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The complaint was, however, understandable. Prior to Bush v. Gore,
three fundamental and interrelated principles had informed the settled
understanding of the Court's appellate authority over the judgments of
the state courts. First, the "system of appellate jurisprudence [initially
established by the twenty-fifth section of the act of 1789] .... has been
based upon the fundamental principle that [the Supreme Court's] juris-
diction was limited to the correction of errors relating solely to Federal
law."90 Second, a state court judgment resting upon an "adequate and
independent" nonfederal ground precludes Supreme Court 'jurisdic-
tion" to review even the erroneously determined federal issues in the case:
"[O]ur power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions."2 1
Third, and of most significance here, the Court is generally "bound to
accept the interpretation of [the State's] law by the highest court of the
State."22
The scope of this last proposition, which played a powerful role in
the Bush v. Gore dissents, especially that of Justice Ginsburg,23 is this Arti-
cle's subject. Bush v. Gore in fact muddied a deeply embedded under-
standing that state-court determinations of state law in federal cases are
open to some reexamination by the Supreme Court: certainly so when, in
Herbert Wechsler's language, the "existence, application or implementa-
tion of a federal right turns on the resolution of a logically antecedent
issue of state law. Because of that relationship the state court does not
speak the final word on the state question .... 24 Over the course of
time, however, the scope of that review has increasingly been assumed to
interpreting state court cases); Michael Wells, Were There Adequate State Grounds in Bush
v. Gore?, 18 Const. Comment. 403, 405 (2001) (arguing that Article 11 served as a federal
constraint on the authoritativeness of the Florida court's state law determinations and that,
consequently, the Supreme Court owed no deference to the state court's determinations).
The most comprehensive and provocative analysis is by Professor Fitzgerald. See
Fitzgerald, supra note 17 (articulating a strongly elaborated defense of the position,
rejected in this Article, that the Supreme Court possesses an exceedingly narrow
jurisdictional authority to review state-court state-law determinations only to prevent clearly
proven evasion of the commands of federal law). For other references, see id. at 85 n.20.
20. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 630 (1874); see also
Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 82 n.9 (collecting authorities).
21. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945). "If in fact thejudgment rests on a state
ground, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review the case." Robert L. Stern et al.,
Supreme Court Practice § 3.22, at 195 (8th ed. 2002).
22. Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 488
(1976), quoted with approval in Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002). Thus, last
term in Ring v. Arizona, involving the state law allocation of functions between judge and
jury, the Court without the slightest embarrassment abandoned its prior construction of an
Arizona death penalty law on the basis of a subsequent state supreme court opinion stating
that the Court's initial understanding was in error: "[W]e recogniz[e] that the Arizona
court's construction of the State's own law is authoritative . 536 U.S. 584, 603 (2002).
23. 531 U.S. at 135-43 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
24. Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections
on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1043, 1054 (1977)
[hereinafter Wechsler, Appellate Jurisdiction].
1924 (Vol. 103:1919
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be quite narrow: When a nonfederal ground is asserted, "it is the prov-
ince of this Court to inquire [only] whether the decision of the state
court rests upon a fair or substantial basis," 25 a standard known as the
"fair support" rule. The "only" is my insertion, one designed to under-
score the presumably limited nature of the Court's jurisdictional
authority.
In an earlier article, I argued that, on direct review of state court
decisions, the Court in constitutional cases could (but was not constitu-
tionally compelled to) review de novo not only all issues of federal law,
but also of constitutional law application and (save to the extent limited
by due process and the Seventh Amendment) of adjudicative fact bearing
on the constitutional claim. 26 I believe that a similar "ancillary" jurisdic-
tional authority exists whenever the applicable federal constitutional pro-
vision directly constrains or incorporates state law. This jurisdiction most
clearly exists when the federal petitioner asserts that the applicable con-
stitutional provision imposes a duty of fidelity to state law at a given point
in time in the past (t1), and the petitioner claims that at some later point
in time (t2) that duty was materially and impermissibly breached.2 7 The
breach of the duty of fidelity at t2 may be the result of subsequent legisla-
tion or adjudication. The Court can, of course, determine for itself
whether a "material" departure has occurred at t2, and, if so, whether the
departure is a constitutionally impermissible one.28 These are pure ques-
tions of the meaning of the applicable constitutional provision. I submit,
however, that our constitutional practice also shows that the Court has
ancillary jurisdiction to review de novo the state court's determination of
25. Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944).
26. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 238-39
(1985) [hereinafter Monaghan, Fact]. This analysis assumed, of course, that no adequate
nonfederal ground existed to bar review.
27. This context may in fact include nearly all the decisions. When the only issue is
whether the rule of law announced by the state court abridges federal constitutional
guarantees, the state court's determination of state law is seldom challenged. But there are
exceptions. See, for example, U.S. Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 293 U.S. 232, 236-37
(1934), in which the state court held that a contract obligation existed and had been
impaired by state legislation. The Supreme Court reversed, but on the ground that no
contract obligation had existed under state law. Id.; see also Mun. Investors Ass'n v.
Birmingham, 316 U.S. 153, 157-58 (1942) (state court assumes the existence of contract
obligation; Supreme Court finds no such obligation); id. at 157 (finding that the Court was
required "to determine for itself the basic assumptions upon which interpretations of the
Federal Constitution rests"). Cases such as Matthews are criticized in Richard H. Fallon, Jr.
et al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 509 (5th ed. 2003)
[hereinafter Hart & Wechsler] (citing Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property,"
62 Cornell L. Rev. 405, 436 n.201 (1977) [hereinafter Monaghan, Liberty]).
28. As the Contract Clause cases, for example, demonstrate, there may indeed be a
departure from the law at t1, yet that departure may not be constitutionally impermissible.
See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438-48 (1934) (holding that,
while a state statute retrospectively changed the obligations of a mortgage contract, such a
departure from established law was permissible in the emergency situation created by the
depression).
192520031
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what the state law was at t1 . If I am correct, "fair support" or deference
review is a rule of judicial self governance, a sensible and important one
to be sure, and one that in our times should mark the ordinary measure
of the Court's appellate review. 29 But it is not the ultimate measure of
the Court's jurisdictional authority, and in appropriate circumstances,
more searching review is permissible. Thus, in Bush v. Gore, the Chief
Justice's opinion could have been framed as follows:
The claim before us is that the conduct of the Florida Supreme
Court has violated Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the Constitu-
tion, which we have interpreted to prohibit what amounts to ma-
terial judicial departures from the electoral framework enacted
by the Florida legislature. Ordinarily, we would accept the de-
termination of the Florida Supreme Court on the meaning of
the Florida statutory enactment so long as it had fair or substan-
tial support in state law. We need not inquire whether that stan-
dard is satisfied here because it is a rule of practice only, not one
of our ultimate appellate jurisdiction. Whenever the petitioner
asserting a federal right or immunity claims that the Constitu-
tion requires fidelity to state law at a given point in time, we
have, of course, authority to determine whether there has been
a material and impermissible departure from that law. More im-
portantly here, we have ancillary jurisdiction to examine the le-
gal materials properly before the state supreme court to make
an independent determination of what the prior state law was in
order to ensure full enforcement of the constitutional com-
mand. [Citations omitted.]11 We believe that such review is ap-
propriate here. If, as we have concluded, the validity of the elec-
tion of the President of the United States presents a legal (not a
political) question as to whether Article II has been violated,
that legal issue should be fully examined and resolved by this
Court, not by a court of one of the fifty states. We have ex-
amined the majority opinion of the Florida Supreme Court with
care and with respect. For the reasons stated below, our conclu-
sion differs from that court's.
So framed, such an opinion would have avoided the needless humiliation
of the Florida Supreme Court.3 ' More importantly, it would have had a
stronger legal and jurisprudential foundation, and for that reason, it
29. On the issue of Supreme Court "discretion" (as opposed to "dity") in this area,
see infra Part lII.A.
30. Despite his well-known distaste for academic commentary, the ChiefJustice would
cite here with great prescience Monaghan, forthcoming, the then as yet unconceived of
article by this author. This is, after all, my imaginary opinion.
31. I presented an earlier draft of this paper (with much profit) at the University of
Miami Law School. Several attendees who knew many or all the judges of the Florida
Supreme Court expressed considerable unhappiness with what they viewed as the
unjustifiable humiliation of those judges.
1926 [Vol. 103:1919
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would have posed problems for the dissenting justices and the chorus of
critics who joined them.32
This Article's examination of the Supreme Court's power to review
state-court determinations of state law in constitutional cases proceeds as
follows. Part I sets the issues in sharper relief with a brief review of Bush
v. Gore, placing particular emphasis on the concurring opinion of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and the dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg. Part II
examines the existing framework of the Court's appellate jurisdictional
authority over state courts in an effort to sketch the contours of its power
to review state-court state-law determinations. Part II.A shows that the
Court's Marbury-based prerogative to "say what the [constitutional] law
is"'- clearly includes not only evident constructions of the constitutional
text (e.g., "the constitution forbids racial classifications absent a compel-
ling state interest") but also threshold issues of the "characterization" of
the state law for constitutional (and, in most cases, federal statutory) pur-
poses. Although there seems to have been some confusion on the point,
questions of characterization do not involve Supreme Court redetermina-
tion of state law. Part II.B sets the issue of the Court's authority to review
state-court determinations of state law in its familiar setting of the ade-
quate nonfederal ground doctrine. It shows that the propriety of some
such review is incontrovertible. Part III is the normative heart of the Arti-
cle. Operating from the premise of the supremacy of valid federal law,
Part III.A argues for independent judgment rather than deference ("fair
support") review as the ultimate measure of the Court's ancillary jurisdic-
tion to determine for itself what the state law was at a given point in time
(t1) whenever the Constitution makes fidelity to state law at t, a matter of
constitutional importance. Part III.B demonstrates that this view in fact
finds solid support in the Court's practice, providing numerous historical
examples of the independent judgment rule, drawn from such diverse
areas as the early treaty cases, Contract Clause cases, and decisions dis-
cussing the adequate nonfederal ground doctrine. The Article concludes
with a claim that the distinctions set out in this Article necessarily matter
to lawyers and they should (but may not) matter to the Justices.
32. While defending the Florida court's 4-3 majority against a charge of unreasonable
interpretation, Justice Souter acknowledged that "other interpretations were of course
possible, and some might have been better than those adopted by the Florida court's
majority." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 131 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg
made a similar concession. Id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), quoted infra note 60.
Such concessions would have caused considerable difficulty had the concurrence argued
for independentjudgment as the proper scope of review. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 19, at
405 (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist's misstatement of' the appropriate standard of
review lent power to the dissent's criticisms).
33. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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I. ILLUSTRATING THE PROBLEM: A BRIEF LOOK AT BUSH V. GORE
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 provides that "Each State shall appoint,
in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," electors for president
and vice-president.3 4 The unanimous per curiam opinion in Bush v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board35 masked deep differences about the
meaning of the italicized language that subsequently surfaced in Bush v.
Gore. Both the Court and the concurrence believed that Article II con-
ferred upon the state legislature a plenary and free standing authority in
presidential elections, subject only to federal constitutional (and perhaps
valid federal statutory) constraints. 36 Under the "Independent State Leg-
islature doctrine," no room existed, therefore, for judicially fashioned
"add ons" drawn from other sources of state law or, of more importance
here, for judicial "rewriting" of legislative enactments under the guise of
statutory "interpretation. 3 7
Nonetheless, for the Court, a five-person majority, the scope of the
Court's authority to redetermine the content of Florida election law
played no perceptible role. The Fourteenth Amendment occupied
center stage.3 8 "Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are constitu-
tional [i.e., Fourteenth Amendment] problems with the [manual] re-
count ordered by the Florida Supreme Court [to determine voter intent]
34. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added). In full, the provision provides:
"Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number
of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State
may be entitled in the Congress . Id.
35. 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
36. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104 (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892));
id. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). This could have been understood to have been
the view of the entire Court in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board. There, the
Court remanded, inter alia, to determine "the extent to which the Florida Supreme Court
saw the [suffrage provisions of the] Florida Constitution as circumscribing the legislature's
authority tinder Art. II, § 1, cl. 2." 531 U.S. at 78. The suggestion-but in the end a
suggestion only-was that any invocation of the Florida Constitution might violate Article
II, "even if the [state] courts are seeking to accommodate the legislative scheme to state
constitutional provisions." Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal
Courts and the Federal System 66 (Stipp. 2002). For an extended historical account, see
Hayward H. Smith, History of the Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine, 29 Fla.
St. U. L. Rev. 731 (2001).
37. Interestingly, however, in Branch v. Smith, the Court went out of its way to vacate
an alternative holding of the district court that Article I, Section 4, Clause l's reference to
"Legislature" precluded state courts from formulating redistricting plans when the state
legislature failed to do so. 123 S. Ct. 1429, 1437 (2003). For an illuminating effort to make
sense out of the various appearances of the "Independent State Legislature doctrine" in
American constitutional law, see generally Saul Zipkin, Note,Judicial Redistricting and the
Article I State Legislature, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 350 (2003).
38. The majority began from the premise that if the state legislature exercised its
appointment power by authorizing citizens to vote, citizens had a fundamental right under
the Equal Protection Clause. 531 U.S. at 104-05 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
555 (1964)); see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a
Conservative Mirror, 18 Const. Comment. 359, 382-86 (2001) (locating the outcome of
the case in the Court's decision in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
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that demand a remedy. The only disagreement is as to the remedy."' 9
The content of Florida election law entered only at the remedial stage, at
the very end of the Court's opinion. And here the Court took Florida
election law as it (correctly or not) understood the state court to have
declared it, in particular that court's "conclusion" that the Florida Legis-
lature intended to secure the safe harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5. 4 0 On
that premise, the Court then concluded that the recount must be halted
because:
1) The state supreme court's "extension" of the manual recount
until December 18 constituted an invalid alteration of the elec-
toral framework prescribed by the Florida legislature.
2) In view of the substantive and procedural infirmities in the
Florida manual recount process, it was too late to conduct a con-
stitutionally satisfactory recount by the safe-harbor date of De-
cember 12.41 "That date is upon us, and there is no recount
procedure in place . . . that comports with minimal constitu-
tional standards."4 2
39. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111 (citations omitted). Seven justices concluded that
the manual recount violated equal protection because of the different standards being
applied to determine voter intent on an inter-county basis. Id. at 104-11; id. at 134-35
(SouterJ., dissenting); id. at 145 (BreyerJ., dissenting). The five members forming the
per curiam opinion also found constitutional infirmities even within a single county. Id. at
106. Professor Tribe's effort to detach Justices Souter and Breyer from the Court on the
Equal Protection Clause, see Tribe, supra note 8, at 292 n.508, strikes me as quite strained.
40. 531 U.S. at 110. The Court cited a Florida Supreme Court opinion issued only a
few hours earlier, which had purported to clarify that court's initial opinion. Whether the
Florida court's language in fact supported the Court's characterization of its meaning, and
if it did, whether the language should have been treated as dictum because it was uttered
in a very different set of circumstances, is a debate I do not enter. For examples of this
view, see id. at 143-44 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting); id. at 155 (BreyerJ., dissenting); see also
Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 Yale L.j.
1407, 1429-31 (2001) (arguing that Florida courts should have been allowed to declare the
content of Florida law on the relationship between the benefits of the safe harbor and
curing the equal protection violations); Greenhouse, supra note 7, at 387 ("It is far from
clear that the Florida court thought it was announcing an authoritative construction of the
3 U.S.C. § 5 question for which the five majority justices cited it."); Tribe, supra note 8, at
187 n.33 ("In hindsight there is strong reason to doubt that, if asked, the Florida Supreme
Court would have read the Florida statutes to require the recount to end by December
12."); Weinberg, supra note 2, at 632-33 ("[I]t was senseless for the Supreme Court to
assume that the Florida Supreme Court would hold that the election must never be
resolved if it could not be resolved by [the 'safe harbor' date.] December 12.").
41. The Court said that the counties did not have in place any adequate or consistent
mechanism for conducting a valid manual recount. 531 U.S. at 109-10. This was the
precise context of its statement that, "Our consideration is limited to the present
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents
many complexities." Id. at 109. The context of the statement is ignored by many writers,
including, for example, Professor Tribe. See Tribe, supra note 8, at 268-73
(characterizing the Court's language as an attempt to preclude its opinion from "having
any precedential value," but failing to note that language's context).
42. 531 U.S. at 110. In Part I of his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer seemingly
agreed that it was too late to rectify the equal protection deficiencies by the safe harbor
date, but argued that it was unclear whether a recount could be achieved by December 18,
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The first holding entailed no disagreement about the content of state
law. The Court merely enforced the constitutional prohibition against
any material alteration of the legislative framework for appointing elec-
tors, and it took the Florida court's conclusion that the legislature in-
tended to secure the safe harbor as an acknowledgment that such a de-
parture had occurred. The concluding proposition was also based on
purely constitutional grounds, predicated upon the Court's finding of an
equal protection violation in the manual recount process and upon the
Florida court's finding of the Florida legislature's desire to secure the safe
harbor.
While almost all academic commentary has centered on the Court's
opinion, it is Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence 4"- and Justice Gins-
burg's dissenting opinion 44 that address the subject of this Article. 45 The
Chief Justice began from the premise that Article II, Section 1, Clause 2
barred state court "rewrites" of election laws governing presidential elec-
tions.4" ! While "[ilsolated sections of the code may well admit of more
than one interpretation . . . the general coherence of the legislative
scheme may not be altered by judicial interpretation .... 47
The Chief Justice thus necessarily faced the question of what defer-
ence, if any, was due to the Florida court's "interpretation" of Florida
the date on which the Florida electors would meet to cast their votes. Id. at 146 (BreyerJ.,
dissenting). Justice Souter also apparently agreed. "To recount these manually would be a
tall order ... ." Id. at 135 (Souter, J., dissenting). If it was in fact too late, Justice Breyer
apparently preferred to leave issuance of the formal death certificate to the Florida
Supreme Court. Id. at 145-47 (Breyer, j., dissenting). So too did Justice Souter, id. at 135
(Souter, J., dissenting), and Justice Ginsburg, id. at 144 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
43. The concurrence was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id. at 111-22
(Rehnquist, ClJ., joined by Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
44. Id. at 135-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
45. For an elegant presentation of these aspects of the opinions, see Hart & Wechsler,
stIpra note 27, at 536-40.
46. 531 U.S. at 112-13. This position draws support from Mcilherson v. Blacker, 146
U.S. 1, 25 (1892), which states that Article 11's grant of legislative power "operat[es] as a
limitation tIpon the State in respect of any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power."
The Court went on to add, "This power is conferred upon the legislatures of the States...
and cannot be taken from them or modified by their State constitutions." Id. at 35. But
the argument does not run entirely in one direction. See 531 U.S. at 123-24 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (claiming that Article II's grant implicates acceptance of state legislatures and
their state constitutional restraints); id. at 141-42 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the state should be allowed to organize itself as it sees fit, and thus interpret its laws,
withott federal disruption). See in particular Zipkin, stIpra note 37, at 360-63 (arguing
that McPherson provides a weak foundation for such an important decision on
constitutional law). Balkin, stIpra note 40, at 1413-25, also relies on McPherson. He makes
the case that state legislative power "is the supreme authority except as limited by the
constitution of the State" and undertakes an analysis of the Florida election law. Id. at
1414, 1424 (qtuoting McPherson, 146 U.S. at 25). The reader could on this basis determine
whether the Florida court's interpretation was "reasonable or tmnreasonable." Balkin,
supra note 40, at 1424.
47. 531 U.S. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice viewed this
limitation'on state law as based on Article II. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 536.
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electoral law. This was the heart of Justice Ginsburg's dissent, and she
cast that issue in deference-saturated terms: "The extraordinary setting of
this case has obscured the ordinary principle that dictates its proper reso-
lution: Federal courts defer to a state high court's interpretations of the
State's own law."'48 While "rare" occasions existed in which the Court
might go further when faced with clear state court "recalcitrance,' 49 she
insisted that "[r] arely has this Court rejected outright an interpretation of
state law by a state high court."
50
Justice Ginsburg's opinion can be read to point in more than one
direction.5 1 Whatever she meant, however, her emphasis on deference
clearly put the Chief Justice on the defensive. He began with important
general concessions:
In most cases, comity and respect for federalism compel us to
defer to the decisions of state courts on issues of state law....
Of course, in ordinary cases, the distribution of powers among
the branches of a State's government raises no questions of fed-
eral constitutional law .... 52
He then sought to escape from the consequences of his concessions:
48. 531 U.S. at 142 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
49. "[T]here are cases in which the proper application of federal law may hinge on
interpretations of state law ... [and thus] this Court must sometimes examine state law in
order to protect federal rights." Id. at 137. But such authority exists only in "rare"
circumstances. Id. at 139-40.
50. Id. at 139 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg added:
The Chief Justice's casual citation of [three] cases might lead one to believe they
are part of a larger collection of cases in which we said that the Constitution
impelled us to train a skeptical eye on a state court's portrayal of state law. But
one would be hard pressed, I think, to find additional cases that fit the mold.
Id. at 140. For her, deference is required absent "the kind of recalcitrance by a state high
court that warrants extraordinary action by this Court." Id. at 139-41. Shortly thereafter,
however, Justice Ginsburgjoined the Court's opinion in Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451
(2001), discussed infra text accompanying notes 311-317, which undertook a rather
extensive review of state law in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment due process
challenge. And she wrote the majority opinion in Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 321-323, closely examining and ultimately
disregarding a state procedural rule relied upon by a state intermediate appeals court on
the ground that, the appellate court's opinion notwithstanding, no published state court
opinion had required "flawless" compliance with the state procedural rules and that the
circumstances of this case were "unique." Id. at 382-83.
51. Justice Ginsburg could be understood to say either that (a) the state court's
determinations of state law must be accepted, except in rare circumstances, or (b) only
"reasonable" state-court determinations must be thus accepted. The former position
would contradict considerable judicial authority, including decisions upon which she
relied. 531 U.S. at 136-38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The latter formulation seems most
probably intended, particularly since Justice Ginsburg joined the opinions of Justices
Souter and Breyer which defended the Florida Supreme Court against a charge of
unreasonableness. Id. at 130-33 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 147-52 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
52. Id. at 112.
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But there are a few exceptional cases in which the Constitution
imposes a duty or confers a power on a particular branch of a
State's government. This is one of them. Article II, § 1, cl. 2,
provides that '[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct,' electors for President and Vice
President. Thus, the text of the election law itself, and not just its
interpretation by the courts of the States, takes on independent
significance....
... Though we generally defer to state courts on the inter-
pretation of state law,... there are of course areas in which the
Constitution requires this Court to undertake an independent,
if still deferential, analysis of state law.53
The Chief Justice's special emphasis on the importance of the role
constitutionally assigned to state "Legislatures" (i.e., at ti) to justify sepa-
ration of the constitutional text from its judicial "interpretation" is un-
convincing. In fact, that separation permeates much constitutional law
theorizing; for example, the distinction is regularly invoked to minimize
the role of stare decisis in constitutional adjudication. 5 4 More impor-
tantly here, how the posited distinction bears upon the scope of the
Court's appellate jurisdiction is decidedly unclear. The Chief Justice's
response that to "attach definitive weight to the pronouncement of a state
court, when the very question at issue is whether the court has actually
departed from the statutory meaning, would be to abdicate our responsi-
bility to enforce the explicit requirements of Article II" is question beg-
ging.55 The crucial issue remains: What is the Court's "responsibility"
once the supreme court of the state has spoken? The posited distinction,
moreover, finds no support whatsoever in the randomly scattered judicial
authorities also invoked by the Chief Justice. 5" Most important for me,
however, is the Chief Justice's implicit concession that Supreme Court
"deference" is displaced only because of the special structure of Article II.
This, I hope to show, would be a significant narrowing of our constitu-
tional tradition.
53. Id. at 112-14 (second emphasis added) (citations omitted). Compare the Chief
justice's dissent in Bunkley v. Florida, 123 S. Ct. 2020, 2024-26 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). Recognizing that petitioner "presents strong arguments" for his claim that
what the state supreme court characterized as an "evolutionary" change in its law was in
fact also the law at the time of his conviction, the Chief justice said, "But the Florida
Supreme Court concluded otherwise, and we may not revisit that question." Id. at 2024
n.1.
54. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 723, 767-70 (1988) (collecting sources). I have criticized the dichotomy in
other contexts. Id. at 770-72 ("[i]n the end, the written Constitution argument cannot
sustain the absolute primacy of text over gloss.").
55. 531 U.S. at 115. As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, Article II itself does not
"license[ ] a departure from the usual deference we give to state-court interpretations of
state law." Id. at 141 (GinsburgJ., dissenting). Justice Breyer made the same point. Id. at
148 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
56. Id. at 114-18 & n.1.
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The Chief Justice's opinion becomes even more unsatisfying once it
is recognized that, in the end, his "Independent Legislature" grounded
separation of the state election-law text from its state-court judicial inter-
pretation does little or no work. After stating that a "significant departure
from the legislative scheme for appointing Presidential electors presents
a federal constitutional question,"5 7 the Chief Justice quickly retreats to
familiar fair-support review. Under the guise of statutory construction,
the Florida Supreme Court had "impermissibly distorted [that law] be-
yond what a fair reading required, in violation of Article II." 5  Some as-
pects of the Florida Supreme Court's opinion were characterized as "ab-
surd" or "peculiar,"5 9 criticisms that resonate "fair support" review. 60 It
should, of course, be acknowledged here that even though the Chief Jus-
tice's opinion ultimately invokes deference language, it is surely arguable
that he was in fact far less deferential-to the views of the Florida Supreme
Court than his opinion suggests. Be that as it may, much of the language
57. Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 115. "Importantly, the legislature has delegated the authority to run the
elections and to oversee election disputes to the Secretary of State .... " Id. at 113-14; see
also id. at 116 ("The legislature has designated the Secretary as the 'chief election officer,'
with the responsibility to '[olbtain and maintain uniformity in the application, operation,
and interpretation of election laws.'"). The Chief Justice went on to complain that the
Florida court had invaded the Secretary's discretion, id. at 118, and rejected her
reasonable interpretation of the election laws, id. at 119-20. The alleged departures
included altering the legislatively prescribed time tables for protests and contests,
emptying certification of real significance, invading the discretion conferred by the Florida
legislature on Florida canvassing boards whether to recount ballots after the certification
deadline, and redefining the meaning of "legal votes" under Florida election law by
requiring the recount of improperly marked ballots. For an excellent presentation of this
view, see Joel Edan Friedlander, The Rule of Law at Century's End, 5 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol.
317, 320 (2001) (decrying the state court departures from the terms of the state election
law). To the same effect is Gary C. Leedes, The Presidential Election Case: Remembering
Safe Harbor Day, 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 237, 270 (2001).
59. 531 U.S. at 119.
60. Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer each believed that the Florida Supreme
Court's construction of the state electoral law found fair support in Florida law (or, in the
language of the Chief Justice, did not amount to a "significant departure"). Justice Souter
wrote, "The issue is whether the judgment of the State Supreme Court has displaced the
state legislature's provisions for election contests .... " Id. at 130 (Souter, J., dissenting).
After concluding that some judicial interpretation was necessary, he said: "None of the
state court's interpretations is unreasonable to the point of displacing the [state law]
legislative enactment quoted." Id. at 131. Next followed his acknowledgment that
conclusions other than those reached by the Florida Supreme Court were possible. Id.
Justice Ginsburg wrote that "I might join the Chief Justice were it my commission to
interpret Florida law. But disagreement with the Florida court's interpretation of its own
State's law does not warrant the conclusion that the justices of that court have legislated."
Id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer undertook a vigorous defense of the
Florida court, id. at 147-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting), and concludes, "I repeat, where is the
'impermissible' distortion?" Id. at 152 (Breyer,J., dissenting) ("Where's the beef," to recall
the famous advertisement). Justice Stevens did not address the issue. Except for Justice
Souter's failure to join Justice Stevens's dissent, the four dissenting justices concurred in
whole or in part in each other's opinions.
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of his opinion suggests he believed that he was applying some form of the
"fair support" rule.
Given the hurried and pressure-filled circumstances, the Chief Jus-
tice understandably lacked the opportunity to explore whether a more
exacting inquiry into state law was permissible. His opinion simply cob-
bled together the fact of a presidential election, a First Amendment and a
vagueness case, and a footnote reference to a taking and a treaty case.!'
No unifying theme is suggested."12 Nonetheless, assuming his premises
(that Article II proscribes significant "interpretive" departures (t 2 ) from
the prior legislatively enacted framework (ti) and that no "political ques-
tion" is involved), I believe that our constitutional structure and history
show that the ChiefJustice was far too hesitant in describing the scope of
his court's ultimate jurisdictional authority. When federal law requires
that a rule of state law be previously established, as the Chief Justice saw
the situation based upon his understanding of Article II and the decisions
that he cited, it is clearly a federal question whether the state court has
impermissibly departed from the prior law."' That inquiry, in turn, al-
lows the Court to examine the legal materials properly before the state
supreme court to determine what the relevant state law was (ti) or is now
(t0). Moreover, that determination can be made de novo, according to
the state court decision only the deference due to its power to persuade.
II. TH-E FRAMEWORK OF THE SUPREME COURT'S AIPELLATEI JURISDICTION
OVER STATE COURTS
The focus of this Article is on the Supreme Court's authority to ex-
amine the state-law legal materials properly before the highest state court
in order to determine for itself the content of that law at a given point in
time. In order to explore the contours of this authority, it is helpful to
examine two background principles that govern the Court's appellate re-
view of state court judgments, namely, "characterization" and the ade-
quate nonfederal ground doctrine. These two concepts are addressed in
this part.
Part II.A's focus on "characterization" is an attempt to dispel some
confusion. A class of decisions most accurately described as instances of
the "characterization" of state law for federal law purposes has attracted
some criticism for their supposed intrusion into the proper province of
the state courts. In my view, these criticisms are misplaced. Issues of
characterization involve straightforward determinations of purely federal
law issues; no redetermination of state law is involved, and no deference
is justified. Examination of these cases, however, helps illuminate the in-
61. Id. at 114-15.
62. The same criticism cannot be made of Justice Ginsburg's opinion. Her" review of
the cases, id. at 136-40, is tightly organized arotInd a principle of deference.
63. For an exploration of these issues, see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 539
n. 15.
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stances when issues concerning the Court's independent review of state-
court state-law determinations are actually presented. Part II.B begins ex-
amination of those questions. As seen in Justice Ginsburg's dissent, the
Court's authority to review state-court state-law determinations is often
viewed as an anomaly, arising (if at all) only in "rare" circumstances. Set-
ting the issue of the Court's authority in the context of the adequate
nonfederal ground doctrine, I reject this view. Part II.B demonstrates
that some Supreme Court reexamination of state court declarations of
state law is not only indisputable, but quite familiar.
A. The Importance of the Threshold Question of Characterization
In Bush v. Gore, no one denies that, in engaging in an equal protec-
tion analysis, the Court undertook an appropriate discharge of its Mar-
bury function "to say what the [constitutional] law is." Disagreement cen-
tered upon the merits of the Court's analysis." 4 But there is another,
perhaps less understood, dimension to the Court's constitutional law-
declaring function: the threshold question of characterizing the signifi-
cance or meaning of state law for constitutional law purposes. Judgment
on that issue is determined pursuant to the application of an indepen-
dent federal standard, that is, the application of a federal "patterning def-
inition," to borrow the language of my colleague Tom Merrill.15 Analyti-
64. For example, Professor Sunstein characterizes the Court's equal protection
analysis as a "bolt from the blue." Sunstein, supra note 18, at 765; see also Choper, supra
note 3, at 337 n.10, 349 n.53 (suggesting minimal equal protection concerns because the
impact of recount standards would be random rather than systematically affecting any
particular group); Tribe, supra note 8, at 217-19 (arguing that variations in tallying
procedures between counties does not justify the Court's equal protection concerns). See
generally Mary Anne Case, Are Plain Hamburgers Now Unconstitutional? The Equal
Protection Component of Bush v. Gore as a Chapter in the History of Ideas About Law, 70
U. Chi. L. Rev. 55 (2003) (offering a witty criticism of the Court's general penchant for
rules over standards). See also the thoughtful commentary of my colleague Richard
Briffault, Bush v. Gore as an Equal Protection Case, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 325 (2001). He
argues that the "undervotes" of "[i]mperfectly marked ballots appear to fall into a
constitutional grey area. They might be votes and they might not be votes." Id. at 359.
Apparently still in a decided minority, I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment
challenge was quite substantial. "[T]he concern was not with county differences, but with
[the] standardless discretion [of the county canvassing boards] that would allow
discrimination" among candidates. Einer Elhauge, The Lessons of Florida, Pol'y Rev., Dec.
2001/Jan. 2002, at 15, 21. Different standards were being employed in different
counties-indeed within the same county-to determine voters' "intent" with respect to a
statewide candidate. "A voter's ballot [in a statewide election] must not be weighted
differently from those of other voters in the same jurisdiction." Note, Non Sub Homine?
A Survey and Analysis of the Legal Resolution of Election 2000, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2170,
2190-91 (2001) (citations omitted).
65. Thomas Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 Va. L. Rev. 885,
893 (2000). The characterization issue often surfaces in the application of a constitutional
standard to the facts. The Court regularly engages in iMarbury-style review when
constitutional standards are in the process of development or further refinement, and the
Court believes that its application of those standards to the facts will helpfully elucidate the
underlying constitutional standard. The Court's endorsement of independent judgment
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cally, the Court does not undertake a redetermination of state law; rather,
the Court simply provides an explication of its meaning for federal law or
in this context clearly appears in numerous recent decisions. See, e.g., Thompson v.
Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112-16 (1995) (finding that "state-court 'in custody'
determinations" are reviewable by federal courts); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110-15
(1985) ("[T]he ultimate question whether.., the challenged confession was obtained in a
manner compatible with the requirements of the Constitution is a matter for independent
federal determination."). In Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), a Fourth
Amendment case involving "probable cause" and "reasonable suspicion," the Court said
that the courts of appeals should exercise independent judgment. These two standards
"acquire content only through application. Independent review is therefore necessary if
appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles." Id. at 697;
see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 579 (arguing that this standard was announced as a
matter of sound judicial administration, not constitutional compulsion). For a more
recent example, see United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274-75 (2002) (relying on
Ornelas to support the Court's de novo review of reasonable suspicion determinations).
See generally Monaghan, Fact, supra note 26, at 273-76. 1 doubt whether, at least in
constitutional cases, any meaningful differences exist between the Court's substantive
review of cases coming from the lower federal courts and cases properly before the Court
that come from the state courts. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695-96 (citing earlier federal and
state cases interchangeably). In United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002), both the
majority and dissent engaged in both law elaboration and an extended law-application
analysis. While Ornelas originated in the federal courts, the principal authority discussed
was the Court's earlier opinion in a decision on appeal from a state supreme court, Florida
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). In Hernandez v. NewYork, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), the Court
assimilated its review of state court fact finding to its review tinder Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a). In addition, see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 580 (noting that
"[t]he plurality opinion in [Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999),] appears to treat the
question of Supreme Court review of state judgments no differently from the question of
federal appellate review in Ornelas").
When the Court views the controlling issue before it as simply the straightforward
application of constitutional standards correctly stated by the state court, review is seldom
granted. Court Rule 10 provides in part, "A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted
when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a
properly stated rule of law." Sup. Ct. R. 10. Even when review is granted, the Court is
under no unyielding compulsion to make an independent law-application determination.
E.g., Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 176 (1983) ("It will do...
little good if this Court turns every colorable claim that a state court erred in ... into a de
novo adjudication. ), discussed in Monaghan, Fact, supra note 26, at 265-66; see also
Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 579. But see id. at 579 n.1 I (discussing one case where
the Court required court of appeals to engage in de novo review of the constitutionality of
a punitive damages award). But neither is the Court under an inexorable duty to eschew
law-application determinations. Whether the Florida court impermissibly departed from
the federal constitutional requirement that no significant departures exist from the
legislatively enacted framework seems to me to be an entirely acceptable exercise of the
Court's appellate jurisdiction even if viewed only as a question of law application. Of
course, the line between "further definition" of constitutional norms and "law application"
can be a thin one; they are almost imperceptible points on a continuum. See Hart &
Wechsler, supra note 27, at 578-86. As Justice Holmes long ago said, "most of the
distinctions of the law are distinctions of degree." Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel.
Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Walz v. Tax
Commn'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678-79 (1970) (noting that the Court must often make "fine
distinctions" between what is and what is not permissible).
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constitutional purposes. Characterization, then, is simply the Court's dis-
charge of its Marbury-based function of providing constitutional meaning.
Until recently at least, some confusion on this issue has existed, as is
apparent from a comparison of the current with the earlier editions of
the classic work in the field, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System. 66 This Article was prepared while the Fourth Edition, pub-
lished in 1996, was current. That edition, along with all prior ones,
treated some "characterization" cases as problematic because of their ap-
parent assertion of authority to redetermine questions of state law previ-
ously decided by state courts. The current edition, published in 2003,
rather quietly walks away from that criticism. A need for analytic clarity
exists here, if we are to assess accurately the proper scope of the Court's
authority to review state law questions on appeal from the highest state
court.
What follows are examples of the Court's exercise of Marbury-style
independent-judgment review whenever the Court understands the issue
before it as involving, not what the state law is or was, but its federal signif-
icance (i.e., characterization) in light of federal constitutional (and to
some extent statutory) commands. These cases highlight the boundary
lines of the Court's authority to review state-court state-law
determinations.
1. Contract Clause. - Albert Beveridge, Marshall's great biographer,
provides an admirable account of the escalation of a campus feud to the
Supreme Court decision in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.6 7
Senator Beveridge notes that "[t]he principle upon which Marshall fi-
nally overthrew the New Hampshire law [i.e., contract impairment] was
given a minor place" in the arguments of college counsel before the state
supreme court.65 That court held that, despite its charter, the college's
trustees held a position of public trust, "as much so as the office of gover-
nor, or of judge of this court. ' 69 Thus, "how far the legislature possesses
a constitutional right to interfere in the concerns of private corporations"
66. Compare Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 528-36 (adopting a view of
characterization consistent with my own), with Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart &
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 555-63 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter
Hart & Wechsler, Fourth Edition] (treating cases here denoted by the term
"characterization" as problematic). This change in perspective is further explored infra
notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
67. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
68. 4 AlbertJ. Beveridge, The Life ofJohn Marshall 234 (1919). Indeed, at argument
in the Supreme Court, Webster gave little emphasis to the Contract Clause claim even
though it was the only issue before the Court. Id. at 240-50.
69. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, I N.H. 111, 119 (1817).
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was not before it.74  Professor Hill agrees. 7 ' As he observes, the Court
"proceeded to disagree [on the meaning of state law], without indicating
why the decision on the issue of state law was thought to be reviewable. ' '7 2
So understood, Dartmouth College seemingly illustrates the Supreme
Court's willingness to determine for itself what the state law was before
the allegedly impairing legislation. 73 I understand Dartmouth College dif-
ferently, however. The Court did not differ with the state court on the
content of state law; rather, it simply construed the Contract Clause itself,
determining the threshold issue that the charter rights constituted a con-
tract for purposes of the constitutional guarantee, whatever the relevance
of the state court characterization for other purposes.7 4
General Motors Corp. v. Romein7 5 recently reiterated this mode of anal-
ysis. In reviewing a state-court determination that no contract had ex-
isted (i.e., what the state law was at tl), the Court said, "The question
whether a contract was made is a federal question for purposes of Con-
tract Clause analysis, . . .and 'whether it turns on issues of general or
purely local law, we can not surrender the duty to exercise our own
judgment."' 76
70. Id. at 120. The Contract Clause "was not intended to limit the power of the states"
over their officers and civil government. Id. at 132. And even if the royal charter were a
contract, it could be modified if "the public interest might require." Id. at 134. Otherwise,
"[s]uch a contract, in relation to a public institution would ... be absurd and repugnant to
the principles of all government." Id.
71. Alfred Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 943, 955 n.43 (1965)
("Throughout the case, the question of impairment as such was a relatively minor one.").
72. Id. Professor Hill correctly observes that no claim was made that the state court
was seeking to avoid the imperatives of federal law. Id.
73. For a lucid discussion of the nineteenth-century cases interpreting the Contract
Clause generally, and state granted franchises particularly, see Stephen A. Siegel,
Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Property-
Privilege Distinction and "Takings" ClauseJurisprudence, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1986); see
particularly id. at 66-75. Mr. Siegel asserts that "many jurists concluded that nineteenth
century state-granted franchises merited differential treatment from ordinary contracts."
Id. at 74.
74. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 626-40 (1819);
Beveridge, supra note 68, at 267-72. The Court in effect said:
We fully accept the New Hampshire supreme court's analysis of the relevant New
Hampshire legal materials, and we also accept that court's conclusion that no
contract has been created as a matter of state law. As to the meaning of
constitutional language, however, we exercise independentjudgment "to say what
the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Whether,
therefore, the interests described by the state court constitute a contract for
Contract Clause purposes is a question for independent judgment because it
involves the meaning of the word "Contract[ ]" in Article I, Section 10, Clause I
of the Constitution.
75. 503 U.S. 181 (1992). Interestingly,Justice Ginsburg also cited this as a deference
case. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 137 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). If so, it is Skidmore,
not Chevron, deference. See infra Part III.B.2.
76. 503 U.S. at 187 (citing Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 561 (1942), and
quoting Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 380 (1926)). At the same time,
however, the Court in Romein acknowledged the "great weight" that it accords to-and in
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But what exactly is the federal question? Is the existence of a con-
tract simply a matter of state law, or does the characterization of the state
law materials involve the meaning of the Impairment Clause itself, with
the latter inquiry to be necessarily determined by an independent federal
standard? In the Fourth Edition (and all earlier ones), Hart & Wechsler
expressed discomfort with the latter suggestion: "Isn't it difficult tojustify
the view that the existence of a contract is governed by federal law?"'77
Although this position has now been abandoned, 78 at first blush, the ob-
jection seems troublesome, since it is state law that creates the obligation
that the Contract Clause protects. 79 Although the Court's Marbury-
based8 law-declaration function requires the exercise of independent
judgment, it tells us nothing at all about what law-state or federal-
governs the characterization issue. In the Contract Clause context, any
answer must be derived from the Contract Clause's origin and line of
growth. To my mind, the Founders' considerable concern with protect-
the end saw "no reason to disagree with"-the state court's views. Id. (quoting Appleby, 271
U.S. at 380).
77. Hart & Wechsler, Fourth Edition, supra note 66, at 556. The authors continue
with more specific objections, which still appear in the Fifth Edition:
Are the federal courts in a position to formulate a complete body of federal
contract law for purposes of the Contract Clause? And should the question
whether a particular contract creates an obligation be governed by one set of
rules (state law) in a suit for breach and by another (federal law) in litigation
under the Contract Clause?
Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 529. These specific objections seem to me to lack force.
Little reason exists to believe that the Court will be called upon to "formulate a complete
body of federal contract law" to deal with a relatively few cases. And the claim that one
body of law should govern both breach and impairment cases is not convincing: A specific
federal constitutional interest exists in preventing impairment, but none in the resolution
of ordinary contract disputes even when the state is a party to the contract-ordinary
breach of contract by state officials is not an "impairment."
78. Most significantly, the key sentence quoted in the text now includes the insertion
of the word "only" between "governed" and "by." Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 529.
Also telling, the authors of the Fifth Edition ask:
But whose law governs the antecedent question whether there was a contract in
the first place? The Brand opinion says that "the existence and nature of the
contract" claimed to be impaired is a question "primarily of state law." On that
view, does it necessarily follow that Supreme Court review of the state court's
determination is inappropriate?
Id. at 528-29 (discussing Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938)). This
formulation elides the distinction between characterization and redetermination of state
law.
79. See Appleby, 271 U.S. at 380 ( "[The] construction and effect [of the contract] is a
state question, and we must determine it from the law of the State."); Ogden v. Saunders,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 259 (1827) ("[TJhe municipal law of the State ... is emphatically
the law of the contract made within the State .... ); Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court
and the Contract Clause, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 512, 852 (1944) ("Whether a contractual
obligation is subject to a particular condition presents a question of state law."). Federal
law could, of course, create contractual interests. State court interference with those
interests would trigger a preemption analysis.
80. See supra note 65.
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ing the stability of contracts against the vicissitudes of subsequent state
legislative impairment ill comports with the permissibility of state-court
judicial nullification."' Moreover, an obvious awkwardness would exist
when the Supreme Court instructs a state supreme court that it did not
correctly characterize the state-law legal significance of the very state-law
interests it had correctly identified. Finally, and for me most decisively,
our general constitutional law tradition is that the meaning of constitu-
tional language is to be determined by an independent federal standard.
Thus in Contract Clause cases the Court has long asserted the authority
to determine what state-law interests are not embraced by the Clause.8 2
2. Property. - In the property area, the characterization (or pattern-
ing definition) issue first surfaced in the early American legal experience
with slavery.8 3 Before the Civil War, the national government actively and
consistently espoused the position that slaves were "property. ' 84 For ex-
ample, Article VII of the Treaty of Peace ending the War of Indepen-
dence enjoined evacuating British troops from the carrying away of "ne-
81. See Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr., The Contract Clause of the Constitution 3-18,
58-60 (1938) (discussing the Founders' views of the Contract Clause and early state
reservation clauses); see also infra Part III.B.2. This argument is by no means a knockdown
one, however. As the language of Article i, Section 10 itself shows, the Framers were
concerned with abuses by the state legislatures, not the state courts. See Jack N. Rakove,
Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 290, passim
(1996).
82. Under current doctrine, a state court cannot enlarge the range of interests
embraced by the Contract Clause simply by recognizing an arrangement as a "contract" as
a matter of state substantive law. E.g., Garrison v. City of New York, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 196,
203 (1874) (finding a judgment of record not to be a contract); see also Paul G. Kauper,
What is a "Contract" Under the Contracts Clause of the Federal Constitution, 31 Mich. L.
Rev. 187, 193-97 (1932) (reviewing the Court's decisions and arguing that quasi-
contractual obligations do not fall within the protection of the clause); Monaghan, Liberty,
supra note 27, at 436 n.201 (noting that "some consensual agreements valid under state
law are not contracts within art. 1, § 10"). A similar exclusionary development has
occurred with respect to state-created liberty interests. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995).
83. My colleague Robert Ferguson called to my attention Thomas Jefferson's famous
"Fire Bell in the Night" letter of April 22, 1820. Jefferson wrote that "[t]he cession of that
kind of property, for so it is misnamed, is a bagatelle which would not cost me a second
thought, if, in that way, a general emancipation and expatriation could be effected ......
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes (Apr. 22, 1820), in 10 The Writings of
ThomasJefferson 157, 157 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892-1899). He added, however, that
Congress had no power "to regulate the condition of the different descriptions of men
composing a State. This certainly is the exclusive right of every State .... " Id. at 158. The
treaty cases, discussed infra Part IlI.B.I, of course illustrate federal protection for state-
created property interests. But they did not involve any issue of characterization as the
term is used here.
84. In a posthumously published work, The Slaveholding Republic, Don Fehrenbacher
describes (as he tlid in another context in his prize-winning book of 1978, The Dred Scott
Case) the political and legal structure of antebellum slavery. He emphasizes that despite
(in his view) the Constitution's neutrality on the subject of slavery, the national
government espoused the view of slaves as "property" at every level. Don Fehrenbacher,
The Slaveholding Republic (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001).
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groes and other Property,"8 5 and judicial decision after judicial decision
characterized slaves as property.86 In the 1828 congressional debates
over an indemnity application based upon the military use of private
"property" in time of war, the characterization issue came into dramatic
focus. During the War of 1812, a "slave named Warrick, who had been
impressed into military service, suffered two serious wounds from enemy
fire .... His owner filed a claim .. .[for] medical expenses, loss of the
slave's time while recuperating, and the depreciation of his value as prop-
erty."'8 7 Southern representatives and some northerners agreed that com-
pensation was due.8 8 But
[flor the most part.., northerners participating in the debate
were disposed to contest the absolute claims of southern spokes-
men. None among them espoused abolitionist principles, to be
sure, and none denied that slaves were property within the juris-
diction of a slaveholding state. Instead, they sought to occupy
middle ground by distinguishing state law from federal law
where slavery was concerned. That strategy enabled them to re-
affirm the security of slavery as a state institution, while at the
same time rejecting southern efforts to define the United States
unconditionally as a slaveholding republic.8 9
While now a matter of historical interest only,9t ° the "Warrick affair"
is a quite early illustration of the need in "property," as in contract, cases
to distinguish between the interests created by state law and their consti-
tutional law significance. Here, too, the Fourth Edition of Hart & Wechs-
Ler expressed some discomfort. It acknowledged that there "might... be
a minimal conception of 'property' in the Due Process Clause beneath
which the states cannot (and almost never do) fall."' 1 Describing my hy-
85. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. VII, 8 Stat. 80, 83.
86. See Fehrenbacher, supra note 84, at 216-25 (citing cases).
87. Id. at 3.
88. "Edward Everett of Massachusetts, classical scholar and conservative politician,
adopted the southern point of view, maintaining that property in slaves was protected by
the just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 5.
89. Id. Professor Fehrenbacher continued:
The northern argument, though it varied from speaker to speaker, was fairly well
summed up in one sentence by John C. Clark of New York. "I am led to the
conclusion," he declared, "that slaves, for certain purposes, are persons; that their
masters have in them only a qualified property; that Government, in cases of high
"necessity, growing out of a state of war, has a right to impress them into its
military service, without the liability of being justly called on for indemnification."
A few northerners pressed the argument to the point of denying that the
Constitution contained any recognition of slaves as property.
Id. at 5-6.
90. Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the Confederate Constitution, a constitution
carefully modeled on the Constitution of the United States, provided that "No ... law
denying or impairing the right of property in negro slaves shall be passed." Confederate
Const. art 1, § 9, cl. 4, reprinted in Emory M. Thomas, The Confederate Nation appx. at
310, 313 (1979).
91. Hart & Wechsler, Fourth Edition, supra note 66, at 559 n.4.
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pothetical that a state could not invest automobile "owners" with all the
familiar attributes of ownership existing in other states but deny that it
constituted property for takings purposes, the authors state: "That the
hypothetical is so extreme .. . indicates how rarely a state definition of
property is likely to fall beneath any possible federal threshold. ' 2 The
authors, however, never explained their willingness to accept at least
some minimal federal definitional threshold for property, but not for
contract.
More importantly, the legal landscape has been dramatically altered
since the authors wrote? 3 Citing College Savings Bank,94 Professor Merrill
states that "the Court has now endorsed, unequivocally and in a majority
opinion, a federal definition of Constitutional property."9 5 There, the
Court denied that protection against trademark infringement was a prop-
erty right that Congress could protect under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment because "[lt]he hallmark of a protected property interest is
the right to exclude others."9" And just recently, the Court stated that
92. Id. at 559 (discussing Monaghan, Liberty, supra note 27, at 440). The Fifth
Edition drops discussion of this hypothetical.
93. The existence, vel non, of "property" seldom raised any issue in tile first half of
the twentieth century. See Monaghan, Liberty, supra note 27, at 435. This is because prior
to Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Court increasingly read "life, liberty
and property" as a unitary concept so as to include the full range of state conduct having
serious impact upon important individual interests. Monaghan, Liberty, supra note 27, at
406-08. For example, in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), a case involving the
termination of welfare benefits, the Court first denied that the individual interests in the
program constituted "accrued property rights," but it then held that they were "of
sufficient substance to fall within the protection from arbitrary governmental action
afforded by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 610-11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
95. Merrill, supra note 65, at 911. Like the editors of the Fifth Edition, I would date
the development earlier with Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,
164-65 (1980) (holding that interest accruing on interpleader fund is depositors'
property). See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 532; see also Brown v. Legal Found., 123
S. Ct. 1406, 1419 (2003) (holding that interest accruing on funds deposited in lawyers'
trust accounts and designated for low-income legal aid is property of client). Professor
Merrill believes that the Court has endorsed three different conceptions of property for
constitutional purposes: one for procedural due process, another for substantive due
process, and another for takings. Merrill, supra note 65, at 911.
96. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 673. This definition is actually quite regressive; it
would exclude many interests now recognized as constitutional "property," such as
entitlements. Compare id. (defining property in terms of the right to exclude), with
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428, 430 (1982) ("The hallmark of
property ... is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed
except 'for cause.'"), and Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 533 (arguing that the
decision in College Savings Bank "cast doubt on thirty years of 'new property' decisions
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments"). Perhaps, however, the Court would now
explicitly endorse Professor Merrill, supra note 65, and conclude that entitlements are
property for some purposes, for example, a right to some kind of a hearing, but not for
others.
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the parcel as a whole constitutes the relevant "property" for purposes of a
regulatory takings inquiry. 97
3. Some Additional Examples. - Other decisions confirm the proposi-
tion that whenever the Court sees the issue before it as involving the con-
stitutional significance of state law, the Court treats it as involving the
meaning of the Constitution itself. In the context of "liberty," the Court
has decided for itself whether interests created by state law were sufficient
to constitute liberty within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.98
And while one might have supposed the question whether a state had
waived its sovereign immunity from suit9 9 should be determined by refer-
ence to state law, this is not so, said a unanimous Court in Lapides v. Board
of Regents of the University System of Georgia: " [W] hether a particular set of
state laws, rules, or activities amounts to a waiver of the State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity is a question of federal law."' 0 o Lemon v. Kurtzman
made the "purpose" of state law relevant for Establishment Clause chal-
lenges.10 1 Purpose, however, is judged by an independent federal stan-
dard.102 The formal legal incidence of a state tax, which in the past often
determined the constitutional immunity of the United States from state
taxation, presents a federal question.10 3 In Ring v. Arizona, the Court
97. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
331 (2002). Effectively (albeit perhaps not technically), this approach goes a very long way
toward repudiating the last vestiges of the divisibility of estates approach of Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Justice Thomas's dissent, joined byJustice Scalia,
expressed bewilderment at the Court's treatment of the "parcel as a whole" proposition as
"settled" law. 535 U.S. at 355 n.* (Thomas, J., dissenting). For a brief but illuminating
discussion of this issue, see Charles M. Haar & Michael Allen Wolf, Euclid Lives: The
Survival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2158, 2189-91 (2002) (discussing
and defending Tahoe majority).
98. E.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995); see Hart & Wechsler, supra note
27, at 534-35 (describing cases dealing with the "respective roles of state and federal law in
defining" liberty).
99. A waiver by a state is an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right." United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938)); see Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680 ("The whole point of requiring a
'clear declaration' by the State of its waiver is to be certain that the State in fact consents to
suit.").
100. 535 U.S. 613, 623 (2002). Here the Court seemingly conflates waiver with
forfeiture. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 1037-38.
101. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
102. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (rejecting state court
characterization of the purpose of a state statute). In Edwards v. Aguillard, the Court
claimed to be "normally deferential" to the state articulation of a secular purpose. The
language had no operative significance, however. 482 U.S. 578, 586-87 (1987) (finding
state's avowed secular purpose "a sham").
103. When the rules on intergovernmental immunity had a shape quite different
from present doctrine, the Court disregarded state law labels. See Robert Post, Federalism
in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be "Revived"?, 51 Duke LJ. 1513, 1531 n.61 (2002)
(collecting cases); see also the line of decisions beginning with Davis v. Michigan
Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), dealing with whether a state tax
discriminates against federal employees. Unsurprisingly, arguable counterexamples exist.
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held that the scope of the constitutional right to trial by jury in capital
cases could not be concluded by state characterization of a matter as a
sentencing factor rather than as an element of the crime."14 And a state
court "trial judge's characterization of his own ruling is not controlling
for purposes of double jeopardy." 105
4. Statutes. - The visibility of the characterization issue has
emerged most clearly in the federal statutory context. The general pre-
mise is that "when it enacts a statute [Congress] is not making the appli-
cation of the federal act dependent on state law."'1 16 This is true even
when the federal law refers to state legal materials. 0 7 First Agricultural
National Bank v. State Tax Commission is a good example of the general
proposition.1' 8 The Court disagreed with the highest state court on the
legal incidence of a state tax. The state supreme court held that the state
sales tax was "not imposed upon the [federally chartered national]
bank ... but [was] a tax upon vendors who sell tangible personal prop-
erty to the bank.'l1 The Supreme Court responded: "Because the ques-
tion here is whether the tax affects federal [statutory] immunity, it is clear
that ...we are not bound by the state court's characterization of the
Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 138 n.] (2000), refers to Gurley v.
Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 208 (1975), in which the Court in the different context of a due
process challenge to a state tax accepted the state court's conclusion as to the legal
incidence of the state tax: "When a state court has made its own definitive determination
as to the operating incidence .... [w]e give this finding great weight in determining the
natural effect of a statute, and if it is consistent with the statute's reasonable interpretation
it will be deemed conclusive." The Gurley Court relied upon American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380
U.S. 451, 455-56 (1965). See also N.Y., Phila. & Norfolk Tel. Co. v. Dolan, 265 U.S. 96, 98
(1924) ("[W]hen the State Court... has come to [a] conclusion ... we should be slow to
differ from it upon a matter having so many purely local elements, even if we did not think
it right, as we do.").
104. 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 (2002).
105. Price v. Vincent, 123 S. Ct. 1848, 1853 (2003). This pattern is also deeply
ingrained in the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence. Whether a federal statute is remedial
tinder Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, or is an impermissible effort to expand
"substantive" rights is an issue that calls for the Court's independentjudgment, without any
deference to Congress, on the issue of characterization. That was the implicit premise of
both the majority and dissenting opinions in Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (upholding Family and Medical Leave Act after a searching
inquiry into its validity tinder Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
106. Jermone v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943).
107. Thus, whether a state court guilty plea amounts to a "conviction" for federal law
purposes is determined by a federal standard. Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460
U.S. 103, 111-12 (1983). The most recent illustration is Scheidler v. National
Organization for Women, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (2003), in which the Court held that a
federal statutory reference to state law prohibitions of extortion absorbs state law only
when that law "requir[es] a party to obtain or to seek to obtain property ....... See
generally Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 723.
108. 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
109. Id. at 346.
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tax.'11° The Court went on to conclude, contrary to the state court, that
the state law "imposes the legal incidence of the tax upon the [bank] ."1 11
Two recent decisions involving the federal tax lien statute' 12 provide
excellent examples of the federal nature of the characterization issue. At
issue in Diye v. United States was whether an insolvent taxpayer's right to
inherit his mother's estate under state intestacy law constituted "prop-
erty" or a "right to property" to which a federal tax lien attached.' 1 3
Holding a taxpayer's valid state law disclaimer ineffective for federal law
purposes, a unanimous Court said that "[w] hen Congress so broadly uses
the term 'property,' we recognize ... that the Legislature aims to reach
'every species of right or interest protected by law and having an ex-
changeable value.' "114 The Court added:
The question whether a state-law right constitutes "property" or
"rights to property" [under § 6321] is a matter of federal law.
We look initially to state law to determine what rights the tax-
payer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then
to federal law to determine whether the taxpayer's state-deline-
ated rights qualify as "property" or "rights of property" within
the compass of the federal tax lien legislation .... Just as "ex-
empt status under state law does not bind the federal collec-
tor" . . . so federal tax law "is not struck blind by a disclaimer." -15
More recently, the Court (contrary to College Savings Bank) explicitly in-
voked the familiar "bundle of sticks" understanding of property, conclud-
ing that a taxpayer who held a tenancy by the entirety possessed sufficient
"sticks" to constitute a "right to property" within the meaning of the tax
lien statute. t 16 The Court added:
In looking to state law, we must be careful to consider the sub-
stance of the rights state law provides, not merely the labels the
State gives these rights or the conclusions it draws from them.
Such state law labels are irrelevant to the federal question of
which bundles of rights constitute property that may be attached
by a federal tax lien. l1 7
In the statutory context, however, the characterization issue is more
complex than in constitutional cases. There are occasions-albeit not
many-in which the Court has accepted the state court's characteriza-
tion. In Reconstruction Financial Corp. v. Beaver County, for example, the
scope of Reconstruction Financial Corp.'s (RFC) federal tax exemption
110. Id. at 347.
111. Id.
112. 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (2000).
113. 528 U.S. 49, 52 (1999).
114. Id. at 56 (quotingJewett v. Comm'r, 455 U.S. 305, 309 (1982)).
115. Id. at 58-59 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
116. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278-79, 284-85 (2002); see Haar & Wolf,
supra note 97, at 2190-91 & nn.128-129 (discussing the use of the bundle of sticks
metaphor in property cases).
117. Crafl, 535 U.S. at 279.
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from personal but not real estate taxes was at issue: Is free-standing heavy
machinery "real property," as Pennsylvania law so characterized it?' 18
The Court accepted the state law characterization,' 19 and the result has
considerable intuitive appeal. Congress could fairly be charged with ac-
cepting state law variations in the application of the statutory exemption.
Bizarre applications (such as characterizing an automobile as real prop-
erty) would "patently run counter to the terms of the Act,"' '2 and could
be avoided through standard preemption analysis. 12 ' The same ap-
proach is equally attractive in situations in which federal law employs defi-
nitions whose terms generally are to be filled out by reference to state
law.' 2 2 Of course, there is a crucial and all-important antecedent-or
gate keeping-question: whether the meaning of the term is to include
any reference to state law.l123
RFC demonstrates that no one-to-one link exists between constitu-
tional and statutory interpretation. Our constitutional tradition, to which
I subscribe, is that Marbuiy v. Madison ("political questions" aside) re-
quires that the Court must exercise independentjudgment on the mean-
ing of constitutional language. 124 Chevron makes clear, however, that no
similar constitutional imperative exists with respect to federal statutory
interpretation.12 5 Nonetheless, decisions in which the characterization
118. 328 U.S. 204, 209-10 (1946).
119. Id. at 208.
120. Id. at 210.
121. Indeed, a preemption analysis could have been employed in D)ye: The state
disclaimer rule threatened to undercut federal tax lien policy. 528 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1999).
But, as the dissent shows, a preemption argument is less clearly available in Craft. Craft,
535 U.S. at 292-93 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
122. See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-82 (1956) (holding copyright
statute protected "children" of deceased author).
123. See, e.g., Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989)
("The initial question we must confront is whether . . . Congress intended the [Indian
Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (2000),] definition of 'domicile' to be a matter of state
law."); see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 123 S. Ct. 1673, 1679 (2003)
(stating that federal standard governs issue of who is an "employee" for purposes of the
Americans with Disabilities Act). Who is an "agent" for purposes of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (2000), is to be decided by general principles, not by reference to the law of
any state. Mateu-Anderegg v. School Dist., 304 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 2002).
124. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L.
Rev. 1, 7-14, 32-34 (1983) [hereinafter Monaghan, Administrative State]. This Article is
not the occasion to join issue with the emerging and aggressive "shared meaning" school.
The most recent essay advancing the shared-meaning banner (i.e., Congress wins if it
advances politically correct values) is Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 773, 827-44 (2002); see
also sources cited supra note 7.
125. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see
Monaghan, Administrative State, supra note 124, at 32-33 ("[T]here never has been a
pervasive notion that limited government mandated an all-encompassing judicial duty to
supply all of the relevant meaning of statutes. Rather the judicial duty is to insure that the
administrative agency stays within the zone of discretion committed to it by its organic
Act.").
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issue is decided by reference to state law are quite infrequent. When, for
example, federal statutory law (as in the tax lien cases) is seen as con-
straining state law interests, the Court seems strongly inclined to deter-
mine for itself the characterization issue based on a federal standard. So
too in heavily regulated areas, even when the issue is the scope of a fed-
eral permission. 2 6 The intuition seems to be that a plenary reservation is
necessary to ensure effective implementation of federal law. 127
These cases as well as the constitutional characterization cases show
that, although state law materials are relevant, the issue of characteriza-
tion, as distinguished from redetermination, is purely one of constitu-
tional or federal statutory interpretation on which the Supreme Court
has since Marbury v. Madison exercised independent judgment. There is
no room for deference. Understanding that the characterization cases
do not in fact invoke the Court's authority to review state-court state-law
determinations helps clarify when the Court does engage in such review
and what the scope of its authority is when it does so.
B. A Note on the Adequate Nonfederal Ground Doctrine
Murdock v. City of Memphis128 is generally taken to be the fountain-
head of the adequate nonfederal ground doctrine, but that decision did
not give us the doctrine in its modern form. In fact, it does not involve
the modern understanding of the doctrine at all:
The leading and most frequently cited case in the field, [Mur-
doch,] ... originally established the unqualified proposition that
every federal question of importance actually decided by the
state court should be reviewed and decided by the Supreme
Court. Only if the federal question were incorrectly decided be-
low-and obviously this presupposed an examination of the
merits-would the Court look for an independent non-federal
ground adequate to support the judgment and prevent reversal
in spite of the federal error.'29
126. E.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 369 n.5 (2002) ("We
have, in a limited number of cases, found certain contracts not to be part of the 'business
of insurance' under McCarran-Ferguson, [15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000),]
notwithstanding their classification as such for the purpose of state regulation."). There
are other contexts, of course, that involve the application of this principle. E.g., Carey v.
Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002) ("Ordinarily, for purposes of applying a federal statute
that interacts with state procedural rules, we look to how a state procedure functions,
rather than the particular name that it bears.").
127. See supra note 49. But, as mentioned, that intuition has far less pull when the
scope of a federal permission in a non-regulatory context is involved or when federal
statutory law incorporates state law for definitional purposes. Preemption analysis will
ordinarily suffice to protect federal interests in such statutory regimes. Moreover, at the
end of the day the whole matter, unlike constitutional cases, is in the hands of Congress,
which can recalibrate the scope of federal statutory displacement of state law.
128. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
129. Note, Supreme Court Disposition of State Decisions Involving Non-Federal
Questions, 49 Yale L.J. 1463, 1463-64 (1940) (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter Yale
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Under this view, the nonfederal ground doctrine was a test for determin-
ing the disposition of a case on the merits after jurisdiction had been
taken, not a test for determining the existence of jurisdiction itself.
Murdock itself fully confirms this analysis. The Court said that "[i] t
has been many times decided" that motions to dismiss for want of juris-
diction must be denied if the "plaintiff in error [properly] raised... one
of the questions specified in the statute."'' If so, "the jurisdiction of
[the] Court attache[s], and we must hear the case on its merits." 13' If (as
in Murdock itself) the federal question was correctly decided below, the
judgment must be affirmed: 13 2
But when it appears that the Federal question was decided erro-
neously against the plaintiff in error, we must then reverse the
case undoubtedly, if there are no other issues decided in it than
that. It often has occurred, however, and will occur again, that
there are other points in the case than those of Federal cogni-
zance, on which the judgment of the court below may stand;
those points being of themselves sufficient to control the
case. 133
These principles are reflected in the fifth and sixth of the seven "proposi-
tions" the Court announced as governing its review of state court
judgments:
5. If [the Court] finds that [the federal issue] was rightly de-
cided, the judgment must be affirmed.
6. If [the federal issue] was erroneously decided against plain-
tiff in error, then this court must further inquire, whether there
is any other matter or issue adjudged by the State court, which is
sufficiently broad to maintain the judgment of that court, not-
withstanding the error in deciding the issue raised by the Fed-
eral question. If this is found to be the case, the judgment must
be affirmed without inquiring into the soundness of the deci-
sion on such other matter or issue.'13 4
Note]. For a more elaborate review of the authorities, see Morris L. Weisberg, Note,
Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions Involving Multiple Questions, 95 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 764, 768-69 (1947) (criticizing the 'jurisdictional" approach of Herb v. Pitcairn, 324
U.S. 117 (1945)).
130. Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 628 (referring to section 25 of the judiciary Act).
131. Id. For another decision holding that the nonfederal ground doctrine was not a
jurisdictional barrier, see Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 643 (1874), decided
with or shortly after Murdock. The Court overruled a motion to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction where the state court had decided both a federal and a state question against
the plaintiff in error: "[W]here the Federal question has been raised, and has been
decided against the plaintiff in error, the jurisdiction has attached, and it must be heard on
the merits." Id. at 645.
132. Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 627. The dissenting opinion of Justice Clifford,
joined by justice Swayne, agreed on this point. Id. at 638-39 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 634.
134. Id. at 636. The Court had earlier explained its rationale for proposition six:
But in the other cases supposed, why should ajudgment be reversed for an error
in deciding the Federal question, if the same judgment must be rendered on the
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Thus, "[t] he presence of a nonfederal question might require affirmance
of a judgment containing federal error, but would not bar the assump-
tion of jurisdiction to expose and correct that error."13 5
Nineteen years after Murdock, however, Eustis v. Bowles characterized
the adequate nonfederal ground as 'jurisdictional" in the sense that we
now understand that term. 1'3 6 Indeed, the unanimous Court suggested
that an intellectual sea change had already occurred:
It is likewise settled law that, where the record discloses that if a
question has been raised and decided adversely to a party claim-
ing the benefit of a provision of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, another question, not Federal, has been also
raised and decided against such party, and the decision of the
latter question is sufficient, notwithstanding the Federal ques-
tion, to sustain the judgment, this court will not review the
judgment. 137
This statement was in fact wrong. In Eustis the state court had not
decided any federal question; instead, it had put its decision entirely
on the basis of state law.' 3 8 Klinger v. MissouriI 39 and Johnson v.
other points in the case? And why should this court reverse a judgment which is
right on the whole record presented to us; or where the same judgment will be
rendered by the court below, after they have corrected the error in the Federal
question?
Id. at 634-35.
135. Yale Note, supra note 129, at 1464; see also Edward Hartnett, Why Is the
Supreme Court of the United States Protecting State Judges from Popular Democracy?, 75
Tex. L. Rev. 907, 924 (1997) [hereinafter Hartnett, Protecting] (noting that Murdock did
not treat the nonfederal ground doctrine as jurisdictional, but that, with Eustis v. Bolles,
150 U.S. 361 (1893), "the Court shifted ground somewhat and held that if the state court's
judgment rested [on an independent, nonfederal ground], it would simply refuse to hear
the case"); Hill, supra note 71, at 954 n.38 ("In Murdock v. City of Memphis, the Court...
took the position that the presence of an independent state ground did not deprive it of
jurisdiction to affirm." (citation omitted)); Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch,
Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the
Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1291, 1309,
1320-21, 1359-62 (1986) (stating the "unassailable historical fact" that "from the Supreme
Court's decision in Murdock v. City of Memphis in 1875, until its decision in Eustis v. Bolles in
1893,... the Court authorized reaching and deciding the correctness of federal questions
in cases containing state grounds held by the Court to be adequate and independent").
The current edition of Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 494, notes that Murdock does not
state the current practice.
136. Eustis, 150 U.S. at 366, 370 (dismissing writ of error). jurisdiction is understood
to be judicial authority to decide a case one way or the other. United States v. Cotton, 535
U.S. 625, 630 (2002).
137. Eustis, 150 U.S. at 366.
138. Id. at 368-70. The lack of jurisdiction in Eustis was old law. See Justice Story's
opinion in Crowell v. Randell, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 368, 391-92 (1836) (holding that unless a
federal question was raised and decided in the state court, section 25 did not vest the
Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction).
139. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 257, 263 (1871) (dismissing writ of error where the Court was
not certain that the state court had decided a federal question).
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Risk, 4 ' both cited in Eustis,"'' also were cases where the state court had
not decided any federal question.142 The language of both section 25 of
the Act of 1789 and the 1867 Act required that the federal question had
been raised and decided adversely to the plaintiff in error.' 4 -1
Eustis, nonetheless, proved to be a harbinger of times to come. Over
the course of time, the modern version of the nonfederal ground
doctrine as a 'jurisdictional" limitation increasingly took hold. 144
Appeals from state courtjudgments resting upon a nonfederal ground
were increasingly dismissed rather than affirmed. 145  More impor-
tantly, the alleged federal errors went uncorrected.' 4"3 The Court's
adoption in 1928 of Supreme Court Rule 12, which required submission
of a jurisdictional statement prior to oral argument on appeals from
the state courts, solidified current doctrine. 14 7 Today, for both the
140. 137 U.S. 300, 309 (1890) (dismissing writ of error where it was unclear whether
the state court had decided a federal question, or had based its decision wholly on state
law).
141. 150 U.S. at 366-67.
142. In Murdock, by contrast, a federal question was presented and decided by the
state court. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 637 (1874).
143. The two acts are set outt in parallel columns in Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at
592-93. Analytically, decisions like Euslis do not involve the adequate nonfederal ground.
"Where the case involves no federal question, review .. , must be denied, not because the
state court decision was based upon [an adequate] non-federal ground . . . .but because
the case submitted to and decided by the state court involved non-federal questions only."
Reynolds Robertson & Francis Robison Kirkham,Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
United States § 85, at 150 n.7 (1936). The Court's current attitude towards the
'jurisdictional" nature of claims of federal error not raised and decided in the state courts
is discussed in Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 542-44.
144. See sUtpra note 136. Still, as late as the 1940s, several commentators viewed the
adequate nonfederal ground rule as simply "a rule of practice." See Weisberg, supra note
129, at 768 (arguing that "the basis of the non-federal ground rule . . . is a self-imposed
limitation"); Yale Note, supra note 129, at 1463 (noting that nonfederal ground rule was
"originated by the Court simply as a convenient canon of selflimitation").
145. See, e.g., Live Oak Water Users' Ass'n v. R.R. Comm., 269 U.S. 354, 359 (1926)
("In cases where the state court has decided a local question adequate to support its
judgment this court has sometimes affirmed, and sometimes has dismissed the writ of
error. We have again considered tie matter and have concluded that, generally at least, it
is better practice to dismiss." (citations omitted)). Here, too, however, the Court had
concluded that appellate jurisdiction was lacking becatuse, unlike Murdock, the record did
not show that a federal question had been raised in the state courts. Id. at 358-59; see also
cases cited supra notes 131 and 136.
146. See, e.g., Enter. Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164
(1917) (stating that where the state court decision rests on an adequate and independent
state ground, "the judgment does not depend upon the decision of any federal question
and we have no power to disturb it").
147. Revised Rules of the Suprene Court of the United States, 275 U.S. 595, 603
(1928) (requiring litigants to file "forty copies of a printed statenent particularly disclosing
the basis on which it is contended this Court has jurisdiction"). On the prior practice, see
Hart & Wechsler, Fourth Edition, spIa note 66, at 646. Rule 12, which was adopted to
ensure that litigants not be able to cast their claims as appeals, rather than as discretionary
petitions for certiorari, was amended in 1932, Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the
1950 [Vol. 103:1919
2003] STATE LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 1951
Court 148 and most commentators, 49 the nonfederal ground doctrine
goes to the Court's 'jurisdiction."' 5" For the Court to disregard a state
court judgment supported by an adequate nonfederal ground is now
thought to contravene principles of federalism and Article III's prohibi-
tion of advisory opinions. ' 5'
United States, 286 U.S. 575, 602-03 (1932), and again in 1936, Amendment of Rules:
Order, 297 U.S. 733, 733 (1936).
Since the adoption of Rule 12 .... under the terms of which the Court considers
the question of its jurisdiction prior to oral argument, the uniform practice has
been to dismiss appeals from state courts when examination of the statements
filed pursuant to that Rule disclose the existence of an adequate non-federal
ground.
Robertson & Kirkham, supra note 143, § 85, at 150 n.8. See generally Felix Frankfurter &
Adrian S. Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1935 and
1936, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 577, 582-97 (1938). The authors state that Rule 12 "affords one of
the most fascinating studies in the history ofjudicial procedure." Id. at 582. It reinforced
the steps taken in the Judiciary Act of 1925 towards making the Court's appellate work
discretionary by screening out efforts by lawyers to invoke inappropriately the Court's
mandatory jurisdiction over appeals. Id. at 582-83. But the conception of the
jurisdictional nature of the adequate nonfederal ground antedates Rule 12.
148. E.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945) (statingjurisdictional nature
of nonfederal ground doctrine).
149. E.g., authorities cited supra note 135; Cynthia L. Fountaine, Article III and the
Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 1053, 1082-83
(1994) (stressing the redressability requirement of Article 1l1).
150. I should note that some commentators still view the adequate nonfederal ground
doctrine as no more than "a self imposed prudential restraint showing respect for state
autonomy." Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 83 n.10; see also supra note 144.
151. See Pitcairn, 324 U.S. at 125-26 (emphasizing both federalism and Article III).
The Court spoke of "the partitioning of power between the state and federal judicial
systems," and of "the limitations of our own jurisdiction." Id. at 125; see also, e.g.,
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983) ("Respect for the independence of state
courts, as well as avoidance of rendering advisory opinions, have been the cornerstones of
this Court's refusal to decide cases where there is an adequate and independent state
ground."); Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 82-83 & n.10 (citing cases illustrating the
jurisdictional limits of the adequate nonfederal ground doctrine). That the state ground
must have at least a tenable foundation in state law, already stated in earlier decisions, see
supra note 134, received its canonical statement in Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17, 22
(1920), which held that the Supreme Court would review whether a nonfederal ground of
decision had "fair or substantial support" in state law. See infra Part III.A.
Implicit in the nonfederal ground doctrine is the idea that the Court's jurisdiction
exists "to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions." Pitcairn, 324 U.S. at 126; see
also Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033, 1034 (1996), in which Justice Ginsburg, joined by
Justice Souter, explained that they had voted against review even though the issue was one
"of great national importance" because the petition "challenge[d only] the rationale" and
not the judgment of the court below. But see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 1601 n.5
(criticizing Justice Ginsburg's view on the facts of the case); cf. Price v. United States, 123
S. Ct. 986, 986 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Five Members of this Court have previously
expressed their disapproval of vacating and remanding a Court of Appeals decision
favorable to the Government in response to the Government's acknowledgment of error,
not in the judgment below, but merely in the reasoning on which the lower court relied.").
Agreeing with Pitcairn, Professor Hartnett takes a further step and argues that the
reasoning in Supreme Court opinions may be entitled to deference, but only judgments
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The modern conception of the nonfederal ground doctrine necessa-
rily invites attention to the existence and the scope of the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction to review state-court determinations of state
law. Murdock is instructive on both issues. Former Supreme CourtJustice
Benjamin Curtis's amicus brief argued that once the Court had properly
secured appellate jurisdiction, it had ancillary jurisdiction to decide every
legal issue in the case before it.15 2 Why? Because under Article III sub-
ject matter jurisdiction exists over "cases," not "issues" in cases.' 53 Draw-
ing upon language in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,' 54 Curtis insisted
that the original and the appellate jurisdiction were coextensive; in sup-
port he pointed to removed cases, where the federal court could deter-
mine all (including state law) legal issues.1 55 Other eminent judges have
agreed with this analysis. "If we have jurisdiction at all," Justice Bradley
wrote in Murdock, "we have jurisdiction of the case, and not merely of a
question in it."1 56 The Court itself, however, expressed alarm at the
require obedience. Edward Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 123, 126-27 (1999). Insofar as the Supreme Court itself is concerned, it
may be conceded that, "There is, of course, an important difference between the holding
in a case and the reasoning that supports that holding." Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S.
574, 585 (1998). But, contrary to Professor Hartnett, this distinction has little resonance in
current American judicial practice so far as courts inferior to the Supreme Court are
concerned. The state courts show no disposition to believe that they need not render
obedience to the reasoning announced in Supreme Court opinions, no matter how
perplexing. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 596 (2002) (noting that the state court
"understand[s] that it was bound by the Supremacy Clause" to apply Supreme Court
constitutional principles announced in an earlier decision even through they were based
upon a misconception of state law). The lower federal courts recognize that even Supreme
Court dicta is entitled to weight. See, e.g., McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301,
1315 (11 th Cir. 1998) ("Because of considerations having to do with the first word in that
court's name, Supreme Court dicta may be a different matter insofar as 'inferior courts'
such as our own and the district courts are concerned."); Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d
214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[T]his court considers itself bound by Supreme Court dicta
almost as firmly as by the Court's outright holdings, particularly when the dicta is recent
and not enfeebled by later statements.").
152. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 602-06 (1874). Justice
Curtis published his brief in his work on federal jurisdiction. Benjamin Robbins Curtis,
Jurisdiction, Practice, and PeculiarJurisprudence of the Courts of the United States 54-58
(George Ticknor Curtis & Benjamin R. Curtis eds., Boston, Little, Brown 1880).
153. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 333 (1816) ("The
judicial power shall extend to all the cases enumerated in the constitution.").
154. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 820 (1824) (stating that, except with respect to cases in
which the Court is given originaljurisdiction, "[i] n every other case, the judiciall power is
to be exercised in its original or appellate form, or both, as the wisdom of Congress may
direct").
155. Curtis, supra note 152, at 56-58. If this argument is thought persuasive, the
Supreme Court could review and decide for itself all state-court determinations of state law
on appeals from state courts so long as the litigants satisfied the diversity requirements of
Article Ill. For a careful criticism of the "whole case" theory, see Fitzgerald, supra note 17,
at 153-58.
156. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 641 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford, joined by
Justice Swayne, agreed in part. In his view, if the state court had wrongly decided the
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thought that once it had jurisdiction because of the presence of a federal
question, "everything in the case is open to 're-examination."1 57 If this
were correct, the Court opined, "it follows that every case tried in any
State court, from that of a justice of the peace to the highest court of the
State, may be brought to this court for final decision on all the points
involved in it."'1 58 Such an undesirable consequence impelled the Court
to conclude that it lacked statutory jurisdiction to undertake such review.
Indeed, the Court seemingly disclaimed any authority whatsoever to en-
gage in review of state-court determinations of state law:
But this examination into the points in the record other than
the Federal question is not for the purpose of determining
whether they were correctly or erroneously decided, but to as-
certain if any such have been decided, and their sufficiency to
maintain the final judgment, as decided by the State court.
Beyond this we are not at liberty to go .... 159
Murdock, it should be noted, clearly established that the existence of
ajurisdiction-conferring federal question in the record was, by itself, not
sufficient to authorize jurisdiction in the Court to decide all issues of state
law in the case. But how about some? In a classic essay, Herbert Wechs-
ler argued that the Court could do so when-and only when-"the exis-
tence, application or implementation of a federal right turns on the reso-
lution of a logically antecedent issue of state law." 1 60 That is, the Court
could review state law claims upon which the litigant must first prevail in
order to prevail on the federal claim. Murdock itself nicely illustrates the
distinction. The state court plaintiff had claimed rights to real property
under both a conveyance governed entirely by state law and also under a
federal question, the Supreme Court could decide all the state law issues in the case. Id. at
638-39 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 628.
158. Id. While noting that the Court's resolution of the statutory issue is open to
question, Professor Wiecek concluded that the Court was concerned with its mounting
case load. In any event, he believes that Murdock was "a godsend for the American federal
system." William M. Wiecek, Murdock v. Memphis: Section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act and
Judicial Federalism, in Origins of the Federal Judiciary 223, 242-43 (Maeva Marcus ed.,
1992).
159. Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 635. The Court continued, "[A]nd we can only go
this far to prevent the injustice of reversing a judgment which must in the end be
reaffirmed, even in this court, if brought here again from the State court after it has
corrected its error in the matter of Federal law." Id. The Court did suggest that Congress
might confer broader authority. Id. at 620 ("We are under no necessity, then, of supposing
that Congress, in the section we are considering, intended to confer on the Supreme Court
the whole power which, by the Constitution, it was competent for Congress to confer in the
class of cases embraced in that section."); see also St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v.
Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 292 (1908) ("[O]ur jurisdiction [over decisions of state courts]
extends only to the cases there enumerated, even though a wider jurisdiction might be
permitted by the constitutional grant of power.").
160. Wechsler, Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 24, at 1054.
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subsequent act of Congress.'"' The state court rejected both grounds,
and the Supreme Court affirmed the rejection of the federal claim.' 62
But the Court ordered reargument on the question whether it had juris-
diction to review the state-court determination of state law. 163 A 5-3 ma-
jority answered the question in the negative on statutory grounds. Wechs-
ler agreed. Were either ground sustained, he observed, the plaintiff
would have fully prevailed. Thus the state and federal claims were logi-
cally and functionally independent.' 6 4 Accordingly, no appellate jurisdic-
tion existed over the state law claim.
While Wechsler's position is fully consistent with Murdock, that deci-
sion does not suggest, let alone invoke, Wechsler's analysis. Nor can I
find it clearly articulated in prior works.'6 5 This is Wechsler's own effort,
a successful one I believe, to clarify and rationalize principles foreshad-
owed in a few prior decisions. 166 Hart and Wechsler correctly state that
[t] he distinction between these two types of cases [described by Wechs-
161. Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 596-98. While this would now be the standard
account of the case, Justice Bradley's dissent persuasively argued that the record in fact
presented no federal question. Id. at 639-41 (BradleyJ., dissenting).
162. Id. at 601. On further consideration, the Court again affirmed its rejection of
the federal claim. Id. at.636-38.
163. Id. at 601-02.
164. See Wechsler, Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 24, at 1056 (arguing that the
Supreme Court should not review state law where the state and federal claims are "wholly
independent of each other"). By contrast, Wechsler observed, had resolution of the state
law claim stood in the way of the vindication of the federal claim, the Supreme Court could
review the state-court determination. Id. at 1050-56. For example, suppose that the
plaintiff claimed a federal right and the defendant: (a) set up the state statute of
limitations, and (b) denied the existence of the asserted federal right. For the plaintiff to
prevail, he or she must prevail on both issues. Since the state law claim is logically anterior
to the federal claim, nuder Wechsler's view the Supreme Court could exercise
independent judgment if the statute of limitations defense were sustained. Id.
165. See, for example, the comprehensive discussion in Robertson & Kirkham, supra
note 143, §§ 84-90, which contains no hint of the distinction. Revealingly, they qualify
their discussion thus: "Whether or not the non-federal ground rule may properly be said
to present a limitation of a strictly jurisdictional nature . I..." Id. § 85, at 150 n.8. This
formulation ignores the circumstances in which, according to Wechsler, the nonfederal
ground does involve constitutionally mandated jurisdictional limitations.
166. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816), does foreshadow
Wechsler's distinction. After concluding that the Court could examine the title to real
property tinder state law that was alleged to be protected from confiscation by treaty,
Justice Story said that section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not permit it to examine
unrelated state law issues. See id. at 358-59; infra note 276 and accompanying text
(quoting Martin). Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 376 (1821), contains a
similar suggestion, as does Smith v. Maryland, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 286, 304-05 (1810). The
closest modern anticipation of Wechsler's formulation of which I am aware is Fox Film
Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935). Justice Sutherland wrote, "The construction put
upon the contracts did not constitute a preliminary step which simply had the effect of
bringing forward for determination the federal question, but was a decision which
automatically took the federal question out of the case if otherwise it would be there." Id.
at 211.
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ler] is critical to understanding this area of the law."', 67 The authors
explain:
"Antecedent" vs. "Distinct" State Law Grounds. In Murdock, the
non-federal issue . . .was logically (and functionally) quite dis-
tinct from any issue of federal law; answering the state law ques-
tion was not a necessary antecedent to any question of federal
law. Put differently, had the Supreme Court resolved the fed-
eral issue in favor of Murdock (the purported federal
rightholder), he would have obtained all the relief he sought,
regardless of the state court's resolution of the non-federal
issues.
In Martin v. Hunters Lessee, by contrast, the state law ques-
tion (did the Commonwealth of Virginia obtain title by escheat
before any federal treaty took effect) was an essential antece-
dent to the application of the federal treaty provisions giving
protection to then-existing land titles.16 8
In light of the foregoing discussion of the adequate nonfederal
ground doctrine, the Court's recent decision in Green Tree Financial Corp.
v. Bazzle169 is puzzling. There, homeowners brought state-court class ac-
tions against a commercial lender alleging violations of the state con-
sumer protection law. Petitioner moved to compel arbitration pursuant
to a provision in the lending agreements, a provision governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).'7° The FAA, which provides protection
for state-law created interests, has been interpreted to be a kind of equal
protection clause: State laws targeting arbitration clauses for unfavorable
treatment are preempted;' 7 1 the validity of arbitration provisions, how-
ever, is determined in accordance with ordinary state-law contract princi-
167. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 493. Wechsler identified the most typical and
most pervasive fact pattern. As previously noted, I would, however, slightly recast
Wechsler's formulation to embrace cases like Bush v. Gore, which could be seen as involving
logically antecedent questions of state law, but which might better be understood as
involving constitutional constraints upon, or indeed constitutional incorporation of, state
law. For me, whenever the Constitution directly makes relevant the content of state law at
a given point in time, the Supreme Court possesses appellate jurisdiction to review what
the state law was at the relevant point in time.
168. Id. That is, "Martin had to prevail on both the non-federal issue (that his chain
of title had not been divested at the time of the Treaty of Peace) and the federal law issue
(that the Treaty protected that title against the Act of Compromise or other [state
legislature] efforts to divest it)." Id.
169. 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003).
170. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000).
171. Courts are directed "to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other
contracts." EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293 (2002). The development of
the Court's jurisprudence in this area is sharply and powerfully criticized in Paul D.
Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 331, 331 ("So
bold has the Court been [in rewriting arbitration laws] that its work ... could be said to
exemplify the indeterminacy of American law, confirming the hypothesis . . . that our
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ples.' 7 2 In Green Tree, petitioner claimed that the arbitration provision
clearly precluded class-wide arbitration. Applying state contract law, how-
ever, the state supreme court held that the arbitration provision was silent
on that question, and in those circumstances ordinary state contract law
permitted class-wide arbitration.173 The Supreme Court vacated thejudg-
ment. Justice Breyer's four-person plurality began:
Whether Green Tree is right about the contracts themselves
presents a disputed issue of contract interpretation. The Chief
Justice believes that Green Tree is right; indeed, that Green
Tree is so clearly right that we should ignore the fact that state
law, not federal law, normally governs such matters and reverse
the South Carolina Supreme Court outright.1 74
So far, so good. Yet Justice Breyer then went on to say: "At the same
time, we cannot automatically accept the South Carolina Supreme
Court's resolution of this contract-interpretation question. Under the
terms of the parties' contracts, the question-whether the agreement for-
bids class arbitration- is for the arbitrator to decide." 75 But why wasn't
the entire Court bound to "automatically accept" the state court decision?
Since there was no claim that the state law impermissibly targeted the
arbitration provision for hostile treatment, no federal claim apparently
existed. Whether the state court correctly determined an allocation issue
(i.e., who decides, court or arbitrator) is an issue of state contract law
only, and one that is not antecedent to any federal claim, and thus, stan-
dard application of the adequate nonfederal ground doctrine should
have barred review. Or is the Court implicitly "federalizing" arbitration
law, at least in terms of allocation of roles between courts and
arbitrators?'17
judges... are uncontrolled by legal texts or precedents and free to decide cases according
to their own political predilections.").
172. Courts "should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of
contracts." First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); accord Stone v.
Doerge, 328 F.3d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 2003) (Easterbrook, J.) (stating that most disputes
about the scope or meaning of an arbitration clause "must be resolved under state law").
Applying, at least ostensibly, ordinary state law contract principles of unconscionability,
lower courts have increasingly refused to enforce one-sided arbitration clauses, particularly
in the employment context. E.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1170-73
(9th Cir. 2003).
173. Green Tree, 123 S. Ct. at 2404. The ChiefJustice, joined by Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy, dissented. Id. at 2409 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Stevens joined the
plurality's disposition because the class-wide arbitration "was correct as a matter of law."
Id. at 2408 (Stevens,J., concurring). Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that the FAA
was inapplicable in state courts. Id. at 2411 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 2406 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
175. Id. at 2407.
176. Justice Breyer seems particularly enamored of such an approach. See, e.g.,
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-86 (2002) (distinguishing between
"gateway" issues concerning arbitration which require judicial resolution, and other
arbitration issues that are properly left to the arbitrator). Concurring in the result, Justice
Thomas thought the allocation issue was simply a matter of state law. Id. at 87 (Thomas, J.,
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III. SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF STATE LAW DETERMINATIONS IN
FEDERAL CASES
This Part is the normative heart of the Article: It examines the scope
of the Court's authority to review state-court determinations of state law
in constitutional cases. That is, to what extent can the Court examine the
state law materials properly before the state court and determine for itself
what the state law was at a given point in time.
A. Introduction and Partial Conclusion
Beginning with an exploration of the implications of the Supremacy
Clause, this Part examines the merits of what have emerged as the two
competing standards of review: independent judgment and deference
(fair support) review. Acknowledging the appeal of deference review, I
submit that independentjudgment is the ultimate measure of the Court's
jurisdictional authority. Part III.B provides numerous historical examples
of the exercise of such review.
1. The Supremacy Clause. - On the same day that the constitutional
convention rejected an effort to invest Congress with a veto power over
state law, it adopted an early version of the Supremacy Clause. 177 This
meant that "it was [now] evident that the authority of the national gov-
ernment would depend on judicial enforcement." 178 Some review of
state-court state-law determinations seemed inevitable if the supremacy of
federal law was to be maintained. 179 Thus, in Bush v. Gore, no member of
the Court denied that some review of the state court's interpretation of
the Florida electoral law fell within the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Nor have many recent commentators. Professor Tribe, for example, cate-
gorically rejected the claim "that the concurring opinion poked its nose
concurring). Hart & Wechsler suggest that perhaps the Court means that if the allocation
issue is unclear, "there is a federal presumption (which a state court must respect) that the
issue is arbitrable .... Richard H. Fallon,Jr. et al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts
and the Federal System 15 (Supp. 2003). What would be the source of such a
presumption?
177. Rakove, supra note 81, at 82.
178. Id. at 173; see also id. at 81-82 (detailing the adoption of the Supremacy
Clause).
179. E.g., Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1920) (stating that claimants were
entitled to bring question of federal right to the Court); Hill, supra note 71, at 949, 990
(relying on the Supremacy Clause); Wechsler, Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 24, at
1054 (same). Such review is permissible whenever it is "necess[ary] to maintain the
effectiveness and uniformity of the federal law." Id. at 1056. Otherjustifications have been
advanced, such as the "whole case" theory, see supra text accompanying notes 152-158,
but they hold little attraction for modern commentators. Professor Currie playfully toys
with the argument that this view of the Constitution is not a logical necessity. The
constitutional constraints on state law could "as a matter of logic" take the state law as
conclusively determined by the state courts. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev 646, 686
n.256 (1982). But he, of course, recognizes that adoption of such a view would severely
undermine federal constitutional constraints. Id. at 686.
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
into a realm that was none of the Supreme Court's business .... [I]t
plainly was the Supreme Court's business, as it always is when a federal
constitutional norm speaks directly to a challenged exercise of state
powe r." 180
In a wide-ranging, elaborately documented, and provocative essay,
Professor Fitzgerald challenges these premises. Acknowledging that her
view "departs significantly from other commentary and from the Court's
practice for most (but not all) of its history,"' she argues that the prof-
fered state ground must be accepted at face value unless "proven mis-
trust" of the state ground has been established.18 2 "[T]he Court should
have to admit that mistrust and identify some concrete basis for it."' 8
That seems tantamount to effectively barring Supreme Court review of
the proffered nonfederal law ground, since few indeed will be the occa-
sions in which the Court will be prepared explicitly to charge the state-
court judges with violating their oaths to support the Constitution. 184
Professor Fitzgerald posits that "[t]he Constitution's values of state inde-
pendence and of federal supremacy have been in tension from the
start."'18 5 For her, however, principles of state autonomy permit virtually
no review of nonfederal grounds. Professor Fitzgerald's positive case for
such a far-reaching departure from our practice is, to my mind, not con-
vincing. 811 She argues that "Erie's principle of state-court prerogative
over state law should strongly influence any theory of Supreme Court ap-
pellate jurisdiction to reverse state-law grounds." 87 I agree. But nothing
180. Tribe, supra note 8, at 191.
181. Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 97.
182. See id. at 91-99.
183. Id. at 90. In other places, Professor Fitzgerald speaks of establishing "cheating"
by the state court. E.g., id. at 99, 177.
184. Id. at 99. She admits that her proposal entails "calling States names," but that is a
virtue, not a defect, because it will reign in the Court's "casual use of a reversal power that
does, after all, both encroach on states' turf and exceed the limits of the Court's formal
jurisdiction." Id. There are decisions that can be seen to rest on this conception. See id.
at 120 n.160. None is of recent vintage.
185. Id. at 115. 1 should add that I do not put these two Values on the same scale that
Professor Fitzgerald apparently does. The Supremacy Clause itself forbids that approach.
186. Some of her challenges to the more orthodox positions seem to proceed from
the premise that her position is correct ab initio. She argues, for example, that orthodox
theories give the Court "automatic subject matterjurisdiction to decide questions affecting
federal interests wherever those federal interests lurk." Id. at 162; see also id. at 159
(criticizing those holding the view that "the Court's central role in enforcing federal-law
supremacy gives it a standing jurisdiction to vindicate any federal right or other interest,
even (or, perhaps, especially) if it is lurking behind a state-law question" (footnote
omitted)). Few if any authors would endorse that formulation. She then adds, "even if it
means ignoring [the] formal jurisdictional ... bar on state ground reversals." Id. at 162.
This seems circular. The entire issue is what the adequate nonfederal ground
'jurisdictional bar" in fact means with respect to Supreme Court review of state law
determinations.
187. Id. at 92 n.47. Her Eri-based challenge is reinforced by her apparent objection
to existing doctrine as to what constitutes an "adequate" state ground. She apparently
objects to inadequacy holdings not required by the Constitution. Id. at 160. This is not the
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in that opinion or its logic suggests that it can be invoked to thwart the
supremacy'of valid federal law, as Herbert Wechsler long ago noted.' 8
More directly, Professor Fitzgerald invokes some of the Court's recent
federalism decisions.' 89 Decisions like Alden v. Maine, 9 11 barring private
damage actions against states, which she cites approvingly, are small beer
so far as threatening the supremacy of federal law is concerned. '91 More-
over, our constitutional order presupposes that valid federal law be capa-
ble of systematic enforcement, not that every individual wrong be
remediated by damages. 19 2 Effectively, as noted, Professor Fitzgerald
makes the state ground unreviewable. This is unacceptably narrow.193 "If
the Constitution and laws of the United States are to be enforced, this
Court cannot accept as final the decision of the state tribunal ... to bar
the assertion of [the federal right] even upon local grounds."'' 94
place to examine current adequacy doctrine, but I fail to see the link between current
adequacy doctrine and the Court's review of state-court determinations of state law.
Moreover, if she would hold that only constitutionally infirm grounds are inadequate, then
I would think that this augurs for greater, not lesser, scrutiny of the assertedly
"independent" state ground.
188. "Because of that relationship" (i.e., the state law is antecedent to the federal
claim) "the state court does not speak the final word on the state question .... Wechsler,
Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 24, at 1054 (quoted in Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 159
n.324).
189. Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 164-71. Fitzgerald does not rely upon decisions in
which the Court held that Congress had exceeded its regulatory powers. These surely
would not help her; no valid federal law is involved.
190. 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999); see Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 164-71. Apart from
the holding itself, she invokes its "trust the state courts" flavor. Id.
191. The Court's recent decisions involving the suability of the states pose no serious
threat to the supremacy of federal law. See Henry Paul Monaghan, The Supreme Court,
1995 Term-Comment: The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 Harv. L. Rev. 102,
132-33 (1996). Injunctions-in state court-against future breaches are readily available.
So too are suits by the United States for past damages.
192. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1778-79 (1991), discussed in Hart &
Wechsler, supra note 27, at 351-52. That some damage claims brought by individuals will
be barred by sovereign and official immunity doctrines hardly compromises the supremacy
clause-based principle of the need for effective systematic enforcement of federal law. But
Professor Fitzgerald's extended exegesis, arguing that Alden weakens the
"nondiscrimination" principle of Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), is revealing: She does
not explain why any such result is desirable in "Our Federalism." Fitzgerald, supra note 17,
at 164-70.
193. As Professor Hill put it, "it is plain that allowing the state courts the last word on
the threshold question [of the meaning of state law] ... would mean that ... [federal law]
would have only as much force as the state courts are willing to accord it." Hill, supra note
71, at 948-49. Indeed, under Professor Fitzgerald's proposal, the long lost nullification
power once claimed by state conventions and legislatures would inhere in the state courts.
See Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 89-91. In Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 n.1 (2000), the
Chief Justice, remarking on the Court's takings cases, said that the "constitutional
guarantee would, of course, afford no protection ... if our inquiry could be concluded by
a state supreme court holding that state property law accorded plaintiff no rights."
194. Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923) (citation omitted).
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2. Deference Review. - Courts and commentators alike now quite re-
flexively assume that narrow review suffices to maintain the supremacy of
federal law.'95 They ask only whether the state court interpretation has
fair support in state law; that is, is the state court's description of state law
reasonable?I 1'6 Justice Van Devanter's opinion in Ward v. Love County is
the doctrinal bellwether:
The right to the [property tax] exemption was a federal right,
and was specially set up and claimed as such in the petition....
[It] is within our province to inquire not only whether the right
was denied in express terms, but also whether it was denied in
substance and effect, as by putting forward non-federal grounds
of decision that were without any fair or substantial support. 19 7
Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. I' provides the best-known modern
example. A divided state court had rejected a due process retroactivity
challenge to a state statute on the ground that its own prior decisions did
not constitute fixed rules of property, but simply provided guidelines for
the exercise of discretion. 1 ' 9 Affirming, the Supreme Court said:
Even though the constitutional protection invoked be denied
on non-federal grounds, it is the province of this Court to in-
quire whether the decision of the state court rests upon a fair or
substantial basis .... But if there is no evasion of the constitu-
tional issue, and the non-federal ground of decision has fair sup-
port [the judgment must be affirmed] .211
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council2 1" arguably provides an even
more recent example. There, the Court held that "newly decreed" prop-
erty limitations depriving land of all viable use can constitute regulatory
takings if they do not "inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already
195. Michael Wells is one exception. He argues that "Bush is actually a simple case of
federal law constraining state authority .... No deference toward the state court's
interpretation of state law is called for in such a case." Wells, supra note 19, at 417. I fully
agree, of course, and I endorse Professor Wells's very apt formulation.
196. In the end, the ChiefJustice adopted that standard in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at
119-200 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring), and that is how the dissents understood his
opinion. See id. at 135-43 (GinsburgJ., dissenting); id. at 149-52 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
Professor Tribe agrees that such review is appropriate. For him, however, the Court's
conclusion that the Florida Supreme Court's decision went beyond the pale of
reasonableness "was itself utterly unreasonable." Tribe, supra note 8, at 191.
197. 253 U.S. 17, 22 (1920) (citations omitted). The fair support rule seems to have
been fully established at least as early as Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual
Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917).
198. 321 U.S. 36 (1944).
199. The statute prescribed a default rule for apportioniment between life tenants and
remaindermen under a will or trust of mortgage salvage operations. Id. at 41.
200. Id. at 42.
201. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see also Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156,
167-69 (1998) (holding that state law enacted prior to regulation determines whether
interest follows the principal).
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place upon land ownership." 20 2 In a footnote at the end of its opinion,
the Court admonished the state courts that any such determination must
be based on "an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents. '20 3
Fairly read, this language is quite consistent with deference review.2 0 4
Limited review of this nature can be seen as akin to step two Chevron
deference, 20 5 to borrow a perhaps imperfect analogy from administrative
law.20 6 Deference review has powerful attractions. First, when viewed
from the perspective of the role of state courts in "Our Federalism," 20 7
limited review recognizes the crucial point that our constitutional order
assumes the state courts' central expository role on the content of state
law.20 8 It recognizes, moreover, that (particularly in our time) the Su-
preme Court cannot formulate doctrine publicly expressing distrust of
202. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
203. Id. at 1032 n.18. The word "objectively" seems to be surplusage.
204. Lucas's author, Justice Scalia, urged deference review in his dissent in Rogers v.
Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 468-69 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See infra text
accompanying notes 316-317.
205. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) ("[Ilf
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute."). For a recent discussion of the reach of Chevron, see United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 229-38 (2001), and the thoughtful examination of Mead's implications in
DavidJ. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201.
206. In Bush v. Gore, justice Ginsburg expressly drew this parallel as supporting
narrow review. 531 U.S. 98, 136 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Chevron deference is
said to be based on an antecedent congressional grant of authority to the agency. See
Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-30 (stating that deference to administrative law making depends on
what authority Congress has conferred upon an agency); see also Yellow Transp. Inc. v.
Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45 (2002) (same); Barron & Kagan, supra note 205, at 212-25
(exploring the evolution of that explanation of Chevron and noting the decline of the
political accountability rationale that was expressed in Chevron itself). The authors
acknowledge the "perhaps . . . fictional" nature of what constitutes a congressional
delegation. Id. at 203. For an elaborate and probing account of what should constitute a
congressional authorization to an agency to promulgate rules having the force of law, see
Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The
Original Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 470-72 (2002) (arguing that agency rules
should be entitled to Chevron deference only if their violation triggers sanctions). But see
infra note 221 (demonstrating that application of Skidmore deference varies with the
circumstances).
Of course, in our constitutional order the states need no conferral of regulatory
authority from the Constitution or Congress. They enter the union possessed of a residual
or inherent authority to govern. They are, accordingly, generally free to allocate power
among their governmental units as they see fit. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 136-37
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing Chevron and residual state authority). Some
limitations on this freedom exist, however. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, First
Amendment "Due Process," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 524 n.23 (1970) [hereinafter Monaghan,
First Amendment].
207. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
208. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring) ("[Deference] to the
decisions of state courts on issues of state law . . . reflects our understanding that the
decisions of state courts are definitive pronouncements of the will of the States as
sovereigns." (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938))).
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the state courts. 2W0 And it draws considerable sustenance from a more
general current perception: the vast improvement of states (including
their courts) as governmental mechanisms. "The states are more profes-
sional, more capable, and less venal than they once were. They are also
less evidently out-of-step with mainstream national values, and those val-
ues are themselves less certain and single-minded than during such re-
formist periods as the 1960s.
' 2111
Second, deference review fits very comfortably with the transforma-
tion of the Supreme Court's role in "Our Federalism": from a court of
errors and appeals (that is, a court concerned not only with whether fed-
eral law has been correctly tnderstood but also with whether that law had
been correctly applied to the facts) to a court of general supervisory au-
thority over matters of federal law in order to ensure its uniformity and
enforceability. This change is the product of two general historical devel-
opments. Especially with the grant of general federal question jurisdic-
tion in 1875, Congress has conferred police-like (i.e., federal law enforce-
ment) functions on the district courts whenever it feared that state courts
might be insufficiently responsive to the commands of federal law. Corre-
spondingly, of course, this meant that the Supreme Court could distance
itself from its earlier role as a court of errors and appeals. Murdock was
fully cognizant of this development, and of its significance.2'I
Moreover, access as of right to the Supreme Court is now long past.
The increasingly discretionary nature of the Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion, symbolized by the Judiciary Act of 1925, greatly intensified the con-
ception of the Supreme Court as a tribunal entrusted with the ultimate
responsibility of maintaining the uniformity of valid federal law. Writing
of the Act, known as the Judges' Bill, in 1927, Frankfurter and Landis
stated:
At the heart of the proposal was the conservation of the Su-
preme Court as the arbiter of legal issues of national signifi-
209. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) ("We are unwilling to assume the
States will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United States.
The good faith of the States thus provides an important assurance that '[t] his Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be
the supreme Law of the Land.'" (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). Professor
Fitzgerald draws heavily on Alden's principle. Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 164-71. Yet her
"proven mistrust" would make exactly that assumption whenever it was successfully invoked
by petitioner. In those circumstances, however rare, the state court judges would stand
accused of violating their oath to support the Constitution.
210. Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's
Federalism Offensive, 51 Duke L.J. 477, 499 (2001). This theme is widely echoed in the
current political science literature. E.g., Jon C. Teaford, The Rise of the States: Evolution
of American State Government (2001) (stressing the role of the states in developing policy
and administrative reforms).
211. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 630-31 (1875). Murdock
was, however, decided on January 11, 1875, id. at 614, before the general grant of "arising
under"jurisdiction. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (2000)). The Court relied upon earlier, more specific, grants of that jurisdiction.
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cance. But this object could hardly be attained so long as there
persisted the obstinate conception that the Court was to be the
vindicator of all federal rights. This conception the Judges' Bill
completely overrode. Litigation which did not represent a wide
public interest was left to state courts of last resort and to the
circuit courts of appeals, always reserving to the Supreme Court
power to determine that some national interest justified invok-
ing its jurisdiction.2 12
In 1988, the Court's appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments be-
came wholly discretionary. 2 13 In addition, the Court now frequently re-
views only important "federal issues" in a case, not entire "cases or
controversies." 2 14
These developments are surely consonant with a narrow conception
of Supreme Court review of state-court determinations of state law.
Moreover, deference review might be thought desirable for another rea-
son: It reduces the possibility that the Supreme Court will get the state
law "wrong."'2 15 This argument, of course, rests on the premise that the
state court is more likely to be expert in its own law than is a distant court
in Washington, D.C. The danger of Supreme Court "error" seems to me
easily overstated. 21 6 Virtually the entire universe of constitutional cases in
which the Supreme Court would be asked to redetermine the content of
state law comprises situations in which the Constitution makes relevant
the content of state law at t1, and the claim is that it was impermissibly
212. Felix Frankfurter &James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 260-61
(1927). For a more recent expression of this point of view, see William H. Rehnquist, The
Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1986); see also Hart &
Wechsler, supra note 27, at 572.
213. Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.). For a summary presentation of the relevant statutes and their
evolution, see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 466-69 and 1852-56. The slow progress
toward almost eliminating the Court's obligatory jurisdiction is set out in detail in Hart &
Wechsler, supra note 27, at 1552-56.
214. This development is further increased by the practice-by no means securely
anchored in the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000)-of limited grants of certiorari. See
Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the
Judges' Bill, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1643, 1705-07, 1717 (2000); see also Hart & Wechsler,
supra note 27, at 1591-93 (discussing the complexities involved in limited grants of
review).
215. Another form of this argument is that what the state court says at t2 about what
the state law was at t, is the best evidence of that law, especially given our increased
appreciation of the indeterminacy of law. But careful students have noted that the
problem of indeterminacy can be overstated. Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and
Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 875, 929-30 (2003).
216. "The process of examining state law is unsatisfactory because it requires us to
interpret state laws with which we are generally unfamiliar .... Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1039 (1983).
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changed at t 2 .2 1 7 This is a rather narrowly focused inquiry, one in which
the Court will surely be alert to what the state court has said.2 1 11
3. Independent Judgment. - Despite its powerful attractions, the fair
support rule should be viewed as a rule of practice only. Article III itself
provides that "the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction both
as to Law and Fact," subject to congressional regulations and exceptions
and subsequently to the Seventh Amendment.2 1 9 Our constitutional
structure and history strongly support the view that, at least unless validly
restricted by an act of Congress, the Court possesses a residual ancillary
jurisdiction independently to determine the content of state law when-
ever the Federal Constitution directly constrains its operation or incorpo-
rates it. That ultimate authority allows the Court to fulfill its appropriate
role in "Our Federalism" in ensuring full enforcement of valid federal law.
Of course, in our federal system, the state court's exposition of state
law cannot be (and especially now) treated as irrelevant. But any defer-
ence due to the state court in these circumstances (to borrow again from
administrative law) need be no more than Skidmore deference: the state
court's "power to persuade.122 0 This, in turn, depends "upon the thor-
oughness evident in" the state court's "consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking the power to
control."22 1 These factors can produce "'substantial deference' ... to
near indifference. "222
217. In fact, many cases involve ti, tH1, til, etc. v. t2. "Until its decision in the present
case the Supreme Court of the State had uniformly held that the teacher's right to
continued employment by virtue of the indefinite contract created pursuant to the Act was
contractual." Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 105 (1938).
218. The Court rarely sees cases in which it was arguable that the state law was "open"
at the time that the Supreme Court decided to interpret it. See supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
219. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; id. amend. VIi. While the Seventh Amendment
does not apply to proceedings in the state courts, it is applicable when the Supreme Court
reviews those proceedings. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 577 (discussing Seventh
Amendment limitations on the Court's ability to review state-court proceedings).
220. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also, e.g., Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110-11 & n.6 (2002) (applying Skidmore
deference to EEOC's interpretive guidelines and only according deference to the extent of
the agency interpretation's "power to persuade" (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140)).
221. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). The Court added that
"[t]he fair measure of [Skidmore] deference to an agency administering its own statute has
been understood to vary with circunstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the
agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness
of the agency's position." Id. (footnote and citations omitted); see Barron & Kagan, supra
note 205, at 227 n.98 ("[A]pplication of Skidmore deference depends so much on context
and circumstance-the kind of agency, the kind of issue, the kind of decision .... ). At
oral argument in Clackamas Gastroentol Associates PC v. Wells, the United States referred to
this as "weight." Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Clackamas Gastroentol Assocs. v.
Wells, 123 S. Ct. 1673 (2003) (No. 01-1435).
222. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228.
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Supreme Court review inexorably confined to preventing evasion of
federal law is unwarrantably narrow. First, at least in high-visibility cases,
the practical (albeit perhaps not the logical) effect of such a principle is a
milder version of Professor Fitzgerald's "proven mistrust" standard: The
Supreme Court must "attribut[e] bad faith" or, I would add, at least intel-
lectual incompetence "to state officers sworn to uphold federal law."'2 23
As Bush v. Gore shows, this is surely a distasteful result, especially so in
high-visibility cases. For seven justices to believe that reversal was possible
only were the Court willing to publicly impugn the intellectual compe-
tence (if not the good faith) of the judges of the state court is, for me, not
an agreeable aspect of "Our Federalism." By contrast, to say, "We respect-
fully disagree," sends an altogether different message. 224 Second, apart
from its distasteful rhetoric, review limited to a search for evasion is too
historically contingent. The present, very amicable, relationship between
the Supreme Court and the state courts is assumed to be unproblematic
and enduring.2 25 Moreover, resistance to full implementation of federal
constitutional norms can occur at the retail level. 22 6 While we see little
evidence of that today,22 7 today is today, not yesterday, and not to-
morrow. We simply cannot predict when penetrating Supreme Court au-
thority to review state-court determinations of state law will be necessary
in "a constitution intended to endure for ages to come." 228
At the end of the day, moreover, state court evasion of federal norms
is not the ultimate issue; full enforcement of federal law is. No reason
223. Hill, supra note 71, at 970. As formulated, the standard could embrace, perhaps
as a prophylactic measure, not only intentional but also inadvertent gross error by the state
courts. So understood, the fair support rule would act as a filter that makes no assertion
about the good or bad faith of the particular interpretation rejected, but that is simply
calculated to reduce the opportunity for evasion in the aggregate.
224. The independent judgment rule is fairly characterized as a "nationalist" view of
Supreme Court jurisdictional authority; the fair support doctrine, a "federalist" or "state-
centered" one.
225. I acknowledge that it may well be, given the powerful economic, social, and
cultural forces drawing the nation ever more tightly together.
226. E.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (cited by the
ChiefJustice in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 114 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)). This
is one of several decisions in which the Alabama Supreme Court seemed determined to
assist the Alabama political branches in destroying the NAACP. See also Staub v. City of
Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 318-19 (1958) (indicating suspicion that state procedural rule had
been applied out of hostility to labor union organizing). See generally Hart & Wechsler,
supra note 27, at 551.
227. The state courts can often insulate themselves from review by invoking their own
constitution to "dissent" from Supreme Court rulings. Indeed,Justice Brennan urged that
course of conduct once he began to fall into a minority on his own Court. See William J.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
489 (1977). But, at best, this technique will result only in the overenforcement of federal
law; for example, when the state court invokes its own broad understanding of federal law
but also separately invokes a state law ground. The state court, however, cannot insulate
itself from a claim that federal law is being underenforced.
228. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat,) 316, 415 (1819).
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exists for a conception of our constitutional order that disables the Su-
preme Court from, in appropriate circumstances, ensuring that both the
uniformity and the supremacy of federal law are fully maintained. 221, Of
course, when coupled with the law enforcement role of the inferior fed-
eral courts, fair support review ordinarily will adequately discharge the
Court's obligations. But as a practical matter many cases, for example,
criminal prosecutions, will remain in the state courts. And more intrusive
review may be necessary, particularly in times of change, 2:31 or in certain
controversial areas of the law.23 1 Put differently, the fair support rule
best suits occasions when the Court "senses" no special need to intervene;
the independent judgment rule comes into play when the Court believes
otherwise, whether or not that belief can be clearly articulated.
What is the source of the independentjudgment (or, indeed, of the
fair support) doctrine?2 32 That is a topic for a paper at least as long as
this one. For now, I would stand upon the historical practice under sec-
tion 25 of the Judiciary Act and its successors. 233 Congress can fairly be
deemed to have authorized such ancillary jurisdiction.23 4 In a federal
system in which the Constitution, valid federal laws, and treaties are the
supreme law of the land, Supreme Court examination of state law in cases
properly removed from the state courts (either by removal to the district
courts or by removal on certiorari to the Supreme Court) is not anoma-
lous. 2 3 5 Perhaps congressional legislation narrowing the Court's ancillary
jurisdiction would be valid under Congress's power to make "Exceptions"
229. Like other courts, the Supreme Court is obliged to "give effect to the supreme
law of the land." Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev.
1001, 1006 (1965). The nature of the Court's obligation is, of course, what is at issue here.
Professor Hill eschews any inquiry into the bad faith of the state courts. For him, as for me,
the federal claims must be "given their due Under the supremacy clatuse." Hill, supra note
71, at 969-70. He apparently believes, as I do not, that Supreme Court review of state law
for "egregious" error or arbitrariness suffices for that purpose.
230. E.g., Patterson, 357 U.S. at 449 (civil rights); Staub, 355 U.S. at 313 (labor
organizing); see also stIpra note 226.
231. See, e.g., Monaghan, First Amendment, supra note 206, at 526-32 (describing
the Court's distrust of juries in defamation cases governed by New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
232. Professor Fitzgerald grounds her proven mistrust standard on the supremacy of
valid federal law-law that the Supreme Court can review-and the principle that the
Court has jurisdiction to review its own jurisdiction. Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 91.
Proven mistrust, if established, would compromise the last principle.
233. The early constitutional practice of Congress has been accorded special weight.
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 778-81 (2003) (emphasizing the importance of
early practice under the patent and copyright clauses for constitutional purposes).
234. Ancillaryjurisdiction has its roots in McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 415-19 (1819) (holding that the grant of power to Congress subsunes the grant of
ancillary powers to make the granted power effective); see also, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(2000) (authorizing supplemental jurisdiction).
235. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 271 (1879) (permitting removal to
the lower federal courts). Review in the Supreme Court of a state courtjudgment is simply
one form of removal of a proceeding fromt the state to the federal court.
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to the Court's appellate jurisdiction 2 36 if only federalism values are
thought to be at issue. Congress has considerable, albeit not unlimited,
power to determine the limits on the exercise of national institutional
authority against the states.2 3 7 But the inquiry becomes much more com-
plicated when Article III is also brought into sight. Of course, an impor-
tant distinction exists "between the obligation of a trial court to decide all
the issues fairly presented and the ability of an appellate court to limit its
review of issues of particular importance. '2 38 Article III, however, itself
establishes one "supreme Court. '239 Moreover, congressional authority
to limit the Court's jurisdiction once appellate jurisdiction exists over
cases involving federal subject matter is especially debatable. 2411 In the
end, however, it suffices for present purposes to claim that the Court's
historical practice provides support for the existence of an ancillary au-
thority to exercise independent judgment over state-law determinations
in federal cases.
B. The Historical Basis of Independent Judgment
When asked whether he believed in infant baptism, Old Ezra replied:
"Believe in it? Why, man, I've seen it done! ' 24 1 Like Old Ezra, I place a
considerable premium on the lessons of history and experience rather
236. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
237. Any standard work on the jurisdiction of the federal courts provides examples of
numerous limitations on the exercise of the potential jurisdiction of the district courts.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000) (Anti-Injunction Act).
238. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 1593 (citing DanielJ. Meltzer, Harmless Error
and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 15-17 (1994)).
239. U.S. Const. art. 111, § 1, cl. 1; see Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 (1996)
(Souter, J., joined by Stevens and Breyer, JJ., concurring) (questioning whether Congress
could limit the Court's appellate jurisdiction if it meant that the Court could not review
"divergent interpretations" in lower federal courts of federal statutes); see also James E.
Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior
Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433, 1441-42 (2000) (arguing that "supreme courts"
historically control "inferior" courts through use of the prerogative writs); James E.
Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's Supervisory Powers, 101
Colum. L. Rev. 1515, 1535 (2001) (semble). For some reason, Professor Pfander confines
his view to Supreme Court review of federal actions. If he is correct, it cannot be so
limited. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 315 (extending Professor Pfander's
discussion to the state court context).
240. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 337-42 (discussing, inter alia, United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871)).
241. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1975). Professor Ely has often spoken
to me of his admiration for Old Ezra and has very kindly inquired as to his health.
Professor Fallon is also acquainted with Old Ezra. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial
Legitimacy and the Unwritten Constitution: A Comment on Miranda and Dickerson, 45
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 119, 133 (2001) [hereinafter Fallon, Judicial Legitimacy]. Indeed, his
work is permeated with Old Ezra's emphasis on the importance of the lessons from history,
experience, and practice. I confess that I do not remember who first introduced me to this
grand old fellow.
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than upon soaring constitutional theory.2 42 But in this Article I do not
wish to impress a unity and clarity upon the historical materials that they
will not bear. Nor, of course, can I claim to be familiar with the entire
universe of potentially relevant precedent. And finally, any student of the
Court's decisions will be aware of "the oscillation of the Justices in review-
ing the state law issues-sometimes engaging in de novo review, some-
times in limited review, and sometimes deferring altogether. '24 3 For my
purposes, however, it suffices to point to the impressive historical support
that exists for the independent judgment rule as the ultimate measure of
Supreme Courtjurisdictional authority over state-court determinations of
state law in federal cases. History may not have the final say,2 4 4 but (per-
haps) it can illuminate the debate. Here, we principally examine four
lines of authority: (a) the now long forgotten treaty cases, one of which is
mentioned in a passing footnote in the Chief Justice's opinion in Bush v.
Gore and distinguished by Justice Ginsburg as involving exceptional cir-
cumstances; 245 (b) the Contract Clause cases, not mentioned by the Chief
Justice although they provide some of the best examples of penetrating
reexamination of state law; (c) a criminal retroactivity case decided only a
few weeks after Bush v. Gore; and (d) a brief discussion of decisions involv-
ing the adequate state ground doctrine itself.
This examination is best prefaced by recalling the early limitations
imposed by statutes and practices governing Supreme Court review of
state-court judgments. Four points about section 25 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789246 and its successors, now partially lost to memory, should be kept
in mind. First, until 1914, the statutes reached only state-courtjudgments
denying federal claims. 247 Second, review was by writ of error. Unlike
242. As Holmes put it, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." N.Y. Trust Co. v.
Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). To the best of my knowledge he never met Justice
Holmes, but I am sure that Old Ezra would heartily endorse these sentiments.
243. Hart & Wechsler, stIpra note 27, at 541. The authors preface this observation
with, "How do you explain ... ?" Id.
244. Professor Fallon rightly observes that no amount of tales told by Old Ezra can
itself yield a theory. See Fallonjudicial Legitimacy, supra note 241, at 133. Nor, of course,
can logic. As Judge Barak recently put it, "The life of the law is complex. It is not mere
logic. It is not mere experience. It is both logic and experience together." Aharon Barak,
The Supreme Court, 2001 Term-Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme
Court in a Democracy, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 16, 29-30 (2002); see also Oliver Wendell
Holmes,Jr., The Common Law (Boston, Little, Brown 1881) (discounting the importance
of logic in the development of the common law).
245. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 n.1 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at
139-40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
246. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 (2000)), quoted in Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 592-93
(1874).
247. See Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 626 ("[1] t is only upon the existence of certain
questions in the case that this court can entertain jurisdiction at all .... It must have been
decided in a certain way, that is, against the right set up tinder the Constitution, laws,
treaties, or authority of the United States."); Hartnett, Protecting, supra note 135, at
922-32 (describing origins of the 1914 Act, and arguing-quite implausibly, I believe, and
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appeal (where all questions of law, fact, and discretion were open), writ
of error review was ostensibly quite narrow: It reached only errors of fed-
eral law apparent on the face of the record.248 Third, until Murdock v.
City of Memphis, state court opinions were not part of the official record
under review, a fact no doubt that significantly accounts for early Su-
preme Court decisions that make little or no reference whatsoever to
them. 249 Fourth, and finally, section 25's final sentence had provided,
"But no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal...
than such as appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects the before
mentioned questions of validity or construction of the said constitution, trea-
ties, statutes, commissions, or authorities in dispute. '2 50 While the 1867
Act eliminated that sentence,2 51 Murdock, over three dissents, held that
Congress did not thereby intend to enlarge the Court's review over issues
of state law.
2 52
And so, were one to describe the formal properties of the framework
established by section 25, one might suppose that the Court's review was
restricted to the state court's interpretation of federal law. Murdock itself
said that the "system [established by section 25] has been based upon the
fundamental principle that this [Court's appellate] jurisdiction was lim-
ited to the correction of errors relating solely to Federal law." 253 That
language, however, cannot be taken literally. From the very beginning,
the Court regularly asserted "ancillary"jurisdiction to determine for itself
against decades of precedent-that state officials should not have the same access to
Supreme Court review as private litigants); see also Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1257).
248. See, e.g., Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 621-22, 624-25; Hill, supra note 71, at
955 n.43. This view is powerfully criticized in Robertson & Kirkham, supra note 143, § 97,
at 175. The authors observe that the writ of error authorized by section 25 properly
encompassed far more cases than did the common law writ and thus the ancient
restrictions should not have been uncritically transposed to Supreme Court review. Id.
249. "[N]othing but the case, as presented by the record and pleadings of the parties,
is considered, and the opinions of the court are never resorted to unless for the purpose of
assisting this court in forming their own opinions." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 380 (1816) (Johnson, J., concurring). Murdock acknowledged the propriety
of referring to the opinions of the state courts. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 633-34. The Court
noted that the 1867 Act had eliminated "the face of the record" language, and it invoked
that development to give sanction to what had become the Court's increasing practice of
looking to the state court opinions. Id.
250. Section 25, 1 Stat. at 86-87 (emphasis added).
251. Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 385, 386-87.
252. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 632-33. On the point of congressional intent, the decision
is open to challenge, as Professor Warren long ago noted. 2 Charles Warren, The
Supreme Court in United States History 682 (rev. ed. 1947). The deletion could be
understood to have expressed a congressional fear that state law could be used to
implement state court animosity to federal law. The Court itself noted this argument but
rejected it on the basis of "eighty-five years of the administration of the law." Murdock, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) at 632. Earlier, the Court noted that Congress had given the circuit courts
specific forms of "arising under" jurisdiction to ensure adequate enforcement of federal
law. Id. at 631; see also supra note 211.
253. Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 630.
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questions of law application and of adjudicative fact bearing on the
claimed federal right or immunity.2 54 More importantly here, as the fol-
254. In theory the writ of error precluded Supreme Court review of fact finding. See
Egan v. Hart, 165 U.S. 188, 189 (1897) (holding that the "nature of a writ of error" and
"the rulings of this court from the beginning, make it clear that on error to a state
court . . . when the facts are found by the court below, this court is concluded by such
findings"); John J. Gibbons, Federal Law and the State Courts 1790-1860, 36 Rutgers L.
Rev. 399, 399 (1984) (" [T] he Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over state courts was
limited to what was considered the bare minimum essential for the preservation of the
supremacy of national law-review of state final judgments rejecting federal law claims.").
But the Court regularly engaged in just such an enterprise. In Fiske v. Kansas, the Court
said:
[T]his Court will review the finding of facts by a State court where a federal right
has been denied as the result of a finding shown by the record to be without
evidence to support it; or where a conclusion of law as to a Federal right and a
finding of fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon
the Federal question, to analyze the facts.
274 U.S. 380, 385-86 (1927); cf. Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923) (holding state
court findings of fact not conclusive). Writing in 1936, Robertson and Kirkham treated
Fiske as stating the customary, not the exceptional, rule. Robertson & Kirkham, supra note
143, § 90, at 159-60. More recently, albeit no longer in the context of the formal
limitations of a writ of error, the Court has emphatically asserted the power to make a quite
extensive inquiry as to the historical facts bearing upon the federal claim. For two striking
examples, see Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 538-44 (1965) (reexamining adjudicative
facts by selecting them from the evidence presented and arranging them in sequence) and
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590 (1935) (holding that the Court may analyze the facts
"whenever a conclusion of law of a state court as to a federal right and findings of fact are
so intermingled that the latter control the former" (citations omitted)). For a general
discussion, see Monaghan, Fact, supra note 26, discussing the extent of independent
judgment appellate courts may exercise over adjudicative facts decisive of constitutional
questions.
Here too, however, absent unusual circumstances, the usual practice is to accept state
court conclusions with respect to facts if they have a reasonable evidentiary basis. Indeed,
the language of deference is often used. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041
(2003) (reviewing decisions treating discriminatory intent injury selection as a question of
fact in which the state court decision is "accorded significant deference"). "Thus, despite
the Court's authority to review state court findings of fact, in practice such findings are
almost never disturbed." Hart & Wechsler, Fourth Edition, supra note 66, at 598; see also
Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 574 ("Cases in which the Supreme Court has in fact
overturned state-court determinations of historical fact are extremely rare."). Nor-is and
Cox were unusual cases. Nonetheless, the level of the Court's potential penetration of the
factual record should not be ignored. 'Justice Goldberg's majority opinion [in Cox] began
with a factual recitation of what had occurred that was based not on state-court
factfindings, but rather on his reading of the testimony in the record." Hart & Wechsler,
Fourth Edition, supra note 66, at 603; see also Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 578
("The Supreme Court, when it considers a state court's application of federal legal
standards to the facts as found, routinely engages in de novo review rather than deferring
to the state court's determination.").
At least on one occasion, the Court asserted the same authority with respect to the
factual underpinnings of state law grounds asserted to be adequate to support the state
court judgment. In Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920), carefully, albeit
unsympathetically, examined in Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 125-29, the state court held
that members of an Indian tribe had "voluntarily" paid contested taxes and that such
payment precluded a suit to recover the taxes. The Supreme Court apparently understood
1970
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lowing pages demonstrate, the same kind of review was applied to state-
court determinations of state law. Characterization of state law,2 5 5 it
should be emphasized, was not the central issue. Rather, the Court ex-
amined the legal materials properly before the state court and deter-
mined for itself what the state law was at the constitutionally relevant
point in time. 25
6
1. Treaty Cases. - Now long forgotten, litigation arising out of the
Revolutionary War provides the earliest example of the independent
judgment rule. 257 Unsurprisingly, the new Americans were far from anx-
ious to pay their debts to English subjects, or, more importantly here, to
return land that they had acquired during and after the war.25 8 Article VI
of the 1783 Treaty of Peace provided that "there shall be no future confis-
cations made" of property held by British subjects.259 The 1794 Jay
Treaty added:
the state court's determination to be one of fact, and it concluded, contrary to the state
supreme court, that the payments were not voluntary and that the state court fact finding
did not rest upon fair or substantial support: "The facts set forth in the petition, all of
which were admitted by the demurrer ... make it plain, as we think, that the finding or
decision that the taxes were paid voluntarily was without any fair or substantial support."
Ward, 253 U.S. at 23. The Court cited no state-court case law. No Oklahoma decisions
were examined, and the state court's ruling had precedential support. Bd. of Comm'rs v.
Ward, 173 P. 1050, 1051 (Okla. 1918). Contrary to Professor Fitzgerald, I see nothing that
could be characterized as "vehemently nationalist" in the Court's decision. Fitzgerald,
supra note 17, at 126 n.189. The Court could have (and perhaps should have) disposed of
the issue on straight preemption grounds: The state rule with respect to what constituted a
voluntary payment was so harsh that it was incompatible with the federal tax immunity.
The case was not about the facts; they simply exemplified the draconian effects of the
substantive rule. In ordinary practice, however, we see the same pattern: the assertion of a
sweeping power to reexamine findings by the state court, but a day-to-day practice that is
far less intrusive.
255. See supra Part II.A.
256. That pattern of review did not contravene the last sentence of section 25. No
textual reason exists as to why issues of fact and of state law cannot "immediately respect[ I
the before mentioned [federal] questions." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 2, § 25, 1 Stat. 73,
86-87 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000)).
257. In Bush v. Gore, the Chief justice obliquely mentions Martin v. Hunter's Lessee in a
footnote. 531 U.S. 98, 115 n.1 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg
viewed the decision as a product of unusual times. Id. at 139-40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
258. See Wythe Holt, "To Establish justice": Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and
the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 Duke L.J. 1421, 1438-49 (1989), which provides
an exhaustive account of the American hostility to their British and Glasgow creditors
before, during, and after the Revolutionary War. While the Constitution permitted
alienage jurisdiction, the Judiciary Act of 1789 rendered access to the federal courts
difficult. Id. at 1487-88. After 1787, Professor Holt claims, northern state hostility against
foreign creditors had significantly abated. Id. at 1450-52.
259. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. VI, 8 Stat. 80, 83.
Article IV provided that "creditors on either side, shall meet with no lawful impediment to
the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore
contracted." Id. at 82. Article V required that loyalists who had fought against the United
States should be given a year to return to the United Kingdom "unmolested in their
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British subjects who now hold lands in the territories of the
United States... shall continue to hold them ... and may grant,
sell, or devise the same to whom they please, in like manner as if
they were natives; and that neither they nor their heirs or assigns
shall, so far as may respect the said lands and the legal remedies
incident thereto, be regarded as aliens. 26 0
This additional guarantee was important because alien land title was gen-
erally subject to uncompensated sovereign defeasance.26' The two trea-
ties were understood to provide federal protection for property interests
created by and existing under state law. On review of state court judg-
ments, the Supreme Court regularly exercised independentjudgment on
the content of state law at time t1, i.e., when that law was asserted to bar
the claimant's treaty-based claims.
At issue in Smith v. Maryland262 was whether the state had confiscated
certain property (land title held by a Maryland resident in trust for an
English subject) before the 1783 treaty had become effective. After ex-
tensive briefing, the Court concluded that the merits "must depend upon
the true construction of' two 1780 Maryland acts. 2 6 3 Although holding
that the land had been confiscated prior to the effective date of the
treaty, the Court accorded no weight to the fact that the Maryland courts
had so held.264 At the beginning of its opinion, the Court rejected a
challenge to its appellate jurisdiction:
It is contended, by the defendants in error, that the question
involved in the cause turns exclusively upon the construction of
the confiscation laws of the state of Maryland, passed prior to
the treaty of peace, and that no question, relative to the con-
struction of that treaty, did or could occur. That the only point
in dispute was, whether the confiscation of the lands in contro-
versy was complete, or not, by the mere operation of those laws,
without any further act to be done. 265
endeavours to obtain the restitution of such of their estates, rights and properties, as may
have been confiscated." Id.
260. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IX,
8 Stat. 116, 122.
261. See infra notes 272-275 and accompanying text.
262. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 286 (1810).
263. Id. at 305. Chapter 45 of the Act of October 1780, declared that "all property
within this state (debts only excepted), belonging to British subects, shall be seized, and is
hereby confiscated to the use of this state." Act of October 1780, ch. 45 (quoted in 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) at 288 (internal quotation marks omitted)). This Act was deemed by the
Maryland courts to put Maryland commissioners "in possession of all British property,
within the limits of the state, Under and by virtue of the act of confiscation." 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) at 288 (citing the findings of the state trial court). The subsequent Act appointed
commissioners.
264. A writ of error had been issued "to the Court of Appeals of the state of Maryland,
being the highest court of law and equity in that state, which affirmed the decree of the
chancellor of Maryland. The facts of the case appear to be correctly stated in the decree of
the chancellor .... 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 286.
265. Id. at 304.
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Responding in elaborate fashion, the Court asserted a theory of ancillary
jurisdiction over the antecedent state law claim:
This argument proves nothing more than that the whole diffi-
culty in this case depends upon that part of it which involves the
construction of certain state laws, and that the operation and
effect of the treaty, which constitutes the residue of the case, is
obvious, so soon as that construction is settled.... The point to
be decided was and is, whether this be a case of future confisca-
tion, within the meaning of the 6th article of that treaty ; [sic]
and in order to arrive at a correct result in the decision of that
point, it became necessary, in the state court, and will be neces-
sary in this, to inquire whether the confiscation, declared by the
state laws, was final and complete, at the time the treaty was
made, or not? The construction of those laws, then, is only a
step in the cause leading to the construction and meaning of
this article of the treaty.266
Far more dramatic from an historical perspective was the litigation
arising out of a vast tract of land in Northern Virginia, which resulted in
Supreme Court opinions in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee26 7 and Mar-
tin v. Hunter's Lessee.268 In Fairfax, the Court reversed a two-judge deci-
sion of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Both Virginia judges had
agreed that a legislative act of compromise, passed in 1796, was disposi-
tive with respect to the competing land claims. 269 That act, however, was
not mentioned in the Fairfax opinion, perhaps because the state court
opinions were not part of the record, and the act itself seems not to have
been mentioned in the elaborate agreed-upon statement of facts27° or in
the arguments of counsel. 27 1 Otherwise, the state-court judges had di-
266. Id. at 304-05. The Court continued:
[I]t is perfectly immaterial to the point of jurisdiction, that the first part of the
way is the most difficult to explore.... [l]f, according to the true construction of
the state laws, this court should be of opinion, that the acts of confiscation left
something to be done, necessary to the perfection of the title claimed under
them, which was not done, at the time the treaty was made, we must say that, in
this case, the construction of the treaty was drawn in question, and that the
decision of the state court was against the right set up, under the treaty, by one of
the parties.
Id. at 305.
267. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813). This was the decision referred to by ChiefJustice
Rehnquist and Justice Ginsburg in Bush v. Gore. 531 U.S. 98, 115 n.1 (2000) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring); id. at 139-40 (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
268. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). For a lucid description, see Hart & Wechsler,
supra note 27, at 469-83.
269. Hunter v. Fairfax's Devisee, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 218, 231-32, 237-38 (1810).
270. Fairfax's Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 604-12.
271. Id. at 612-17. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, the Court did refer to the Act of
Compromise and, disagreeing with the concurring opinion in the court below, Hunter, 15
Va. (1 Munf.) at 237-38 (opinion of Fleming, J.), brushed it aside as lacking dispositive
significance:
If it be true (as we are informed) that this was a private act, to take effect only
upon a certain condition . . . which was matter in pais, it is somewhat difficult to
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vided on issues of state law.27 2 Speaking for the Court, Justice Story in-
tensely scrutinized state law, particularly the various acts of the Virginia
legislature specifically addressed to Northern Neck. He concluded that
no Virginia statute had altered the common law rules governing the di-
vestiture of an alien's title (which required an inquest of office) before
the protection of the 1794 treaty had attached. 2 73 He implicitly rejected
the argument that no federal issue was presented because the status of
the alien's title prior to 1794 presented an issue solely of state law; in-
deed, his opinion did not address this argument: "So completely did
Judge [sic] Story accept the principle of Supreme Court review of State-
court determinations limiting the right to qualify for an appeal under the
treaty supremacy clause, that he did not mention the Smith v. Maryland
precedent in this connection. ' 2 74 Justice Johnson dissented on the state
law issue.2 75
understand how the court could take judicial cognizance of the act, or of the
performance of the condition, unless spread upon the record. At all events, we
are bound to consider that the court did decide upon the facts actually before
them.
Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 360.
272. Speaking for himself alone, Judge Roane concluded that the alien owner held
only a defeasible title that had vested in the Commonwealth by an act of 1782. Hunter, 15
Va. (1 Munf.) at 230 (citing Act of 1782, ch. 8, § 24). Judge Fleming disagreed, and he
insisted that the legislature must be explicit if it intends to substitute new means of
confiscation for the method existing at common law. Id. at 233-34.
273. Fairfax's Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 618-28. Justice Story began by
investigating the title of Lord Fairfax and said that at his death in 1781 Lord Fairfax "had
the absolute property of the soil of the land in controversy." Id. at 619. "The next
question is, as to the nature and character of the title which Denny Fairfax took by the will
of Lord Fairfax, he being, at the time of the death of Lord Fairfax, an alien enemy." Id.
Justice Story next followed with an examination of the title of an alien. While the
sovereign could take title, he said, "this title could only be divested by an inquest of office,
perfected by an entry and seizure, where the possession was not vacant." Id. at 622. He
concluded:
It was once in the power of the commonwealth of Virginia, by an inquest of office
or its equivalent, to have vested the estate completely in itself or its grantee. But it
has not so done, and its own inchoate title (and of course, the derivative title, if
any, of its grantee) has, by the operation of the treaty, become ineffectual and
void.
Id. at 627.
274. 2 George L. Haskins & Herbert A. Johnson, The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise,
History of the Supreme Court of the United States 555 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1981). Justice
Johnson did address the jurisdictional issue.
I am also of opinion that whenever a case is brought up to this Court under that
section, the title of the parties litigant must necessarily be enquired into, and that
such an enquiry must, in the nature of things, precede the consideration how far
the law, treaty, and so forth, is applicable to it; otherwise an appeal to this Court
would be worse than nIgatory.
Fairfax's Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 632 Uohnson, J., dissenting).
275. For him, Smith had settled the question "whether it was not competent for the
state to assert its rights over the alien's property, by any other means than an inquest of
office." J'airftaxs Devisee, II U.S. (7 Cranch) at 631 (ohnson, J., dissenting). And the
legislative grant of title issued to the plaintiff was sufficient to transfer title. Id. The Court
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Martin v. Hunter's Lessee squarely rejected the argument "that this
court cannot inquire into the title, but simply into the correctness of the
construction put upon the treaty by the court of appeals." Justice Story
wrote:
If this be the true construction of the section, it will be wholly
inadequate for the purposes which it professes to have in view,
and may be evaded at pleasure. But we see no reason for adopt-
ing this narrow construction; and there are the strongest rea-
sons against it, founded upon the words as well as the intent of
the legislature. What is the case for which the body of the sec-
tion provides a remedy by writ of error? The answer must be in
the words of the section, a suit where is drawn in question the
construction of a treaty, and the decision is against the title set up
by the party. It is, therefore, the decision against the title set up
with reference to the treaty, and not the mere abstract construc-
tion of the treaty itself, upon which the statute intends to found
the appellate jurisdiction. 27 6
He added:
How, indeed, can it be possible to decide whether a title be
within the protection of a treaty, until it is ascertained what that
title is, and whether it had legal validity? From the very necessity
of the case, there must be a preliminary inquiry into the exis-
tence and structure of the title.2 7 7
Justice Ginsburg sought to isolate the treaty cases on the ground that
the Court intervened in an atmosphere of state hostility to the content of
federal law.2 78 Perhaps so.2 79 But the fact remains that the Court be-
lieved that, in appropriate circumstances, its appellate jurisdiction ex-
tended to an independent determination of state law. If perceived hostil-
itself did not claim "that it was not competent for the legislature (supposing no treaty in
the way) by a special act to have vested the land in the commonwealth without an inquest
of office for the cause of alienage." Id. at 622.
276. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 357-58. He added:
The restraining clause was manifestly intended for a very different purpose. It
was foreseen that the parties might claim under various titles, and might assert
various defences, altogether independent of each other. The Court might admit
or reject evidence applicable to one particular title, and not to all, and in such
cases it was the intention of Congress to limit what would otherwise have
unquestionably attached to the Court, the right of revising all the points involved
in the cause. It therefore restrains this right to such errors as respect the
questions specified in the section; and in this view, it has an appropriate sense,
consistent with the preceding clauses. We are, therefore, satisfied, that, upon
principle, the case was rightfully before us, and if the point were perfectly new, we
should not hesitate to assert the jurisdiction.
Id. at 359.
277. Id. at 358.
278. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 139-40 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
279. Southern states were particularly hostile to efforts by British creditors to collect
their debts or recover their property. See supra note 258.
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ity to federal law justifies such a penetrating examination of state law,
other occasions might also.
2. Contract Clause Cases. - The treaty cases have long receded from
the active memory of the legal profession. For most lawyers, the Contract
Clause cases provide the most familiar examples of the Supreme Court's
independent review of state-court determinations of state law. Article I,
Section 10, Clause 1 prohibits states, inter alia, from passing any "Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts."2 8 1 Construction and implemen-
tation of that Clause was an important staple of the Court's business until
the end of the nineteenth century,28 1 when it was overtaken by litigation
involving the more inclusive notion of substantive due process associated
with Lochner v. New York 28 2 and its progeny.
Many of the Court's cases turned not on the question of whether the
state legislation impaired the contract, but rather upon the antecedent
question of whether a contractual obligation had existed. In these cases,
the state court frequently gave effect to the allegedly impairing legislation
by denying that a contract had existed, often through its interpretation of
a prior state statute. 2 3 Such determinations did not prevent Supreme
Court review of the state court's decision on what the state law was prior
to application of the allegedly impairing legislation. "It is well established
doctrine that where the contract clause is invoked this Court must determine
for itself the nature and effect of the alleged agreement and whether this has
been impaired."2 4 The issue in these cases is not one of characteriza-
tion, where the question is whether a given transaction is a "contract"
within the meaning of the Contract Clause, notwithstanding its state law
280. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
281. Siegel, supra note 73, at 3-4 & n.2 ("Before 1889, 40% of the cases contesting
the validity of state legislation involved the contract clause."); Wright, supra note 81, at xiii,
91-97 ("During the nineteenth century, no constitutional clause was so frequently the basis
of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States as that forbidding the states to pass
laws impairing the obligation of contracts.").
282. 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law:
1836-1937, at 17 (1991) (noting decline in Contract Clause claims in favor of due process
claims); Wright, supra note 81, at 92 (stating that, "partly because of the greater scope and
flexibility of the expanded due process clause, [the Contract Clause] ceased to be the
bulwark of vested interests and came to be a clause of distinctly secondary importance").
283. "As in most cases brought to this court under the contract clause of the
Constitution, the question is as to the existence and nature of the contract and not as to
the construction of the law which is supposed to impair it." Indiana ex rel. Anderson v.
Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938).
284. United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 293 U.S. 232, 236 (1934) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted); see also Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 230 (1904) (Holmes,
J.) (describing, in non-Contract Clause case, the principle that "[i]t is well known that this
court will decide for itself whether a contract was made as well as whether the obligation of
the contract has been impaired," as illustrative of a broader proposition (citation
omitted)); West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28-29 (1951) (reversing a state
court construction of its constitution that had rendered void the state's participation in a
congressionally approved interstate contract and analogizing the Court's authority in this
area to its power under the Contract Clause).
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significance. Here, the Court is determining for itself the existence of a
contract by examining de novo the relevant state law legal materials.
An early exposition of the independent judgment rule in Contract
Clause cases came in a series of decisions stemming out of the state of
Ohio's attempts to increase by statute the rate of taxation of a state
chartered bank. Piqua Branch v. Knoop reversed a decision of the Ohio
Supreme Court that an earlier statute had not created a contract binding
on the state legislature, stating that "whilst we have all the respect for the
learning and ability which the opinions of the judges of the Supreme
Court of the State command, we are called upon to exercise our own
judgments in the case." 28 5 To do otherwise, the Court noted, "would be
to surrender one of the most important provisions of the federal Consti-
tution. ' 28 6 Addressing a similar issue eleven years later in Jefferson Branch
Bank v. Skelly, 28 7 the Court elaborated upon the necessity for indepen-
dent judgment:
Of what use would the appellate power be to the litigant ... if
this court could not decide, independently of all adjudication by the
Supreme Court of a State, whether or not the phraseology of the
instrument in controversy was expressive of a contract and within
the protection of the Constitution of the United States, and that
its obligation should be enforced, notwithstanding a contrary
conclusion by the Supreme Court of a State? It never was in-
tended, and cannot be sustained by any course of reasoning,
that this court should, or could with fidelity to the Constitution
of the United States, follow the construction of the Supreme
Court of a State in such a matter, when it entertained a different
opinion .... 288
Nor was the Supreme Court's exercise of independent judgment re-
served exclusively for those cases in which the state court decision deny-
ing the existence of a contract was simply a pretext for giving effect to the
allegedly impairing legislation. As Professor Hill observed, "the scope of
the [Court's] review of the state decision on [the] threshold questions [of
the existence and scope of the contract] was quite broad, especially in
earlier cases; it was not limited to a search for 'error' so outrageous as to
suggest willful evasion of the claim of impairment. '289
The independent judgment rule in Contract Clause cases assumed
textbook status. 29 0 The line it has followed has not been a straight one,
285. Piqua Branch of the State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 392
(1854).
286. Id.
287. 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436 (1861).
288. Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
289. Hill, supra note 71, at 957.
290. Robertson & Kirkham, supra note 143, § 93, at 165-66. Robertson and Kirkham
state:
[I]t is well settled that in cases arising under this clause the Supreme Court
determines for itself whether there is a contract and what are its terms .... [T]he
Supreme Court is not limited, in determining what effect, if any, has been given
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however. Deference language increasingly appeared, particularly as the
Court's interest in protecting the Clause's substantive values waned.
Sometimes, the deference language is that of Skidmore.29 1 On other occa-
sions, however, the language suggests Chevron deference: "[Wle ... ac-
cept [the state court's] judgment as to [the existence and meaning of a
contract] unless manifestly wrong. ' '29 2 Still, albeit sometimes informed by
Skidmore deference, the independent judgment rule can be found in nu-
merous opinions. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand2 93 is a well-known ex-
ample. There, the Court overturned a state-court holding denying the
existence of a contract, stating:
On such a question, one primarily of state law, we accord re-
spectful consideration and great weight to the views of the
State's highest court but, in order that the constitutional man-
date may not become a dead letter, we are bound to decide for
ourselves whether a contract was made, what are its terms and
conditions, and whether the State has, by later legislation, im-
to the subsequent statute, to a mere consideration of the language of the opinion
of the state court, but will determine for itself [giving due deference to the state
court's views] whether the subsequent statute was an essential, although
unmentioned, element of the decision under review.
Id. The bracketed language was inserted in the Wolfson and Kurland edition. Reynolds
Robertson & Francis R. Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States
§ 100, at 182 (Richard F. Wolfson & Philip B. Kurland eds., Matthew Bender & Co. 1951)
(1936); see also Wright, supra note 81, at 80 ("The Supreme Court has reserved to itself
the final authority to determine whether a contract existed, the nature of its obligations,
and whether a state law has impaired these obligations."); Robert L. Hale, The Supreme
Court and the Contract Clause: III, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 852, 852 (1944) ("When determining
whether an obligation was such that a subsequent statute impaired it, the Supreme Court
has never felt bound to follow state decisions.").
291. E.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187 (1992) ("We 'accord
respectful consideration and great weight to the views of the State's highest court,' though
ultimately we are 'bound to decide for ourselves whether a contract was made."' (quoting
Indiana ex rel, Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938))); Higginbotham v. City of
Baton Rouge, 306 U.S. 535, 538-39 (1939) ("While this Court in applying the contract
clause of the Constitution must reach an independent judgment as to the existence and
nature of the alleged contract, we attach great weight to the views of the highest court of
the State." (citations omitted)); Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 379-80 (1926)
("Of course we should give all proper weight to [the state court's] judgment, but we can
not perform our duty to enforce the guaranty of the Federal Constitution as to the
inviolability of contracts by state legislative action unless we give the questions independent
consideration."); Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236, 246-47
(1923) ("We accord to [the state court's] ruling the respect which we must always give to
the decisions of an appellate tribunal of a State .... ").
292. Hale v. State Bd. of Assessment & Review, 302 U.S. 95, 101 (1937); see also, e.g.,
At. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168, 170 (1947) (noting that, on matters of
local policy, the Court "should be slow to depart from [the state court's] judgment, if there
was no real oppression or manifest wrong in the result" (quoting New York ex rel. Clyde v.
Gilchrist, 262 U.S. 94, 97 (1923))); Phelps v. Bd. of Educ., 300 U.S. 319, 322-23 (1937)
("This court is not bound by the decision of a state court as- to the existence and terms of a
contract ... [but u]nless [the state court's] views are palpably erroneous we should accept
them.").
293. 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
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paired its obligation. This involves an appraisal of the statutes of
the State and the decisions of its courts. 2 9 4
The Court then undertook a very extensive analysis of the Indiana stat-
utes and case law, precisely the kind of analysis that one would expect to
find, not in the Court's reports, but in the Indiana law reports.295 Simi-
larly, in Appleby, although the Court recognized that the state court's
judgment should be given "proper weight," it was careful to point out that
the Supreme Court "must give [its] own judgment derived from [state
statutes and decisional law] and not accept the present conclusion of the
state court without inquiry. '2 9 6 The Court then embarked upon an ex-
amination of New York law that covered over twenty pages of the United
States Reports! 297
The extensive litigation during and after the Civil War arising from
county and municipal defaults on ill-advisedly issued railroad bonds pro-
vides perhaps the best known example of the Court's disregard of state
court construction of state law. 298 The cases, however, do not provide
support for the independent judgment rule. This litigation teaches us
294. Id. at 100 (footnote omitted).
295. Id. at 100-09.
296. Appleby, 271 U.S. at 379-80.
297. Id. at 381-402. For additional examples of cases in which the Supreme Court
has employed deference language while nonetheless conducting a searching inquiry into
state law, see Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187-91 (1992) (characterizing
review in terms evoking Skidmore deference and affirming state court decision, but
engaging in extensive review of state law in determining existence of a contract); Columbia
Ry., Gas & Electric Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236, 247-51 (1923) (invoking Skidmore-
style deference, but independently determining content of state statutes in question and
reversing state supreme court decision); see also text accompanying notes 75-76
(discussing Romein as an independentjudgment case). Justice Ginsburg, emphasizing its
deference language, cites Romein as a true deference case. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 137
(2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). I believe that the deference language used was (if at all
meaningful) Skidmore deference.
298. The classic account of this litigation is contained in 6 Charles Fairman, History of
the Supreme Court of the United States 918-1116 (1971) [hereinafter Fairman, History].
In this litigation the Court's "zeal was directed toward protecting the bondholder if he, or
any predecessor in title, had bought without actual knowledge of invalidity." Id. at 921. In
a well-known letter to his brother-in-law, Justice Miller characterized the majority of the
Court as "fanatics on that subject." He added, "In four cases out of five the case is decided
when it is seen by the pleadings that it is a suit to enforce a contract against a city, or town,
or a county. If there is a written instrument its validity is a forgone conclusion." Letter
from Samuel Freeman Miller to William Pitt Ballinger (Feb. 3, 1878), quoted in Charles
Fairman, Mr.Justice Miller and the Supreme Court, 1862-1890, at 232 (1939) [hereinafter
Fairman, Miller]; see also Fairman, History, supra, at 920.
Professor Freyer cites estimates that the total of the defaulted bonds was between $100
and $150 million, and that some 300 bond cases reached the Supreme Court during the
last third of the century. Tony Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance: The Swift & Erie Cases in
American Federalism 60 (1981). The litigation was, as Professor Fairman wrote, "a phase
of the great struggle between farmers and taxpayers on the one hand and railroad
promoters and investors on the other. The Supreme Court threw its support on the side of
the latter groups by a somewhat violent assertion of federal judicial power." Fairman,
Miller, supra, at 207.
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that disregard of state judicial decisions is not necessarily the equivalent
of redetermining state law. State law was not redetermined by the Court;
it was simply irrelevant.
Many of the cases reached the Court on the basis of diversityjurisdic-
tion in the lower federal courts, 2 9 9 thereby falling within the domain of
Swift v. Tyson, 3 1° which allowed the Court to disregard state law in favor of
principles based upon the "general" law. 30 1 In a number of these cases,
the Court, while perhaps appearing to be engaged in an independent
interpretation of state law, simply avoided giving effect to the statutory
language by reading into the statutes general principles of commercial
law.3 112 Thus, they are merely relics of the pre-Erie era, and provide no
support for the independent judgment rule.
299. Fairman, History, supra note 298, at 918. General "arising under" jurisdiction
did not exist in the federal courts until 1875, Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)), and even then, it seemed that the contract right of
action accrued under state law, the Contract Clause operating only to negative state
defenses.
300. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
301. Under Swift, state law was not redetermined; it was simply not determinative in
diversity cases governed by principles of general law. See id. at 19 (holding that the rule
that state law was binding on federal courts in diversity cases was "strictly limited to local
statutes and local [customs]" and that, in deciding questions involving "contracts and
other instruments of a commercial nature," the Court would look to "general principles
and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence").
302. In these cases, the Court repeatedly upheld the validity of bonds in the face of
challenges alleging (in all probability, quite correctly) that no contract had been formed
because of fraud or a failure in fact to comply with statutory conditions. It refused to allow
previously-issued bonds to be invalidated on these grounds, and instead read into the state
statutes a general principle that municipal officers were required to decide, prior to the
issuance of the bonds, whether the statutory preconditions had been complied with. Once
this had been done and the bonds had been issued, the initial determination of
compliance was conclusive and binding upon the municipality. E.g., Town of Coloma v.
Eaves, 92 U.S. 484, 488-93 (1875); Comm'rs of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 539, 544-46 (1858). Decisions such as these came about in part because the Court
decided for itself that most of the bonds were negotiable instruments in Mercer County v.
Hackett, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 83, 95-96 (1863), decided a few weeks after Gelpcke v. City of
Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863).
The Court also disregarded state court holdings that taxes could not be levied to pay
off municipal bonds because issuance of railroad bonds contravened the "first and most
fundamental maxim of taxation." Fairman, History, supra note 298, at 1010-14 (quoting
People ex rel. Detroit & Howell R.R. v. Township Bd., 20 Mich. 452, 494 (1870)) (internal
quotations marks omitted). In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court refused to follow the
Michigan court's decision, which had been written by the esteemed Judge Cooley,
concluding that the state court simply got its "first principles" wrong. "With all respect for
the eminent tribunal by which thejudgments were pronounced, we must be permitted to
say that they are not satisfactory to our minds .... The question before us belongs to the
domain of general jurisprudence ... [and] this court is not bound by the judgment of the
courts of the States where the cases arise." Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. (19
Wall.) 666, 677 (1873); see also Olcott v. Supervisors, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678, 690 (1872)
(disregarding Wisconsin Supreme Court decision interpreting the state constitution and
stating that "[t]he nature of taxation, what uses are public and what are private, and the
extent of . . .legislative power, are matters which, like questions of commercial law, no
1980 [Vol. 103:1919
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Other decisions appear more troubling. Even under Swift, state
court construction of state statutes and constitutional provisions bound
federal diversity courts. 30 3 No doubt because of its extreme language,
Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque remains the most notorious example of the
Court disregarding that principle. 30 4 Overruling a prior decision by a
divided court, the Supreme Court of Iowa had held that a statute author-
izing the issuance of certain bonds violated the state constitution. 3115 The
Court refused to follow the new decision. "We shall never immolate
truth, justice, and the law," said the Court, simply "because a State tribu-
nal has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice." 3°1 6 At times, the
Court appears to have believed that its interdiction of judicial retroactiv-
ity invalidating bonds was an interpretation of the Contract Clause it-
self.3 0 7 But the Court later expressly disavowed that proposition because
State court can conclusively determine for us"). In Olcott, the Court noted that the earlier
state court decision had not relied upon any specific provision of the state constitution,
and was not, therefore, a decision of state constitutional interpretation or construction. Id.
at 689.
303. See Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18 (holding that the word "laws" in the Rules of
Decision Act meant primarily statutes); see also Leffingwell v. Warren, 67 U.S. (2 Black)
599, 603 (1862) ("If the highest judicial tribunal of a state adopt new views as to the proper
construction of such a statute, and reverse its former decisions, this Court will follow the
latest settled adjudications."); Green v. Lessee of Neal, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291, 295-301
(1832) (holding that the Supreme Court will abandon its own prior construction of a state
statute in deference to a subsequent decision of the state supreme court).
304. Gelpcke, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 205-06.
305. Professor Fairman points out that the overruled state court precedent was of a
decidedly wobbly nature. Fairman, History, supra note 298, at 940-42.
306. Gelpcke, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 206-07. Justice Miller dissented, claiming that the
decision was "a usurpation of the right, which belongs to the State courts, to decide as a
finality upon the construction of State constitutions and State statutes." Id. at 220 (Miller,
J., dissenting).
307. In Gelpcke, Justice Swayne wrote:
"The sound and true rule is, that if the contract, when made, was valid by the laws
of the State as then expounded by all departments of the government, and
administered in its courts ofjustice, its validity and obligation cannot be impaired
by any subsequent action of legislation, or decision of its courts altering the
construction of the law."
The same principle applies where there is a change ofjudicial decision as to
the constitutional power of the legislature to enact the law. To this rule, thus
enlarged, we adhere.
Id. at 206 (quoting Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416, 432 (1854)
(Taney, CJ.)). Further, subsequent bond decisions understood Gelpcke as holding that
state court decisions altering the settled understanding of state law could trigger the
Contract Clause. In Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, for example, the Court said that
the impairment could be accomplished "no more by judicial decisions than by legislation,"
86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 678, and in Douglass v. County of Pike, the Court said that the
"settled" construction of a statute becomes, for Contract Clause purposes, "as much a part
of the statute as the text itself, and a change of decision is [equivalent to] an amendment
of the law by means of a legislative enactment," 101 U.S. 677, 687 (1879).
Professor Fairman observes that, in contrast to Contract Clause cases involving the
independent judgment rule, "the [Gelpcke] majority did not claim that the Court should
exercise an independent judgment [on the content of state law]. The previous [state] rule
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the Clause restrains only legislative, not judicial, conduct.t1 8 Attempting
to make sense of the decision, Professor Fairman and other commenta-
tors read Gelpcke as freeing Swift v. Tyson from the general rule that the
judicial constructions of state statutes bound federal diversity courts:
"Gelpcke v. Dubuque and Swift v. Tyson worked as a team in the munici-
pal bond cases."' ' 1)t If that is correct, the Gelpcke line of cases is another
was to be upheld, right or wrong." Fairman, Miller, supra note 298, at 214 n.20. But see
Fairman, History, supra note 298, at 938 (stating that "[t]he Court's position in Gelpcke was
that it had an independentjudgment"). The Gelpcke opinion itself does, however, make
clear that the Court viewed the overruling decision as reaching an incorrect result. Gelpeke,
68 U.S. (I Wall.) at 205-06 ("The earlier decisions, we think, are sustained by reason and
authority."). But, as Professor Thompson points out, "[T]his answer was not satisfactory.
The Gelpcke approach applied regardless of the merits involved in the prior decisions."
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The History of the Judicial Impairment "Doctrine" and Its
Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1373, 1421 (1992).
308. Both before and after Gelpcke the Court had held that the Clause's prohibition of
"Laws" impairing the obligation of contract applied only to legislative, not judicial,
conduct. Fairman, History, supra note 298, at 937. Referring to Gelpcke, Chief Justice Taft
wrote, "Certain unguarded language in [it] and some other cases, has caused confusion,
although those cases did not really involve the contract impairment clause of the
Constitution." Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 454 (1924) (citations omitted); see
also Thompson, supra note 307, at 1375, 1390 (stating that, since the early twentieth
century, the Court has "consistently refus[ed] to constrain judicial decisions undermining
contractual expectations"). Moreover, even immediately in the wake of Gelpcke, the Court
refused for want of jurisdiction impairment challenges coming from the state courts that
were premised on state-court overruling of prior precedent. E.g., R.R. Co. v. McClure, 77
U.S. (10 Wall.) 511, 515 (1871); R.R. Co. v. Rock, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 177, 181 (1867). Hart
& Wechsler asks: "Suppose the question had come to the Supreme Court on review of the
state court's overruling decision? Would the state's decision have been vulnerable to
challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment or any other constitutional provision? If not,
can the Gelpcke decision be defended?" Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 626-27.
309. Fairman, History, supra note 298, at 939 n.78 ("Gelpcke v. Dubuque and Swift v.
Tyson may be bracketed as cases where the Supreme Court asserted its independence of
State Court rulings on State law."); see also Freyer, supra note 298, at 58-60
(characterizing Gelpcke as an extension of Swift). Not all commentators agree, however.
See William H. Rand, Jr., Swift v. Tyson versus Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 328,
345 (1895) ("To abide firmly by Swift v. Tyson the court should have considered neither
local ruling as law, but only as evidence of the law.... This, however, is precisely what the
court did not do."); Thompson, supra note 307, at 1417 ("[T]he early municipal bond
cases . . . differed crucially from Swfl.... From the standpoint of result, Swift permitted
federal courts to independently determine the law for commercial transactions, while
Gelpcke bound the Court to preexisting state case law.").
While the narrow holding of Gelpcke did bind the Supreme Court to the settled law for
the state at the time the bonds were issued, and thus did not fully incorporate the Swift
power to decide based on general principles of law, several subsequent cases did attempt to
merge the doctrines of Gelpcke and Swift in the manner suggested by Professor Fairman. In
Butz v. City of Muscatine, the Court, interpreting a state statute, stated that "[t]here are
several adjudications of the highest court of the State more or less adverse to the views we
have expressed. We do not deem it necessary more particularly to advert to them." 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 575, 582 (1869). The Court continued:
This court construes all contracts brought before it for consideration, and in
doing so its action is independent of that of the State courts, which may have
exercised their judgment upon the same subject.... We are of the opinion that
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pre-Erie relic. State law is not redetermined; it is simply disregarded be-
cause it is irrelevant.
Nonetheless, the decisions have some pertinence here. Neither Swift
nor Lessee of Neal involved review of state law antecedent to a federal
claim. Thus the question is whether the problem in Gelpcke should be
framed differently, The Court correctly looked to state court statutes and
judicial opinions to determine for itself whether, when issued (t1), the
bonds constituted valid contracts, and if so, their terms.311
3. Retroactivity in Criminal Cases. - Retroactivity challenges to state
criminal convictions present another area in which the Court has demon-
strated a willingness to engage in an extensive examination of what the
state law was at a given point in time. In Rogers v. Tennessee,-3 11 the Court
once again stated that (like its companion, the Contract Clause) the Ex
Post Facto Clause restricts only legislative retroactivity. Judicial retroactiv-
ity is restrained by the Due Process Clause ,312 which forbids only "unex-
pected and indefensible" changes.3 13 In Rogers, the Tennessee Supreme
Court abrogated the "year and a day" rule of its common law of homicide.
Application of this holding to the defendant, the state court held, did not
deny due process because abrogation was foreseeable.3 14 The Supreme
Court affirmed, but only after undertaking an extensive review of the
state law to show how weakly the year and a day rule had been rooted in
state law. 315 Acknowledging the propriety of some such review, Justice
Scalia's dissent argued that "[though the Court spends some time ques-
under the statutes of Iowa, in force when the contract was made, the relator is
entitled to the remedy he asks, and that this right can no more be taken away by
subsequent judicial decisions than by subsequent legislation.
Id. at 584; see also Talcott, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 677 (disregarding state court interpretation
of the state constitution and declaring that "[tlhe question before us belongs to the
domain of general jurisprudence ... [and that in] this class of cases this court is not bound
by the judgment of the courts of the States where the cases arise").
310. While judicial retroactivity does not raise impairment issues, judicial retroactivity
must be measured against the now-but perhaps not then-more forgiving standards of
substantive due process. The difficulty here, of course, is that substantive due process did
not make its formal appearance in the Supreme Court as a basis for a decision of invalidity
until 1890. See Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 456-58
(1890).
311. 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
312. Id. at 457-58.
313. Id. at 462. The severance of the connection between the Ex Post Facto and Due
Process Clauses drew a sharp dissent from Justice Scalia. Id. at 469-71 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). For similar criticism, see The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Leading Cases,
115 Harv. L. Rev. 306, 321-22 (2001).
314. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 459, 462-66. The whole idea that the defendant was (or was
not) "surprised" by the evolving trends in the criminal law throughout the nation is, of
course, a massive fiction.
315. Id. at 462-67. The Court's examination of prior state law was at least as extensive
as that undertaken by the state court. See State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393, 396-401 (Tenn.
1999). Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissenters in Bush v. Gore, joined the Court's opinion
without comment.
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tioning whether the year and a day rule was ever truly established in Ten-
nessee" the state court's "reasonable reading of state law by the State's
highest court is binding upon us."'3 16 "Reasonableness" in this context is,
of course, a synonym for "fair support. 317
4. Adequate Nonfederal Ground. - Some of the best known illustra-
tions of the independent judgment rule can be found in decisions dis-
cussing the adequate and independent state ground doctrine itself. The
Court has rejected a proffered state procedural rule when the rule vio-
lated due process, when it was novel or had been erratically applied, or
when the rule unduly burdened federal rights. -1 8 In Bush v. Gore, both
316. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 468-69; see also Smith v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1147 (2003),
reh'g denied 123 S. Ct. 1925 (2003) (stating that sex registration statute is civil and thus
the Ex Post Facto Clause is inapplicable and noting that the Court defers to the
legislature's stated intent absent the "clearest proof' to the contrary).
317. Like the concurrence in Bush v. Gore, Rogers severed the statutory text from its
interpretation. But unlike the ChiefJustice's conclusion that the Florida court's statutory
"interpretation" was unreasonable statutory interpretation, Rogers viewed the state court's
abrogation of the year and a day rule not as an act of statutory interpretation but as an
exercise in common law decisionmaking. Indeed, the Court seemed to go further, and to
suggest that at least some judicial "interpretations" of a (criminal) statute are not acts of
statutory interpretation, "where, as here, the allegedly impermissible judicial application of
a rule of law involves not the interpretation of a statute but an act of common lawjudging."
Rogers, 532 U.S. at 461. Instead they raise issues about the limits of common law
decisionmaking. Id. at 461-62. This is how the Court explained Bouie v. City of Columbia.
378 U.S. 347 (1964); see Rogers, 532 U.S. at 461. Bouie also involved a redetermination of
state law. The Court rejected the state construction of a state trespass law on the ground
that it involved an expansion of liability that was "unexpected and indefensible by
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue." Id. (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Viewing state court construction of background
principles governing state stattites as essentially common law decisionmaking may be
acceptable when the state law difference between that process and statutory
"interpretation" is not only blurred but also consciously deemphasized. See Judith S. Kaye,
State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and
Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 29 n.164 (1995) (quoting Daniel A. Farber, Statutory
Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo. LJ. 281, 286 (1989), and Jane S.
Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 604 (1995)). Such a separation at the federal level
is, however, quite problematic. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 459-60 (discussing, inter alia, Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)). The Court has increasingly treated federal common
law as a suspect enterprise, except within the narrowest range. E.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 519
U.S. 213, 217-26 (1997) ("[N]ormally, when courts decide to fashion rules of federal
common law, 'the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some federal
policy or interest and the use of state law ... must first be specifically shown.' (quoting
Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966))). Indeed, the Court has gone
to rather startling lengths to cast its results as statutory interpretation rather than federal
common law. See, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760-65 (1998) (creating
an affirmative defense to a Title VII claim while insisting that the Court was engaged in
statutory interpretation, not making federal common law).
318. 1 follow the excellent presentation in Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 551-65,
which in turn is based upon Daniel A. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights,
99 Harv. L. Rev. 1128 (1986). In an earlier study, Professor Hill denied that undue
burdens constituted a legitimate basis for disregarding state law. Hill, supra note 71, at
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the Chief Justice and Justice Ginsburg referred to NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson.3 1 9 There, the Court carefully examined state law and con-
cluded that the state court had applied a novel procedural rule to bar
consideration of federal challenges to a trial court's contempt finding.
320
Lee v. Kemna32 1 is the most recent example. A state appeals court had
upheld a trial court's denial of an oral motion for a continuance chal-
lenged on due process grounds because state procedural rules required
that such motions be in writing and supported by an affidavit. Justice
Ginsburg's majority opinion acknowledged that violation of regularly fol-
lowed state procedural rules ordinarily sufficed to foreclose federal re-
view. However, "exceptional cases [exist] in which exorbitant application
of a generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate .... This
case fits within that limited category." 322 She noted that petitioner had
"substantially complied with" state law, and that a written motion would
not have met the trial judge's reasons for denying the motion. Examin-
ing Missouri law, she rejected the state court's interpretation, stating that
"no published Missouri decision directs flawless compliance with [the
state rules] in the unique circumstances this case presents-the sudden,
unanticipated, and at the time unexplained disappearance of critical,
subpoenaed witnesses on what became the trial's last day."3 2 3
971-80. Professor Meltzer seems to me to have much the better of the argument, both on
principle and authority. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150-53 (1988)
(invalidating inter alia as excessively burdensome in § 1983 context a nondiscriminatory
state notice of claim statute). For a recent treatment of the undue burden test, see
Catherine T. Struve, Direct and Collateral Federal Court Review of the Adequacy of State
Procedural Rules, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 243, 264-76 (2003). On the issue of the extent to
which the state courts are bound in future proceedings by a holding that the state
procedural ground is inadequate, see Meltzer, supra, at 1150-52, 1202 n.370. Meltzer
argues that the state courts are bound as a matter of federal common law. Id. at 1158-85.
My inclination is to believe that in undue burden cases the basis for binding state courts is
preemption.
319. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
320. Id. at 454-55, 466; see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,114-15 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring); id. at 139-40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). "Note the detailed examination of
state law necessary to make such a determination." Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 555.
321. 534 U.S. 362 (2002). The Court reversed the lower federal courts on the denial
of habeas, which now effectively embodies the adequate nonfederal ground doctrine. For
a lengthy analysis of Kemna, see Struve, supra note 318, at 268-72, 285-86, 299-300.
322. Kemna, 534 U.S. at 376.
323. Id. at 382. The Court added that to require perfect compliance in these
circumstances would be "bizarre." The defendant's alibi witnesses had suddenly
disappeared during the trial, and Lee offered to prove that they had left the courtroom
because a court officer told them that their testimony would not be needed. "[I]nsistence
on a written continuance application, supported by an affidavit, 'in the midst of trial upon
the discovery that subpoenaed witnesses are suddenly absent, would be so bizarre as to
inject an Alice-in-Wonderland quality into the proceedings."' Id. at 383 (quoting Lee v.
Kemna, 213 F.3d 1037, 1047 (8th Cir. 2000) (Bennett, J., dissenting)). The Court also
emphasized that neither the trial judge nor the prosecutor had objected to the motion
because it did not comply with the rules, and the Court characterized the state appellate
court as having "injected" that issue into the case. Id. at 366.
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Some of these decisions could be rationalized in "fair support"
terms. But the scope of the Court's actual, careful examination of state
law is far more consistent with the independent judgment rule. 3 2 4
Another example, drawn from Eighth Amendment death penalty ju-
risprudence, is raised (but not closely examined) for consideration here.
Here is how Hart and Wechsler invite us to think about some of the
decisions:
Under prevailing doctrine, once a state has opted among a vari-
ety of constitutionally permissible schemes for imposition of
capital punishment, the Eighth Amendment can be seen as pro-
tecting a state-created liberty interest: state law defines when a
capital sentence is permitted, and the federal Constitution pro-
tects against capital punishment imposed other than in accor-
dance with the state's statutes.
Although the Court has not described the problem in these
terms, this approach may cast light on a number of difficult
cases.
32 5
Obviously, such a formulation of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
could require, inter alia, detailed examination of state law, when the
claim was that there had been an impermissible departure from prior
state law.
3 2 6
CONCLUSION
I have argued that issues concerning the characterization of state law
are for the Court's independent judgment pursuant to a federal stan-
dard, and that the Court also retains independent authority to review all
questions of law application and of adjudicative fact, save those governed
by the Due Process Clause and the Seventh Amendment.3 27 Given that
324. In Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 583 (1969), cited in Hart & Wechsler, supra
note 27, at 543 & n.3, the Court acknowledged that there was uncertainty over whether it
was exercising independent judgment on the issue of whether the federal claim had been
adequately raised. Cf. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 319-20 (1958) (rejecting a
state court procedural bar on fair support grounds but, I believe, in fact relying on
preemption grounds where the State rule invoked "arid ritual of meaningless form").
325. Hart & Wechsler, Fourth Edition, supra note 66, at 563 (citing Parker v. Dugger,
498 U.S. 308 (1991), as illustrative).
326. Other examples could be supplied but further detailed analysis would unduly
extend this Article. For example, in Gooding v. Wilson, the Court said, "We have ... made
our own examination of the Georgia cases," and then concluded that those cases had not
interpreted a Georgia statute consistently with the First Amendment. 405 U.S. 518, 524
(1972). Along a different dimension, it is also settled, for example, that the Court will
determine for itself the content of the law of F, when the question is whether F2 has
satisfied its obligations to give full faith and credit to the law of Fl. Adam v. Saenger, 303
U.S. 59, 64 (1938). While the Court used deference language, it seemed quite clearly to be
Skidmore deference, and it is unclear why the Supreme Court should accord any deference
to F2's exposition of Fl's law.
327. Earlier, I addressed the argument that the independent judgment rule with
respect to issues of state law is no longer warranted, if it were ever warranted. See supra
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authority, is it really important, as a matter of 'Judicial epistemology,"32"8
whether the ultimate scope of the Court's review over state-court determi-
nations of state law is framed in terms of independent judgment or fair
support?3 29 As Judge Posner recently put it: "[I]f there is a difference, is
it one within the cognitive capacity of a reviewing court to discern? For
we have remarked a number of times that there are limits to the fineness
of the distinctions thatjudges are able to make. '3 30 Speaking in the con-
text of the Contract Clause decisions, Herbert Wechsler asked, "Is it psy-
chologically possible for the Supreme Court to do any more than ask it-
self whether it clearly would have judged the issue differently, on the
available materials of decision, if it were the state's highest court?"
33
'
From a litigant's point of view, the distinction between independent
judgment and fair support review quite clearly matters. Like so many
other distinctions (e.g., law application versus fact), the distinction is a
fine one, and it operates only to identify points on a continuum.
3 2
Nonetheless, distinctions of this order are the only tools with which law-
yers have to work when framing the all important question of the scope of
appellate review. From the Court's point of view, however, the matter is
far less clear. The concurring and dissenting opinions in Bush v. Gore
illustrate that extensive review of state law can take place even under the
fair support umbrella. Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co.,33" the lead-
ing modern case articulating the "fair support" rule, is in fact a striking
illustration of intensive review of state law. At issue was a retroactivity
challenge to a New York statute allocating mortgage salvage proceeds be-
tween life tenants and remaindermen in wills or trusts. Rejecting a chal-
lenge that the statute impaired a vested right by changing the prior com-
mon law, the Court invoked the "fair support" standard. In the process
however, the Court engaged in an extensive survey of New York law. The
Part III.A.3. As I said, I do not find the argument persuasive, but I will not retrace that
discussion here.
328. Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.).
329. The question is especially troublesome because when the Court is convinced that
the outcome of the case turns importantly on the content of state law, it can in fact
undertake penetrating review of that law even under a fair support standard. ChiefJustice
Rehnquist's concurrence in Bush v. Gore is a potent illustration of that fact.
330. Reynolds, 296 F.3d at 527.
331. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal
System 467 (1953) (emphasis added). Wechsler returned to this formulation in Wechsler,
Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 24, at 1052. 1 have underscored "clearly." Wechsler can
of course be read to endorse the fair support rule. For me, however, "clearly"
acknowledges that Skidmore deference is an appropriate component of an independent
judgment rule. The quality of the state court opinion clearly matters, and any sensible
application of the independent judgment rule must take that into account. Some
significant perceptible countervailing pull from the state legal materials must exist before
the Court should reject the well-considered conclusions of the state supreme court on the
content of state law.
332. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 571-72; see also supra note 65; Monaghan,
Fact, supra note 26, at 233.
333. 321 U.S. 36 (1944).
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Court discussed the prior New York decisions, and quoted extensively
from a report of the Executive Committee of the Surrogates' Association
of the State of New York submitted to the legislature, and followed with
an extensive quote from an opinion of a surrogate judge.3 4 This discus-
sion drew a one-paragraph protest from Justice Douglas, with whom Jus-
tice Black concurred.3 35 Justice Douglas said that there was no claim that
"state law has been manipulated in evasion of a federal constitutional
right," and consequently, he could "see no possible claim to substantiality
of any federal question. 33 6
Moreover, even under the independentjudgment rule deference has
a place. A well-reasoned opinion of the highest state court is, in our con-
stitutional order not to be lightly discarded. Skidmore, which I have used
by analogy, is quite consistent with considerable deference. 33 7 In addi-
tion, as Judge Posner has observed, there is a basis in recent Supreme
Court decisions for a belief that any distinction between Skidmore and
Chevron has been elided. 338
Nonetheless, the distinction between the two standards should mat-
ter to the Court. One need not wallow in "poststructuralism" to acknowl-
edge the importance of "language and [of] language's underlying struc-
tures in shaping our understandings of reality and texts. '3 - The Justices
334. Id. at 43-47. For a recent example of penetrating review under an ostensibly
narrow standard of review (clear error), see Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001),
discussed in John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie: Are Racial Stereotypes Now
Acceptable Across the Board or Only W'hen Used in Support of Partisan Gerrymanders?,
56 U. Miami L. Rev. 489, 498 (2002) ("Indeed the very fact that the Court's decision was
five-four suggests that the error, if any, was something short of cleat, as does the fact that it
took Justice Breyer eleven closely reasoned and fact-intensive pages to defend the Court's
conclusion [reversing the three-judge district court].").
335. De'morest, 321 U.S. at 49 (Douglas, J., concurring).
336. Id. Earlier he wrote, "It is none of our business-whether we deem that
interpretation to be reasonable or unreasonable, sound or erroneous." Id.
337. See supra text accompanying note 221.
338. In Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., Judge Posner, over Judge Easterbrook's vigorous
dissent on the point, said that Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002), "the Supreme
Court's most recent decision interpreting Chevron, suggests a merger between Chevron
deference and Skidmore's." 314 F.3d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 2002). Judge Easterbrook stated,
"Agencies' interpretive role stems from delegation of authority, not raw ambiguity." Id. at
883 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Recent
decisions seem more concerned with whether the agency has given the matter
consideration at the right level rather than with a search for delegated authority. In Meyer
v. Holley, the Court, per Justice Breyer, said, "[W]e ordinarily defer to an administering
agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute." 123 S. Ct. 824, 830 (2003). The Court
cited both (and only) Chevron and Skidmore for this proposition. Justice Breyer was also the
author of Barnhart. See also Boeing Co. v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 1099, 1107 (2003)
(according deference to interpretive tax regulation); Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health
Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 123 S. Ct. 1017, 1026, 1028 (2003) (invoking
Chevron to sustain an administrative regulation and Skidmore to sustain other "reasoned"
administrative interpretation).
339. Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for
Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2505, 2514 (1992).
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should fully understand that there will be cases in which they can prop-
erly undertake an investigation of state law materials. The distinction
posited between independent judgment and fair support review should
condition the way they see the allowable scope of review. They are, to
borrow from Justice Frankfurter's language in Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB,340 at least "mood" points that give the Court "an attitudinal per-
spective on [its] work."'34 1 Moreover, Bush v. Gore itself shows that the
articulated standard can matter in a particular case. That regrettable by-
product of the concurring opinion suggests either stupidity or cupidity
on the part of the Florida Supreme Court majority. That effect would
have been significantly minimized had the independent judgment rule
been invoked, and the dissenting justices would have been forced to de-
cide not whether the Florida Supreme Court's construction of the Florida
election law was unreasonable, but whether it was basically correct.
One remaining question is whether any general criteria can be ar-
ticulated that would make deference review the operative working-day
premise of Supreme Court practice, reserving independent judgment for
exceptional occasions.3 42 On that point I am not sure. As matters cur-
rently stand, I would be inclined not to formulate criteria, but rather to
call for a case-by-case analysis based upon the Court's "sense of the situa-
tion," with a strong orientation towards the fair or substantial support
rule.
3 4 3
There is, however, one factor that seems to me tojustify independent
review, and that is the perceived importance of the issue in light of our
constitutional structure and tradition. Rule 10(c) of the Court's rules
lists as a factor in a decision to grant review whether an inferior court
"has decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but
340. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951).
341. Russell L. Weaver, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Christensen, Mead and Dual
Deference Standards, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 173, 179 (2002). Writing in the context of Chevron
and Skidmore, Professor Weaver argues that the decisions give insufficient guidance to the
lower courts. That issue is of no significance here.
342. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 541, ask, "Is there any reason why the scope of
review, on the question of the existence of an antecedent state-created entitlement, should
not be the same in all the various cases discussed ... ?" If the implicit suggestion is that the
standard of review should vary with the constitutional clause involved, I am unpersuaded.
In discussing guidelines for the Court's exercise of independent judgment with respect to
law application and adjudicative fact, I emphasized such considerations as: (1) whether
the area was one of evolving standards, and (2) whether there was any reason to distrust
the other actors in the legal system. Monaghan, Fact, supra note 26, at 271-76; see also
supra note 65. These factors are not readily transferable to this context. Distrust of the
state court may have been an invisible component of the concurring opinion in Bush v.
Gore. But that distrust could not be openly avowed. See supra text accompanying note
209. Moreover, any distrust of the Florida Supreme Court majority seems to be without
foundation-wrong, perhaps, but no more than that. Furthermore, the distrust which I
had in mind in Constitutional Fact Review was institutional in nature-for example,
censorship boards and, in certain contexts, juries.
343. 1 would not ordinarily expect to see independent judgment with respect to
antecedent state-law issues bearing upon federal statutory claims.
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should be, settled by this Court .... "344 "Importance," of course, cannot
be reduced to some kind of self-evident, self-applying formula. It reflects
intuitions and judgments, both conscious and unconscious, upon which
all courts routinely act.34 5 The "importance" criterion of Rule 10(c)
should be extended to the scope of review as well as the decision to grant
review. They seem closely linked. Tying independentjudgment scrutiny
to the structural importance of the issue is not open to a charge of unfair-
ness to the litigants. They, after all, have no right to be in the Court, and
they do not have any strong claim to a particular standard of review, so
long as the Court is not acting arbitrarily or motivated by partisan
concerns.
The exercise of discretion with respect to the standard of review
might, however, be thought inconsistent with the grant of 'Judicial
power" to the Supreme Court (and other Article III courts). While this is
not the occasion to examine that question in great detail, it is surely a fair
question. Over the course of time, however, the Court has fashioned lim-
its on the exercise of the judicial power that it could have exercised. This
is true for example with respect to the prudential components of the
standing and ripeness doctrines and the various abstention doctrines, 4 6
Similar practices have also obtained in the Supreme Court, even with re-
spect to its once ostensibly obligatoryjurisdiction over "appeals" under 28
U.S.C. § 1257.347 My general view is to treat this practice as far too em-
bedded to be thought invalid. My particular difficulty, however, is the
discretion that I posit may have a more ad hoc character to it than the
prudential doctrines to which I have pointed.3 48 Unlike Professor Bickel,
however, I do not see the discretion posited as one driven by a distaste for
certain substantive outcomes. 349
If "structural importance" is a valid criterion, intense scrutiny of the
state court's disposition of state law in Bush v. Gore seems to me fully war-
ranted. I disagree with Justice Breyer's statement that "[o]f course, the
selection of the President is of fundamental national importance. But
344. Sup. Ct. R. 10(c).
345. Examples are decisions to grant an expedited hearing or to enter extraordinary
relief.
346. For a very recent example, see National Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Department of
Interior, 123 S. Ct. 2026, 2032 (2003) (rejecting a suit for declaratory and equitable relief
on prudential ripeness grounds). The Court has also treated its jurisdiction over certified
questions under 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2000) as essentially discretionary. Hart & Wechsler,
supra note 27, at 1582.
347. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947), is the leading decision.
The third edition of Hart & Wechsler contains the most comprehensive general account.
See Paul M. Bator et al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System
735-48 (3d ed. 1988). The obligatory "appeals" jurisdiction was eliminated in 1988. See
supra note 213.
348. Cf. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2443
(2003) (stating that the absurdity doctrine cannot be defended as a background principle
of construction because of its ad hoc character).
349. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (2d ed. 1986).
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that importance is political, not legal. '350 In our law-centered legal con-
stitutional order,3 51 I can think of few legal issues of more importance
than whether the president was lawfully elected.352 In a system in which
election depends on electoral, not popular, votes, whether Florida con-
ducted its election in accordance with the strictures of Article II is an
issue in which all Americans have an interest. That issue should be finally
decided by the highest national court.353
350. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 153 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Immediately
following comes a mystifying sentence: "And this Court should resist the temptation
unnecessarily to resolve tangential legal disputes, where doing so threatens to determine the
outcome of the election." Id. (emphasis added).
351. This assumes with the Court and the concurrence that the validity of a
presidential election presents a judicially cognizable constitutional issue. There are, as I
have noted, those who think that the specific issue of presidential elections under Article
II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the Constitution was left to Congress to determine. That is not
my inclination, and it would require overruling McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892),
see supra note 46, but that would be another consideration of that topic. In any event, I do
not see how one would conclude that Congress would determine whether or not the Equal
Protection Clause had been violated, as the per curiam opinion holds.
352. "The President is vested with the executive power of the nation. The importance
of his election and the vital character of its relationship to and effect upon the welfare and
safety of the whole people cannot be too strongly stated." Burroughs v. United States, 290
U.S. 534, 545 (1934).
353. Contrast Carrington & Powell, supra note 5, at 11, who argue that it would be a
valuable civics lesson if the Court had declined jurisdiction and thereby dramatically
demonstrated to the American public the limited nature of the Court's job. I disagree. A
valuable civics lesson was taught: If presidential elections are governed by legal rules, the
highest court must ensure compliance with those rules.
